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  The	  radical	  socialist	  period	  of	  China	  (1949-­‐1978)	  marked	  three	  decades	  of	  dramatic	  transformation	  of	  the	  country.	  China	  underwent	  rapid	  industrialization	  (the	  First	  Five	  Year	  Plan)	  and	  the	  Great	  Leap	  Forward,	  one	  of	  the	  biggest	  famines	  in	  human	  history,	  a	  striking	  reversal	  of	  industrialization	  (the	  Cultural	  Revolution),	  and	  the	  market	  reforms	  of	  1978.	  Scholars	  of	  Chinese	  history	  and	  economy	  have	  treated	  China	  before	  and	  after	  1978	  as	  two	  distinct	  periods.	  The	  opening	  and	  reform	  of	  1978	  was	  usually	  presented	  as	  a	  distinctive	  break	  from	  the	  country’s	  socialist	  years.	  In	  contemporary	  discourse	  on	  China,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  relate	  the	  fast-­‐growing,	  now	  the	  world’s	  largest	  economy,	  to	  a	  socialist	  country	  that	  was	  marred	  by	  the	  craze	  of	  personality	  cult	  just	  fifty	  years	  ago.	  Nevertheless,	  this	  thesis	  examines	  the	  continuities	  of	  China’s	  business	  history	  from	  the	  country’s	  radical	  socialist	  years	  to	  its	  more	  recent	  market	  reforms.	  It	  uncovers	  the	  transformation	  of	  major	  business	  models	  that	  developed	  in	  the	  Chinese	  economy	  starting	  from	  the	  Great	  Leap	  Forward,	  as	  the	  country	  first	  underwent	  rapid	  industrialization,	  to	  the	  opening	  and	  reform	  in	  1978,	  when	  the	  country	  entered	  into	  a	  new	  era	  of	  high-­‐speed	  growth.	  	  The	  Great	  Leap	  Forward(GLF)	  has	  usually	  been	  presented	  as	  a	  great	  catastrophe	  in	  the	  human	  history,	  resulting	  in	  the	  loss	  of	  millions	  of	  human	  lives	  in	  the	  famine	  following	  the	  movement.	  For	  example,	  the	  Chinese	  historian	  Yang	  Jisheng	  estimated	  the	  total	  death	  toll	  of	  the	  GLF	  to	  be	  36	  million,	  resulting	  from	  the	  mandatory	  agricultural	  collectivization	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and	  the	  installment	  of	  communal	  kitchens	  in	  the	  countryside.1	  Frank	  Dïkotter	  has	  given	  a	  higher	  estimate,	  pointing	  that	  the	  total	  death	  toll	  may	  have	  been	  as	  high	  as	  45	  million.2	  The	  famine	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  common	  images	  associated	  with	  the	  GLF.	  Another	  theme	  that	  was	  usually	  associated	  with	  the	  GLF	  was	  the	  obsession	  with	  iron	  and	  steel	  production,	  or	  the	  establishment	  of	  millions	  of	  “backyard	  steel	  furnaces”	  all	  over	  the	  country.	  It	  was	  reported	  that	  in	  the	  heyday	  of	  the	  GLF,	  more	  than	  50	  million	  people	  participated	  in	  the	  iron	  and	  steel	  campaign	  and	  another	  50	  million	  worked	  in	  supporting	  functions.3	  Slogans	  during	  the	  steel	  mania	  centered	  on	  unrealistic	  goals	  in	  steel	  production,	  including	  the	  call	  to	  ”overtake	  Britain	  in	  iron	  and	  steel	  and	  other	  major	  industrial	  products	  in	  fifteen	  years”.4	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  people’s	  communes	  and	  the	  steel	  mania	  that	  were	  most	  commonly	  associated	  with	  the	  GLF,	  most	  scholars	  have	  agreed	  that	  the	  movement	  was	  a	  full-­‐fledged,	  man-­‐made	  disaster,	  whether	  in	  terms	  of	  agricultural	  production,	  industrial	  output,	  or	  the	  cost	  of	  human	  lives.	  James	  C.	  Scott	  identified	  the	  GLF	  as	  one	  of	  the	  “great	  human	  tragedies	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  in	  terms	  of	  both	  lives	  lost	  and	  lives	  irretrievably	  disrupted”.5	  	  The	  GLF	  was,	  beyond	  doubt,	  a	  man-­‐made	  catastrophe.	  However,	  most	  historians	  have	  overlooked	  important	  business	  decisions	  made	  by	  Chinese	  economic	  actors	  during	  the	  movement.	  The	  proliferation	  of	  “backyard	  steel	  furnaces”	  seemed	  to	  result	  from	  a	  purely	  irrational,	  and	  ideological	  commitment	  to	  industrialize	  the	  country	  at	  an	  unrealistic	  pace.	  These	  were	  small-­‐scale	  and	  local	  production	  units	  that	  integrated	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Yang	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  the	  Great	  Chinese	  Famine,	  trans.	  Stacy	  Mosher	  and	  Guo	  Jian	  (New	  York	  :	  Farrar,	  Straus	  and	  Giroux,	  2012),	  3-­‐22. 2	  Frank	  Dïkotter,	  preface	  to	  Mao's	  great	  famine	  :	  the	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  of	  China's	  Most	  Devastating	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  2010),	  x.	  3	  Alfred	  L.	  Chan,	  Mao's	  Crusade	  :	  Politics	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  Implementation	  in	  China's	  Great	  Leap	  Forward	  (Oxford	  ;	  New	  York	  :	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2001),	  185. 4	  Carl	  Riskin,	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  University	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  James	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  Improve	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Failed	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production	  of	  iron	  and	  steel.	  They	  were	  also	  rational	  response	  to	  a	  real	  challenge	  that	  the	  country	  was	  running	  into—that	  of	  broad	  front	  development.	  This	  is	  a	  classical	  challenge	  faced	  by	  many	  economies	  at	  the	  initial	  stage	  of	  industrialization.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  China,	  the	  challenge	  was	  particularly	  relevant	  because	  the	  economic	  actors	  attempted	  to	  industrialize	  the	  country	  at	  an	  unprecedented	  pace.	  Gerschenkron	  first	  used	  the	  term	  in	  his	  essay	  on	  economic	  backwardness	  in	  1966,	  in	  which	  he	  wrote:	  “As	  likely	  as	  not	  the	  period	  of	  stagnation	  …	  	  can	  be	  terminated	  and	  industrialization	  processes	  begun	  only	  if	  the	  industrialization	  movement	  can	  proceed,	  as	  it	  were,	  along	  a	  broad	  front,	  starting	  simultaneously	  along	  many	  lines	  of	  economic	  activities.”6	  He	  described	  the	  challenge	  on	  a	  macro	  scale—various	  industries	  of	  an	  economy	  had	  to	  move	  forward	  at	  the	  same	  pace	  for	  industrialization	  to	  unfold	  in	  a	  country.	  Chinese	  economic	  actors,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  were	  presented	  with	  the	  same	  challenge	  on	  a	  micro	  scale—individual	  factories,	  with	  incomplete	  supply	  chains	  in	  a	  underdeveloped	  economy,	  needed	  to	  produce	  finished	  goods	  so	  that	  the	  country	  could	  industrialize.	  The	  “backyard	  steel	  furnaces”	  were	  a	  subset	  of	  a	  more	  general	  business	  model	  that	  was	  prevalent	  in	  the	  Chinese	  economy	  at	  that	  time—that	  of	  complete	  factories.	  In	  order	  to	  produce	  steel	  with	  an	  unreliable	  or	  insufficient	  supply	  of	  pig	  iron	  in	  the	  economy,	  the	  “homemade”	  furnaces	  dealt	  with	  this	  bottleneck	  by	  making	  iron	  on	  their	  own.	  For	  a	  complete	  factory	  in	  any	  industry,	  presented	  with	  the	  challenge	  of	  gaps	  in	  supply	  chains,	  it	  sought	  to	  manufacture	  raw	  materials	  and	  intermediate	  goods	  for	  itself.	  	  Complete	  factories	  were	  originally	  developed	  in	  the	  machine-­‐building	  industry	  as	  makeshift	  solutions	  to	  the	  bottlenecks	  of	  machine	  tool	  making.	  However,	  soon	  the	  logic	  of	  making	  use	  of	  all	  equipment	  capacities	  led	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  multiple	  product	  lines	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Alexander	  Gerschenkron,	  “Economic	  Backwardness	  in	  Historical	  Perspective,”	  in	  Economic	  
Backwardness	  in	  Historical	  Perspective	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  Belknap	  Press,	  1966),	  10.	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diversification.	  They	  were	  originally	  created	  as	  makeshift	  solutions	  to	  complete	  gaps	  in	  the	  supply	  chains	  of	  local	  factories.	  With	  the	  proliferation	  of	  this	  model,	  the	  necessity	  of	  internalizing	  diverse	  production	  capabilities	  within	  one,	  self-­‐contained	  factory	  was	  turned	  into	  a	  virtue.	  	  Complete	  factories	  began	  using	  their	  internalized	  capabilities	  to	  produce	  a	  diverse	  range	  of	  parts	  and	  semi-­‐finished	  materials	  for	  external	  use,	  supplying	  not	  only	  their	  own	  needs	  but	  those	  of	  other	  factories.	  Diversification	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  another	  solution	  to	  the	  challenge	  of	  broad	  front	  development—instead	  of	  calling	  for	  more	  specialized	  enterprises	  to	  fill	  in	  the	  gaps	  of	  incomplete	  supply	  chains,	  Chinese	  policy	  makers	  advocated	  for	  greater	  diversification	  and	  believed	  that	  the	  diversified	  enterprises	  would	  be	  able	  to	  address	  the	  challenge.	  	  They	  soon	  realized	  that	  the	  complete	  and	  diversified	  enterprises	  could	  not	  serve	  China	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  With	  the	  proliferation	  of	  small,	  self-­‐sufficient	  factories,	  the	  flaws	  of	  the	  previous	  business	  model	  began	  to	  emerge.	  One	  of	  the	  major	  flaw	  of	  complete	  factories	  was	  the	  redundancy	  of	  underutilized	  capacities.	  For	  example,	  if	  every	  machine-­‐building	  factory	  in	  the	  economy	  were	  to	  have	  a	  forging	  and	  casting	  workshop,	  none	  of	  these	  workshops	  would	  be	  in	  use	  full-­‐time	  during	  the	  day	  and	  it	  was	  a	  serious	  waste	  of	  labor	  and	  resources.	  As	  the	  Chinese	  economy	  industrialized	  and	  was	  required	  to	  create	  more	  sophisticated	  machinery,	  the	  flaws	  of	  the	  complete	  factory	  model	  soon	  outweighed	  its	  benefits.	  Therefore,	  starting	  from	  the	  early	  1960s	  to	  mid-­‐1960s,	  right	  before	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  Cultural	  Revolution,	  the	  model	  of	  	  complete	  factories	  and	  diversification	  was	  dismantled,	  and	  what	  was	  known	  as	  the	  Specialization	  and	  Coordination	  Movement	  started	  to	  unfold.	  This	  movement	  called	  for	  big	  and	  medium-­‐sized	  complete	  factories	  to	  be	  broken	  down	  into	  smaller	  specialized	  enterprises.	  With	  higher	  level	  of	  specialization,	  enterprises	  were	  then	  able	  to	  mass	  produce	  and	  benefit	  from	  economies	  of	  scale.	  With	  expansion	  of	  production	  capacities,	  specialized	  factories	  could	  produce	  raw	  materials,	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intermediate	  goods,	  machine	  parts,	  and	  components	  at	  a	  lower	  cost.	  In	  addition,	  as	  they	  started	  to	  specialize,	  they	  could	  exert	  more	  rigorous	  quality	  control	  and	  make	  high-­‐quality	  products.	  	  More	  specialized	  factories	  required	  a	  corresponding	  level	  of	  coordination	  in	  the	  economy.	  The	  more	  specialized	  an	  economy	  became,	  the	  more	  factories	  depended	  on	  each	  other	  for	  the	  manufacturing	  of	  finished	  products.	  The	  need	  for	  coordination	  was	  highlighted	  by	  Chinese	  economic	  critics	  and	  commentators	  as	  well	  during	  the	  Specialization	  and	  Coordination	  Movement.	  However,	  the	  case	  for	  coordination	  was	  not	  easily	  made	  in	  a	  socialist	  economy,	  where	  central	  planning	  was	  the	  dominant	  way	  to	  channel	  resources	  among	  enterprises.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  in	  a	  planned	  economy	  like	  China,	  users	  and	  producers	  of	  a	  product	  could	  not	  communicate	  with	  each	  other	  directly.	  Therefore,	  the	  need	  for	  coordination	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  more	  complicated	  than	  what	  would	  take	  place	  in	  a	  market	  economy,	  in	  which	  users	  and	  producers	  could	  coordinate	  with	  each	  other	  through	  market	  mechanisms.	  	  Starting	  from	  the	  end	  of	  mid-­‐1960s,	  economic	  commentators	  and	  critics	  started	  to	  explore	  the	  possibility	  of	  getting	  around	  national	  planning	  	  and	  calling	  for	  greater	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination.	  They	  came	  to	  realize	  that	  one	  of	  the	  greatest	  impediments	  to	  the	  Specialization	  and	  Coordination	  Movement	  was	  the	  national	  plan,	  which	  was	  unable	  to	  accommodate	  the	  needs	  of	  individual	  factories.	  Therefore,	  they	  brought	  up	  the	  ideas	  of	  fairs	  and	  contracts.	  Sometimes	  referred	  to	  as	  “coordination	  conferences”,	  these	  fairs	  were	  events	  set	  up	  by	  local	  and	  provincial	  governments	  that	  brought	  together	  different	  factories,	  which	  were	  usually	  users	  and	  producers	  of	  specific	  products.	  In	  these	  government-­‐led	  fairs,	  factories	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  communicate	  with	  each	  other	  to	  specify	  their	  individual	  needs.	  In	  addition,	  participants	  of	  the	  coordination	  conferences	  were	  encouraged	  to	  sign	  contracts	  on	  the	  spot.	  The	  idea	  of	  “contract”	  was	  one	  that	  was	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repeatedly	  brought	  up	  by	  Chinese	  economic	  writers	  during	  the	  Specialization	  and	  Coordination	  Movement.	  Contracts	  facilitated	  and	  upheld	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination,	  which	  was	  previously	  not	  recognized	  by	  the	  national	  plan.	  With	  contractual	  coordination	  in	  place,	  factories	  were	  able	  to	  secure	  long-­‐term	  suppliers	  or	  buyers	  of	  their	  products.	  	  The	  movement,	  however,	  came	  to	  an	  abrupt	  end	  once	  the	  Cultural	  Revolution	  started.	  Dismissed	  as	  capitalist	  practices,	  the	  call	  for	  greater	  specialization	  and	  coordination	  was	  dismantled,	  and	  Chinese	  factories	  came	  back	  to	  the	  older	  model	  of	  complete	  factories.	  The	  principle	  of	  self-­‐sufficiency	  was	  again	  touted,	  more	  as	  an	  ideological	  commitment	  under	  a	  socialist	  economy	  than	  an	  economic	  convenience	  or	  expediency.	  During	  the	  Cultural	  Revolution,	  many	  specialized	  factories	  were	  consolidated	  into	  complete	  factories,	  and	  the	  older	  model	  of	  complete	  factories	  was	  revived.	  	  Following	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Gang	  of	  Four	  and	  the	  end	  of	  Cultural	  Revolution,	  Chinese	  economic	  actors	  were	  presented	  with	  the	  same	  challenge	  that	  they	  faced	  decades	  ago	  during	  the	  Great	  Leap	  Forward.	  In	  response	  to	  the	  challenge	  of	  broad	  front	  development,	  writers	  revived	  the	  Specialization	  and	  Coordination	  Movement.	  Enterprises	  were	  encouraged	  to	  specialize,	  and	  greater	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  was	  promoted.	  In	  addition,	  writers	  came	  up	  with	  new	  terms,	  such	  as	  “horizontal	  economic	  relationships”	  and	  “horizontal	  economic	  integration”,	  to	  describe	  contractual	  coordination,	  but	  the	  same	  basic	  principles	  that	  emerged	  in	  1960s	  were	  reintroduced.	  More	  importantly,	  with	  the	  opening	  and	  reform	  of	  1978,	  the	  topic	  of	  market	  was	  no	  longer	  a	  taboo.	  Writers	  started	  to	  talk	  openly	  about	  the	  use	  of	  market	  in	  a	  socialist	  economy.	  In	  fact,	  the	  concept	  of	  contractual	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  led	  nicely	  into	  the	  discussion	  on	  market	  coordination.	  Chinese	  economic	  thinkers	  came	  to	  realize	  that	  market	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  the	  ideal	  set-­‐up	  for	  specialized	  factories	  to	  coordinate	  with	  each	  other.	  The	  discussions	  about	  markets	  were,	  therefore,	  direct	  outgrowths	  of	  challenges	  that	  had	  already	  been	  explored	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in	  1960s,	  and	  even	  back	  to	  the	  complete	  factor	  model	  during	  the	  GLF,	  which	  had	  emerged	  as	  solutions	  to	  problems	  of	  broad	  front	  development.	  Market	  coordination	  was	  not	  a	  brand	  new	  solution	  that	  emerged	  out	  of	  nowhere.	  It	  was	  a	  continuation	  of	  a	  series	  of	  efforts,	  solutions,	  and	  reforms	  that	  Chinese	  economic	  actors	  had	  been	  grappling	  with	  since	  the	  start	  of	  the	  country’s	  industrialization	  process.	  	  





The	  Great	  Leap	  Forward	  (1958-­‐1961)	  and	  the	  Complete	  Factory	  Model	  
	  	   During	  the	  Great	  Leap	  Forward,	  Chinese	  state	  planners	  and	  economic	  actors	  were	  presented	  with	  the	  challenge	  of	  industrializing	  the	  country	  at	  an	  unprecedented	  pace.	  Although	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  provided	  extensive	  aid	  to	  China	  to	  help	  establish	  156	  large-­‐scale,	  modern	  enterprises	  during	  the	  First	  Five-­‐Year	  Plan,	  these	  large	  enterprises	  alone	  could	  not	  bring	  about	  industrialization	  on	  a	  national	  scale.	  In	  light	  of	  the	  limited	  capacity	  of	  large,	  modern	  enterprises	  in	  China,	  the	  state	  planners	  came	  up	  with	  the	  slogan	  “Walking	  on	  Two	  Legs”	  and	  advocated	  for	  small-­‐scale,	  local	  factories	  as	  an	  important	  force	  for	  industrialization.	  The	  slogan	  “Walking	  on	  Two	  Legs”	  indicated	  that	  “both	  relatively	  capital-­‐intensive,	  large-­‐scale,	  modern	  production	  units,	  and	  relatively	  labor-­‐intensive,	  small-­‐scale,	  and	  technologically	  backward	  ones	  were	  to	  develop	  simultaneously.”1	  Chinese	  state	  planners	  were	  aware	  of	  the	  long	  time	  span	  in	  building	  from	  scratch	  large,	  vertically	  integrated,	  modern	  enterprises	  in	  China.	  Therefore,	  small,	  local	  factories	  that	  could	  make	  ready	  use	  of	  local	  resources	  and	  labor	  became	  a	  desirable	  solution	  to	  the	  need	  for	  rapid	  industrialization.	  The	  slogan	  called	  for	  simultaneous	  development	  of	  both	  legs—the	  state	  would	  invest	  resources	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  large,	  modern	  enterprises	  that	  would	  serve	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Carl	  Riskin,	  China's	  political	  economy	  :	  the	  quest	  for	  development	  since	  1949	  (New	  York	  :	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1987),	  117.	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as	  the	  vanguard	  of	  the	  country’s	  industrialization;	  in	  the	  meantime,	  provincial	  and	  local	  governments	  would	  encourage	  existing	  local	  factories	  to	  industrialize	  as	  well.	  	  A	  People’s	  Daily	  editorial	  in	  1960	  articulated	  the	  logic	  behind	  “Walking	  on	  Two	  Legs”:	   On	  the	  one	  hand,	  we	  must	  develop	  a	  large-­‐scale	  petroleum	  industry.	  These	  factories	  could	  make	  use	  of	  innovative	  technology,	  have	  high-­‐yields,	  offer	  products	  of	  high-­‐quality	  and	  great	  variety.	  However,	  to	  establish	  a	  modern,	  large-­‐scale	  petroleum	  factory	  it	  requires	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  steel,	  complicated	  equipment,	  large	  initial	  investment	  and	  a	  long	  time	  span.	  If	  we	  were	  to	  satisfy	  the	  needs	  for	  petroleum	  within	  a	  limited	  amount	  of	  time	  only	  through	  the	  development	  of	  large	  enterprises,	  relying	  only	  on	  the	  “foreign	  leg”	  of	  our	  economy,	  the	  speed	  and	  scope	  of	  development	  would	  be	  severely	  limited.	  Therefore,	  we	  must	  make	  full	  use	  of	  all	  available	  resources	  by	  establishing	  small,	  local	  petroleum	  factories.	  We	  must	  continue	  with	  the	  principle	  of	  combining	  both	  foreign	  and	  local	  methods	  and	  build	  factories	  on	  large,	  medium	  and	  small	  scales,	  in	  order	  to	  rapidly	  increase	  our	  petroleum	  production.2	  	  	  The	  author	  of	  the	  editorial	  specifically	  addressed	  the	  petroleum	  industry,	  but	  the	  same	  logic	  could	  be	  applied	  to	  all	  industries	  during	  the	  Great	  Leap	  Forward	  as	  well.	  He	  highlighted	  the	  necessity	  of	  building	  small	  and	  medium	  petroleum	  factories	  due	  to	  the	  significant	  initial	  investment	  and	  long	  time	  span	  of	  building	  modern,	  large-­‐scale	  petroleum	  enterprises.	  Therefore,	  the	  logic	  behind	  “Walking	  on	  Two	  Legs”	  was	  that	  small,	  local	  factories	  would	  develop	  simultaneously	  with	  large,	  moden	  enterprises	  so	  as	  to	  increase	  the	  pace	  and	  scope	  of	  industrialization.	  	  	   However,	  as	  local	  factories	  sought	  to	  undertake	  their	  part	  of	  the	  industrialization	  mission,	  they	  ran	  into	  the	  problem	  of	  “broad	  front	  development”—a	  classical	  challenge	  faced	  by	  many	  economies	  at	  the	  initial	  stage	  of	  industrialization.	  Gerschenkron	  described	  the	  challenge	  of	  broad	  front	  development	  on	  a	  macro	  scale.	  The	  Chinese	  state	  planners	  were	  keenly	  aware	  of	  this	  challenge.	  For	  example,	  during	  the	  height	  of	  the	  First	  Five-­‐Year	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  “Daban	  zhongxiaoxing	  shiyou	  gongchang,”	  Renmin	  ribao,	  January	  19,	  1960.	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Plan	  in	  1956,	  the	  economic	  writer	  Sun	  Yang	  used	  the	  example	  of	  No.1	  Automobile	  Factory	  to	  illustrate	  how	  the	  challenge	  of	  broad	  front	  development	  unfolded	  in	  the	  Chinese	  economy	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  individual	  enterprise:	  To	  make	  an	  automobile,	  it	  is	  insufficient	  to	  make	  the	  body	  and	  generator	  out	  of	  steel	  and	  make	  wheels	  out	  of	  rubber,	  because	  an	  automobile	  requires	  glass	  for	  windows,	  textile	  to	  make	  seat	  mats,	  paper	  to	  make	  washers,	  and	  spray	  paint	  to	  paint	  the	  body.	  In	  addition,	  we	  need	  specific	  factories	  to	  make	  an	  automobile’s	  meters,	  springs	  and	  various	  accessories	  and	  components.	  The	  more	  modern	  a	  large	  automobile	  factory	  is,	  the	  more	  factories	  it	  needs	  to	  supply	  its	  production	  process.	  For	  example,	  the	  No.1	  Automobile	  Factory	  we	  are	  currently	  building	  requires	  dozens	  of	  factories	  to	  coordinate	  with	  its	  production.3	  	  Sun	  elaborated	  on	  the	  challenge	  	  of	  broad	  front	  development	  on	  a	  micro	  scale,	  how	  an	  individual	  enterprise	  would	  require	  various	  suppliers	  of	  raw	  materials	  or	  intermediate	  goods	  in	  the	  making	  of	  finished	  products	  such	  as	  automobiles.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Gerschenkron	  pointed	  out	  that	  for	  a	  rapidly	  developing	  economy,	  various	  industries	  or	  sectors	  of	  the	  country’s	  economy	  must	  develop	  simultaneously	  for	  industrialization	  to	  move	  forward.	  	  This	  chapter	  explores	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  small,	  indigenous	  factories	  initially	  tackled	  the	  challenge	  of	  broad	  front	  development.,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  business	  models	  they	  turned	  to	  and	  the	  solutions	  they	  came	  up	  with.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  small	  factories	  constituted	  one	  of	  the	  “legs”	  advocated	  by	  Chinese	  planners,	  and	  can	  arguably	  be	  considered	  as	  the	  major	  undertakers	  of	  the	  country’s	  industrialization.	  	  The	  challenge	  of	  broad	  front	  development	  unfolded	  in	  particular	  ways	  on	  the	  enterprise	  level.	  	  When	  local	  factories	  started	  to	  produce	  complicated	  and	  technologically	  advanced	  products,	  they	  did	  not	  have	  adequate	  supplies	  of	  semi-­‐finished	  goods	  or	  machine	  tools	  due	  to	  the	  absence	  of	  specialized	  enterprises	  in	  the	  economy.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  individual	  enterprises	  needed	  to	  address	  gaps	  in	  their	  supply	  chains	  on	  their	  own.	  	  The	  initial	  solution	  came	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  particular	  business	  paradigm	  advocated	  by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Sun	  Yang,	  Woguo	  wunianjihua	  de	  gushi	  (Beijing:	  Zhongguo	  qingnian	  chubanshe,	  1956),	  28. 
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Chinese	  economic	  policy	  makers:	  the	  model	  of	  "small	  and	  complete"	  (xiao	  er	  quan)	  factories.	  	  These	  small	  factories	  started	  to	  integrate	  backwards	  and	  internalize	  supply	  chains	  on	  their	  own.	  Since	  they	  were	  unable	  to	  have	  adequate	  supplies	  of	  the	  desired	  goods	  through	  other	  specialized	  factories,	  local	  factories	  chose	  to	  become	  self-­‐sufficient	  in	  meeting	  their	  own	  needs.	  	  Self-­‐sufficiency	  also	  served	  as	  a	  response	  to	  another	  challenge	  that	  aggravated	  incomplete	  supply	  chains:	  poor	  transportation	  infrastructure.	  Due	  to	  high	  costs	  of	  transportation,	  factories	  tended	  to	  produce	  everything	  in-­‐house	  to	  reduce	  these	  costs.	  	   The	  emergence	  of	  complete,	  self-­‐sufficient	  factories	  during	  the	  Great	  Leap	  Forward	  has	  been	  discussed	  by	  other	  historians	  as	  well.	  For	  example,	  Chu-­‐Yuan	  Cheng	  highlighted	  the	  prevalence	  of	  self-­‐sufficiency	  among	  many	  factories	  in	  the	  1950s:	  	  From	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  First	  Five-­‐Year	  Plan,	  almost	  all	  the	  new	  or	  expanded	  plants	  took	  self-­‐sufficiency	  as	  their	  basic	  goal.	  They	  undertook	  not	  only	  the	  production	  of	  machinery	  but	  also	  all	  kinds	  of	  ancillary	  operations	  and	  services	  which	  in	  a	  more	  advanced	  economy	  would	  be	  contracted	  out	  to	  other	  plants.	  As	  a	  result,	  there	  were	  hundreds	  of	  what	  they	  called	  ‘omnipotent’	  plants	  and	  thousands	  of	  small	  ‘complete’	  plants.5	  	  Cheng	  noted	  that	  one	  of	  the	  major	  features	  of	  complete	  factories	  was	  the	  internalization	  of	  supply	  chains.	  For	  example,	  an	  automobile	  factory	  that	  followed	  the	  complete	  factory	  model	  would	  not	  only	  produce	  most	  of	  the	  components	  and	  machine	  parts	  in-­‐house,	  but	  would	  also	  be	  in	  charge	  of	  providing	  repairing	  and	  other	  auxiliary	  services	  on	  its	  own.	  Cheng	  also	  pointed	  out	  that	  in	  a	  more	  advanced	  economy,	  where	  conditions	  for	  specialization	  were	  favorable,	  factories	  tended	  to	  outsource	  many	  of	  the	  in-­‐house	  operations	  to	  other	  specialized	  enterprises.	  Riskin	  also	  observed	  the	  prevalence	  of	  complete	  factories	  in	  the	  Chinese	  economy	  during	  the	  GLF:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Cheng	  Chu-­‐yüan,	  The	  Machine-­‐Building	  Industry	  in	  Communist	  China	  (Chicago:	  Aldine-­‐Atherton,	  1971),	  148-­‐149.	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In	  factories,	  self-­‐reliance	  gave	  rise	  to	  the	  “comprehensive”	  production	  unit	  that	  made	  for	  itself	  a	  large	  part	  of	  the	  materials	  and	  intermediate	  goods	  needed	  to	  turn	  out	  its	  main	  production	  line.	  Now	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  division	  of	  labour	  to	  be	  carried	  out	  in	  a	  large,	  integrated	  enterprise	  which	  is	  broken	  down	  into	  specialized	  production	  units.	  To	  some	  degree,	  larger	  Chinese	  enterprises	  functioned	  in	  this	  way,	  and	  it	  is	  unclear	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  efficiencies	  of	  specialization	  were	  sacrificed	  in	  such	  enterprises.	  However,	  ‘completeness’	  often	  meant	  that	  enterprises	  maintained	  general	  machine	  shops	  that	  turned	  out	  the	  odd	  pieces	  of	  equipment	  needed	  for	  expansion	  or	  technical	  renovation.	  Such	  “completeness”	  was	  purchased	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  some	  inefficiency.6	  	  Riskin	  used	  the	  term	  “comprehensive	  production	  units”,	  which	  was	  equivalent	  to	  the	  model	  of	  complete	  factories—these	  local	  enterprises	  chose	  to	  integrate	  backwards	  by	  producing	  a	  large	  part	  of	  the	  materials	  or	  intermediate	  goods	  needed	  on	  their	  own.	  He	  noted	  that	  the	  benefits	  of	  specialization	  might	  be	  achieved	  in	  a	  large	  complete	  enterprise.	  However,	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  complete	  factories	  that	  emerged	  during	  the	  GLF	  were	  xiao	  er	  
quan	  (small	  and	  complete)	  enterprises	  or	  production	  units	  that	  closely	  followed	  the	  principle	  of	  self-­‐sufficiency.	  	   Cheng	  and	  Riskin	  gave	  different	  reasons	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  complete	  factories	  during	  the	  Great	  Leap	  Forward.	  Cheng,	  for	  example,	  believed	  that	  their	  emergence	  was	  a	  result	  of	  historical	  legacies	  from	  pre-­‐1949	  period:	  when	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	  took	  over	  plants	  left	  over	  from	  pre-­‐1949	  period,	  they	  were	  built	  by	  various	  foreign	  countries	  with	  no	  uniform	  standardization	  of	  parts	  or	  components.	  Therefore,	  most	  large	  plants	  chose	  to	  be	  self-­‐sufficient	  due	  to	  the	  “uncertainties	  in	  the	  supply	  of	  parts	  and	  services	  from	  other	  plants.”7	  Another	  historian,	  Carl	  Riskin,	  believed	  that	  complete	  factories	  were	  an	  administrative	  intervention	  that	  served	  to	  block	  the	  natural	  progression	  of	  specialization.	  	  He	  pointed	  out	  that	  conditions	  for	  specialization	  were	  not	  available	  as	  a	  country	  first	  started	  to	  industrialize:	  “It	  is	  arguable	  that,	  when	  countries	  were	  first	  setting	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Riskin,	  China’s	  Political	  Economy,	  218.	  7	  Cheng,	  The	  machine-­‐building	  industry	  in	  Communist	  China,	  149.	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up	  factories,	  neither	  demand	  nor	  supply	  conditions	  permitted	  extensive	  specialization	  among	  the	  factories,	  but	  that,	  as	  industry	  developed	  and	  factories	  spread	  throughout	  the	  country-­‐side,	  greater	  division	  of	  labour	  among	  them	  became	  desirable.	  Whatever	  economic	  conditions	  in	  the	  abstract	  may	  have	  dictated,	  however,	  institutional	  and	  administrative	  considerations	  intervened.”8	  The	  intervention	  mentioned	  by	  Riskin	  came	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  particular	  business	  model	  advocated	  by	  Chinese	  economic	  policy-­‐makers:	  the	  model	  of	  “small	  and	  complete”	  factories.	  Riskin	  seems	  to	  imply	  that	  all	  other	  things	  being	  equal,	  Chinese	  industry	  would	  have	  specialized.	  	  	  Instead,	  administrative	  intervention	  produced	  small-­‐scale	  complete	  factories.	  	  Implicitly,	  in	  his	  view,	  the	  small	  complete	  factory	  was	  not	  a	  solution,	  but	  a	  major	  administrative	  blunder,	  an	  intervention	  to	  prevented	  the	  "natural"	  course	  of	  development.	  	  This	  thesis,	  however,	  takes	  a	  different	  approach	  and	  argues	  that	  complete	  factories	  served	  as	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  challenge	  of	  broad	  front	  development.	  Moreover,	  Riskin	  believed	  that	  the	  central	  planning	  apparatus	  played	  a	  part	  in	  the	  advancement	  of	  the	  complete	  factory	  model.	  He	  argued	  that	  “Comprehensive	  enterprises,	  then,	  were	  not	  so	  much	  desirable	  in	  and	  of	  themselves,	  but	  rather	  were	  the	  only	  possible	  way	  to	  organize	  production	  with	  no	  market	  and	  only	  skeletal	  planning.”9	  Under	  the	  central	  planning	  system,	  local	  enterprises	  were	  required	  to	  meet	  certain	  production	  targets,	  without	  the	  necessary	  technological	  know-­‐how	  or	  intermediate	  goods	  provided.	  Therefore,	  self-­‐sufficiency	  was	  the	  only	  alternative	  for	  them	  to	  meet	  the	  planning	  targets	  set	  from	  above.	  Both	  Cheng	  and	  Riskin	  had	  observed	  the	  rise	  of	  complete	  factories	  during	  the	  GLF,	  but	  neither	  of	  them	  had	  looked	  at	  the	  problems	  of	  broad	  front	  development	  in	  any	  significant	  way.	  Historical	  legacies	  from	  wartime	  periods	  or	  central	  planning	  might	  have	  contributed	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Riskin,	  China’s	  Political	  Economy,	  218	  9	  Riskin,	  China’s	  Political	  Economy,	  218-­‐220.	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to	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  complete	  factory	  model,	  but	  fundamentally,	  the	  model	  emerged	  from	  individual	  factories’	  efforts	  to	  address	  the	  challenges	  of	  broad	  front	  development	  on	  the	  micro	  level.	  	  	  	   The	  complete	  factory	  model	  was	  first	  extensively	  advocated	  and	  used	  in	  the	  machine-­‐building	  industry.	  Examples	  from	  the	  machine-­‐building	  industry	  presented	  the	  simplest	  and	  most	  basic	  form	  of	  complete	  factories.	  For	  the	  Chinese	  economy	  during	  the	  GLF,	  the	  machine-­‐building	  industry	  constituted	  the	  backbone	  of	  the	  economy	  because	  every	  other	  industry	  relied	  on	  it	  for	  greater	  use	  of	  machinery,	  a	  major	  step	  toward	  industrialization.	  Chinese	  economic	  writers	  were	  keenly	  aware	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  limited	  capacity	  of	  the	  machine-­‐building	  industry	  constituted	  a	  major	  bottleneck	  in	  the	  economy.	  For	  example,	  according	  to	  a	  People’s	  Daily	  editorial	  in	  1958	  on	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  machine-­‐building	  industry	  during	  the	  country’s	  industrialization	  process:	  The	  machine-­‐building	  industry	  is	  in	  a	  position	  such	  that	  it	  is	  not	  only	  responsible	  for	  supplying	  equipment	  to	  other	  industries,	  including	  heavy	  industry,	  agriculture,	  transportation,	  etc.,	  it	  also	  needed	  to	  equip	  itself	  with	  proper	  machinery.	  During	  the	  Great	  Leap	  Forward,	  the	  steel	  industry	  asked	  it	  for	  metallurgical	  equipment,	  the	  power	  industry	  asked	  it	  for	  generator	  equipment,	  agriculture	  asked	  it	  for	  various	  types	  of	  farm	  equipment….	  In	  addition	  to	  meeting	  all	  the	  demands,	  the	  machine-­‐building	  industry	  must	  also	  empower	  itself	  by	  manufacturing	  a	  large	  number	  of	  machine	  tools	  required	  for	  production.	  It	  bore	  a	  heavy	  burden.	  Currently,	  a	  major	  bottleneck	  was	  that	  the	  capacity	  of	  the	  machine-­‐building	  industry	  could	  not	  meet	  the	  demand.10	  	  While	  the	  machine-­‐building	  industry	  was	  responsible	  for	  producing	  machinery	  for	  many	  other	  industries,	  it	  also	  faced	  the	  challenge	  of	  broad	  front	  development	  within	  its	  own	  sector	  of	  production.	  In	  other	  words,	  many	  of	  the	  small,	  indigenous	  factories	  that	  were	  ordered	  to	  manufacture	  machinery	  for	  others	  lacked	  the	  essential	  machine	  tools	  or	  equipment	  to	  complete	  their	  production.	  In	  response,	  many	  factories	  in	  the	  machine-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  “Sheishuo	  mayi	  buneng	  ken	  gutou,”	  Renmin	  ribao,	  August	  20,	  1958.	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building	  industry	  turned	  to	  the	  complete	  factory	  model	  and	  started	  producing	  machine	  tools	  in-­‐house.	  The	  following	  example	  of	  Jingye	  Machinery	  Factory	  (Jingye	  jiqi	  chang )	  illustrated	  how	  a	  small,	  local	  factory	  integrated	  backwards	  in	  order	  to	  produce	  more	  complicated	  machinery	  set	  by	  the	  production	  targets.	  The	  Jingye	  Factory	  was	  instructed	  by	  the	  City	  Government	  of	  Shanghai	  to	  produce	  7	  tolling	  mills	  and	  3	  gearboxes	  to	  supply	  to	  the	  steel	  industry.	  However,	  the	  factory	  had	  no	  proper	  equipment,	  nor	  prior	  experience,	  in	  the	  manufacturing	  of	  rolling	  mills	  or	  gearboxes.	  In	  1959,	  a	  worker	  from	  the	  Jingye	  factory	  published	  an	  article	  on	  the	  Machine	  Building	  Weekly	  and	  described	  how	  the	  factory	  integrated	  backwards	  to	  make	  machine	  tools:	  With	  no	  large-­‐scale	  equipment	  and	  inadequate	  technological	  support,	  we	  faced	  many	  challenges.	  In	  order	  to	  meet	  the	  demand	  for	  rolling	  mills	  from	  our	  country,	  we	  choose	  to	  mobilize	  the	  masses	  and	  make	  use	  of	  simple	  equipment	  to	  prepare	  ourselves	  to	  complete	  the	  task	  of	  manufacturing	  rolling	  mills.	  By	  January	  of	  this	  year,	  we	  have	  made	  a	  total	  of	  63	  machine	  tools	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  producing	  rolling	  mills.11	  	  Faced	  with	  the	  challenge	  of	  producing	  rolling	  mills	  when	  it	  lacked	  the	  proper	  equipment	  to	  do	  so,	  the	  factory	  decided	  to	  manufacture	  the	  supplemental	  machine	  tools	  on	  its	  own.	  These	  machine	  tools	  included	  milling	  machines,	  boring	  mills	  ,	  slotting	  machines,	  planers,	  and	  other	  pieces	  of	  equipment.	  Another	  quotation	  from	  a	  worker	  at	  Jingye	  Factory	  reflected	  the	  pursuit	  of	  self-­‐sufficiency	  among	  local,	  indigenous	  factories	  in	  the	  machine-­‐building	  industry:	  “We	  must	  use	  ‘homemade’	  machine	  tools	  (tu	  ji	  chuang)	  to	  produce	  large	  equipment.	  Using	  small	  [machines]	  to	  achieve	  big	  things	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  ways	  to	  address	  the	  current	  lack	  of	  large	  equipment.”12	  Following	  the	  principle	  of	  self-­‐sufficiency,	  local	  factories	  began	  to	  integrate	  upstream	  and	  internalize	  their	  own	  supply	  chains	  as	  a	  solution	  to	  various	  bottlenecks	  they	  encountered.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Zhonggong	  shanghai	  jingye	  jiqichang	  zongzhi	  weiyuanhui,	  “Women	  shi	  zenyang	  wancheng	  zhagangji	  zhizao	  renwude,”	  Jixie	  gongye	  zhoubao,	  January	  31,	  1959,	  2.	  12	  Ibid.	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   Similarly,	  the	  Jinzhou	  Mining	  Machine	  Factory	  (Jingzhou	  kuangshan	  jiqi	  chang)	  in	  Liaoning	  also	  started	  to	  produce	  various	  machine	  tools	  and	  equipment	  in-­‐house.	  Jinzhou	  Mining	  Machine	  Factory	  specialized	  in	  the	  manufacturing	  of	  machinery	  for	  the	  mining	  industry.	  In	  1959,	  for	  example,	  it	  was	  instructed	  to	  to	  make	  heavy	  mining	  hoists,	  windlasses,	  washing	  appliances	  and	  other	  heavy,	  large-­‐scale	  machinery	  for	  the	  mining	  industry.	  Under	  the	  new	  production	  targets,	  however,	  its	  original	  equipment	  was	  no	  longer	  adequate	  for	  the	  making	  of	  more	  complicated	  machinery.	  In	  response,	  the	  Jingzhou	  factory	  started	  to	  make	  the	  necessary	  equipment,	  including	  both	  single-­‐purpose	  machine	  tools	  and	  multi-­‐purpose	  auxiliary	  equipment,	  as	  a	  solution.	  It	  was	  featured	  in	  the	  Machine-­‐Building	  Weekly	  in	  1959:	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  they	  built	  some	  temporary,	  simplified	  and	  specialized	  equipment	  based	  on	  current	  production	  needs;	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  they	  designed	  and	  manufactured	  a	  set	  of	  multi-­‐purpose,	  complex,	  large-­‐scale	  equipment	  using	  a	  combination	  of	  foreign	  and	  indigenous	  methods.	  These	  large	  equipment	  sets	  constituted	  part	  of	  the	  basic	  construction	  plan	  of	  the	  factory.	  Although	  this	  equipment	  was	  simple	  in	  structure	  and	  low	  in	  cost,	  it	  was	  extremely	  efficient.13	  	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  two	  factories	  above,	  another	  local	  factory	  in	  the	  machine-­‐building	  industry	  produced	  single-­‐purpose	  machine	  tools	  on	  its	  own	  as	  a	  solution	  to	  fill	  in	  gaps	  in	  supply	  chains.	  Similar	  to	  the	  Jingye	  Factory,	  the	  Qunli	  Machine	  Factory	  (Qunli	  jixie	  chang)	  in	  Harbin	  was	  presented	  with	  the	  challenge	  of	  manufacturing	  two	  complete	  sets	  of	  rolling	  mills.	  Qunli	  was	  a	  small,	  indigenous	  factory	  equipped	  with	  only	  50	  machine	  tools,	  one	  conveyer	  belt	  machine	  and	  one	  double-­‐column	  planing	  machine.	  These	  equipment	  was	  not	  adequate	  to	  manufacture	  the	  essential	  components	  of	  a	  rolling	  mill,	  including	  the	  main	  machine	  body	  and	  herringbone	  gears.	  In	  the	  editorial	  article	  featuring	  Qunli	  in	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  “Jingzhou	  kuangshan	  jixiechang	  zizhi	  dajichuang,	  wei	  jiagong	  dajian	  kailu,”	  Jixie	  gongye	  zhoubao,	  February	  14,	  1959,	  9.	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Machine	  Building	  Weekly,	  the	  author	  described	  an	  internal	  debate	  within	  the	  factory	  on	  whether	  it	  was	  capable	  of	  producing	  the	  required	  rolling	  mills:	  For	  a	  small	  factory	  like	  Qunli,	  is	  it	  able	  to	  manufacture	  complete	  sets	  of	  rolling	  mils?	  This	  depends	  on	  whether	  it	  is	  able	  to	  solve	  a	  series	  of	  very	  serious	  bottlenecks.	  For	  example,	  is	  it	  able	  to	  make	  the	  herringbone	  gears	  without	  a	  gear	  cutting	  machine	  tool?	  Is	  it	  able	  to	  make	  the	  rolling	  mill	  housing	  without	  a	  large-­‐scale	  double	  column	  planing	  machine	  and	  a	  boring	  mill?	  Some	  people	  say:	  ‘Qunli	  is	  ill-­‐equipped	  with	  the	  proper	  equipment	  for	  making	  rolling	  mills.’	  Others	  say	  that	  in	  order	  to	  make	  rolling	  mills,	  one	  must	  either	  obtain	  large-­‐scale	  equipment	  from	  the	  government	  or	  ask	  for	  outside	  help.	  However,	  neither	  option	  was	  available	  at	  that	  time.14	  	  In	  response,	  Qunli	  chose	  to	  go	  into	  the	  direction	  of	  a	  “complete”	  plant	  and	  make	  the	  necessary	  machine	  tools	  on	  its	  own.	  It	  manufactured	  an	  “homemade”	  version	  of	  a	  gear	  cutting	  machine	  tool	  with	  under	  five	  thousand	  yuan,	  while	  purchasing	  such	  a	  equipment	  based	  on	  an	  imported	  model	  would	  cost	  260	  thousand	  yuan.	  In	  addition,	  workers	  at	  Qunli	  made	  a	  set	  of	  machine	  tools	  to	  manufacture	  rolling	  mills.	  These	  internally-­‐made	  machine	  tools	  took	  the	  place	  of	  a	  large-­‐scale	  double	  column	  planing	  machine	  and	  boring	  mill	  in	  production	  that	  would	  otherwise	  have	  to	  be	  imported.	  	  	   In	  addition	  to	  the	  machine-­‐building	  factories	  that	  specialized	  in	  the	  manufacturing	  of	  machinery,	  various	  factories	  in	  other	  industries	  embarked	  on	  the	  production	  of	  machine	  tools	  and	  equipment	  as	  well.	  Following	  the	  principle	  of	  self-­‐sufficiency	  and	  the	  model	  of	  complete	  factories,	  local	  factories	  started	  manufacturing	  the	  required	  equipment	  on	  their	  own.	  For	  example,	  in	  1958,	  the	  People’s	  Daily	  featured	  Jilin	  Dye	  House	  (Jilin	  ranliao	  chang)	  that	  became	  fully	  self-­‐sufficient	  in	  producing	  all	  the	  equipment	  it	  needed	  in	  production	  in-­‐house.15	  Prior	  to	  manufacturing	  its	  own	  equipment,	  noted	  the	  editorial,	  the	  repair	  workshop	  of	  the	  factory	  was	  only	  responsible	  for	  repairing	  and	  maintaining	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  “	  ‘Qunli’	  chang	  yingyong	  zuhe	  jichuang	  qiaozhi	  zhagangji,”	  Jixie	  gongye	  zhoubao,	  January	  31,	  1959,	  2.	  15	  “Jilin	  ranliao	  chang	  zhebei	  quanbu	  ziji,”	  Renmin	  ribao,	  August	  12,	  1958.	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equipment	  for	  the	  dye	  house.	  When	  it	  was	  in	  need	  of	  any	  large-­‐scale	  or	  more	  complicated	  machinery,	  the	  dye	  house	  had	  to	  rely	  on	  procuring	  equipment	  from	  other	  machine-­‐building	  factories.	  The	  factory’s	  reliance	  on	  other	  machine-­‐building	  factories	  was	  considered	  an	  inconvenience.	  Therefore,	  the	  dye	  house	  transformed	  its	  repair	  workshop	  into	  a	  machine-­‐tool-­‐building	  workshop	  that	  was	  capable	  of	  manufacturing	  all	  of	  the	  equipment	  it	  needed	  in	  the	  production	  process:	  	  Recently	  the	  workers	  at	  this	  factor	  decided	  to	  make	  full	  use	  of	  scrap	  steel	  and	  iron,	  as	  well	  as	  existing	  equipment,	  to	  build	  a	  total	  of	  40	  pieces	  of	  equipment	  this	  year.	  This	  would	  allow	  the	  factory	  to	  become	  self	  sufficient	  in	  supplying	  itself	  with	  a12-­‐feet	  long	  machine	  tool,	  various	  types	  of	  pumps,	  boilers,	  potteries,	  and	  ventilators.16	  	  The	  example	  of	  Jilin	  Dye	  House	  presented	  a	  slightly	  more	  complex	  form	  of	  complete	  factory,	  as	  it	  moved	  into	  the	  manufacturing	  of	  machine	  tools	  and	  various	  other	  products.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  basic	  principle	  of	  self-­‐sufficiency	  remained	  the	  same—by	  making	  use	  of	  existing	  resources	  and	  equipment,	  complete	  factories	  sought	  to	  fill	  in	  the	  gaps	  in	  supply	  chains	  on	  their	  own.	  	   Similarly,	  the	  construction	  firms	  in	  Beijing	  ran	  into	  shortage	  of	  machine	  tools	  and	  they	  came	  up	  with	  the	  solution	  of	  manufacturing	  the	  required	  machinery	  and	  equipment	  on	  their	  own.	  In	  order	  to	  do	  so,	  construction	  firms	  not	  only	  undertook	  the	  production	  of	  raw	  materials,	  but	  also	  the	  construction	  of	  various	  workshops	  for	  the	  manufacturing	  of	  necessary	  equipment.	  They	  transformed	  repair	  workshops	  within	  the	  factory	  into	  equipment-­‐making	  workshops	  that	  were	  responsible	  for	  making	  indigenous	  machine	  tools.	  They	  also	  created	  “home-­‐made”	  blast	  furnaces,	  “home-­‐made”	  converters,	  cement	  plants,	  as	  well	  as	  made	  steel	  and	  iron	  to	  become	  fully	  self-­‐sufficient	  in	  all	  the	  required	  construction	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  Ibid.	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materials.	  A	  People’s	  Daily	  article	  in	  1958	  offered	  detailed	  descriptions	  on	  specific	  measures	  undertaken	  by	  the	  No.2,	  No.3	  and	  No.4	  construction	  firms	  of	  Beijing:	  No.	  2	  Construction	  Firm	  has	  been	  successful	  in	  producing	  steel	  from	  the	  converter	  it	  made;	  it	  is	  now	  in	  the	  process	  of	  establishing	  its	  own	  timetable	  to	  make	  reinforced	  concrete.	  The	  subsidiary	  component	  workshop	  of	  the	  factory	  has	  been	  expanding	  and	  can	  now	  make	  silicon	  steel;	  after	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  workshop	  has	  been	  completed,	  it	  will	  be	  able	  to	  mass	  produce	  its	  own	  machine	  tools	  and	  general	  construction	  equipment.	  No.3	  Construction	  Firm	  has	  started	  building	  an	  additional	  13	  small-­‐scale	  subsidiary	  factories	  or	  workshops,	  including:	  machine-­‐building	  factory,	  cement	  plant,	  manufacturing	  plants	  for	  water-­‐heating	  equipment	  and	  scrap	  wood	  materials,	  etc.	  The	  cement	  plant	  made	  by	  No.4	  Construction	  Firm	  has	  already	  started	  the	  mass	  production	  of	  construction	  materials.17	  	  In	  order	  to	  make	  the	  required	  machinery,	  the	  construction	  firms	  integrated	  backward	  into	  the	  production	  of	  various	  forms	  of	  steel,	  concrete,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  construction	  of	  13	  workshops.	  The	  logic	  behind	  integration	  remained	  the	  same:	  there	  was	  inadequate	  supply	  of	  machinery	  and	  equipment	  in	  the	  Chinese	  economy,	  and	  factories	  that	  specialized	  in	  the	  production	  of	  machine	  tools	  were	  nonexistent.	  In	  response	  to	  incomplete	  supply	  chains,	  local,	  indigenous	  factories	  started	  to	  manufacture	  their	  own	  equipment	  using	  their	  existing	  capacity	  and	  resources	  by	  following	  the	  complete	  factory	  model.	  	  	   The	  complete	  factory	  model	  emerged	  in	  almost	  every	  other	  industry	  that	  faced	  the	  challenge	  of	  broad	  front	  development.	  The	  model	  evolved	  and	  adjusted	  according	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  different	  industries.	  Under	  more	  evolved	  forms	  of	  complete	  factories,	  enterprises	  integrated	  backward	  not	  only	  to	  produce	  single-­‐purpose	  machine	  tools,	  but	  also	  start	  to	  develop	  multiple	  product	  lines	  to	  meet	  the	  needs	  of	  various	  production	  stages	  and	  processes.	  Take	  the	  example	  of	  Guangzhou	  Light	  Bulb	  Factory	  (Guangzhou	  dengpao	  chang),	  which	  needed	  to	  build	  an	  additional	  three	  workshops	  to	  expand	  its	  production	  capacity.	  The	  construction	  firms	  in	  the	  city	  were	  unable	  to	  take	  construction	  orders	  for	  the	  light	  bulb	  factory	  due	  to	  the	  overwhelming	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  	  “Ziji	  banchang,	  zizhi	  jixie,	  Beijing	  jianzhu	  qiye	  xiang	  jixiehua	  jinjun,”	  Renmin	  ribao,	  July	  17,	  1958.	  
	   20	  
demand	  for	  construction	  during	  the	  Great	  Leap	  Forward,	  nor	  was	  the	  light	  bulb	  factory	  able	  to	  secure	  orders	  from	  construction	  firms	  outside	  Guangzhou.	  In	  response	  to	  the	  inadequate	  construction	  capacity	  from	  outside	  factories,	  the	  light	  bulb	  factory	  undertook	  the	  construction	  of	  three	  workshops	  on	  its	  own	  in	  1959:	  The	  Design	  Academy	  of	  Guangzhou	  is	  too	  busy	  to	  provide	  designs	  for	  the	  light	  bulb	  factory,	  while	  other	  construction	  firms	  are	  unable	  to	  be	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  factory.	  In	  terms	  of	  ordering	  machinery	  from	  other	  enterprises,	  although	  [the	  light	  bulb	  factory]	  has	  travelled	  to	  Shanghai,	  Beijing,	  Chengdu,	  Tianjin	  and	  various	  other	  big	  cities	  to	  place	  orders,	  they	  are	  unable	  to	  have	  their	  needs	  [for	  machinery]	  met.	  Under	  this	  situation,	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  light	  bulb	  factory	  realized	  that	  they	  can	  no	  longer	  rely	  on	  aid	  from	  the	  outside,	  but	  have	  to	  become	  self-­‐sufficient…	  they	  decided	  to	  take	  charge	  of	  the	  design	  and	  construction	  of	  an	  additional	  three	  projects:	  one	  for	  metalworking,	  one	  for	  glass	  making,	  and	  one	  for	  storage.25	  	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  construction	  of	  two	  workshops	  and	  a	  storage	  facility,	  the	  light	  bulb	  factory	  was	  also	  in	  charge	  of	  manufacturing	  their	  own	  equipment	  and	  machine	  tools	  in	  the	  newly	  added	  workshops.	  For	  example,	  lacking	  a	  dry-­‐bottom	  boiler,	  the	  factory	  manufactured	  one	  on	  its	  own.	  The	  complete	  factory	  model,	  which	  first	  emerged	  in	  the	  machine-­‐building	  industry	  and	  involved	  the	  making	  of	  single-­‐purpose	  machine	  tools,	  had	  expanded	  into	  other	  industries	  and	  involved	  the	  making	  of	  more	  complicated	  equipment,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  construction	  of	  workshops.	  	   A	  more	  interesting	  case	  is	  the	  Harbin	  Bearing	  Factory	  (Harbin	  zhoucheng	  chang),	  which	  started	  to	  manufacture	  meters,	  instruments	  and	  grinding	  wheels	  for	  its	  own	  use.	  The	  bearing	  factory	  ,	  expanding	  its	  production	  capacities	  and	  undertaking	  the	  making	  of	  multiple	  products,	  represented	  a	  more	  complex	  form	  of	  complete	  factory	  model:	  Take	  the	  example	  of	  Harbin	  Bearing	  Factory,	  whose	  bearing	  production	  output	  increased	  multiple	  times	  in	  1958.	  Previously,	  they	  relied	  heavily	  on	  the	  import	  of	  instruments	  and	  meters,	  as	  well	  as	  grinding	  wheels.	  When	  the	  import	  could	  not	  keep	  up	  with	  their	  demand	  in	  quantity	  and	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  “Guangzhou	  dengpaochang	  yong	  tufa	  jiancheng	  liangge	  chejian,	  zili	  gengsheng,	  qinjian	  jianchang,”	  
Jixie	  gongye	  zhoubao,	  February	  7,	  1959,	  11.	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time,	  they	  decided	  to	  manufacture	  on	  their	  own.	  By	  1959,	  they	  were	  completely	  self-­‐sufficient	  in	  instruments	  and	  meters…26	  	  A	  factory	  that	  took	  the	  complete	  factory	  model	  even	  further	  was	  Chengdu	  Measuring	  and	  Cutting	  Device	  Factory	  (Chengdu	  liangju	  daoju	  chang),	  which	  expanded	  into	  an	  even	  wider	  variety	  of	  products,	  including	  iron,	  steel,	  refractory	  materials,	  and	  eventually	  established	  a	  total	  of	  14	  satellite	  factories,	  all	  of	  which	  were	  created	  in	  response	  to	  a	  shortage	  of	  certain	  materials:	  When	  they	  faced	  a	  shortage	  of	  steel	  in	  production,	  they	  would	  make	  iron,	  steel	  and	  rolled	  steel;	  when	  they	  did	  not	  have	  enough	  refractory	  materials	  for	  the	  production	  of	  iron	  and	  steel,	  they	  would	  make	  the	  materials	  on	  their	  own.	  In	  the	  end,	  the	  productive	  capacity	  of	  the	  factory	  increased	  three	  times	  more	  than	  the	  design	  capacity.	  Over	  one	  third	  of	  the	  high-­‐quality	  steel	  and	  medium	  carbon	  steel	  required	  is	  now	  provided	  by	  the	  integrated	  enterprise	  on	  its	  own.27	  	  From	  the	  simple	  case	  of	  machine-­‐building	  factories	  that	  manufactured	  single-­‐purpose	  machine	  tools	  to	  the	  Chengdu	  Measuring	  and	  Cutting	  Device	  Factory	  that	  produced	  a	  multitude	  of	  raw	  materials	  and	  intermediate	  goods,	  the	  complete	  factory	  model	  had	  evolved	  from	  internalizing	  one	  step	  of	  the	  supply	  chain	  to	  internalizing	  various	  steps	  in	  the	  production	  process.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  rationale	  behind	  the	  complete	  factory	  remained	  the	  same—the	  various	  products	  and	  materials	  were	  produced	  for	  the	  factory’s	  internal	  use.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Great	  Leap	  Forward,	  complete	  factories	  not	  only	  made	  equipment	  and	  machine	  parts	  for	  their	  own	  use,	  but	  for	  the	  use	  of	  other	  factories	  as	  well.	  Once	  they	  started	  to	  diversify,	  however,	  complete	  factories	  started	  to	  manufacture	  goods	  for	  the	  use	  of	  others.	  As	  we	  shall	  see	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  with	  extensive	  diversification,	  the	  complete	  factory	  model	  was	  transformed	  to	  serve	  a	  fundamentally	  different	  purpose.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26 Li	  Ximu,	  “Duozhong	  jingying	  shi	  gongye	  qiyeduokuai	  haosheng	  de	  fazhan	  shengchan	  zhilu,”	  Renmin	  
ribao,	  October	  8,	  1960.	  27	  Benbao	  pinglun	  yuan,	  “Yige	  zhongyaode	  fangxiang,”	  Renmin	  ribao,	  April	  22,	  1960.	  





The	  Emergence	  of	  the	  Diversified	  Complete	  Factory	  Model	  
	   The	  complete	  factory	  model	  emerged	  during	  the	  Great	  Leap	  Forward	  as	  makeshift	  solutions	  to	  incomplete	  supply	  chains.	  In	  the	  process	  of	  producing	  various	  required	  pieces	  of	  machinery	  to	  supply	  other	  industries,	  the	  machine-­‐building	  factories	  described	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  started	  manufacturing	  machine-­‐building	  equipment	  on	  their	  own.	  Although	  such	  practices	  started	  out	  as	  makeshift	  solutions,	  policy	  makers	  and	  analysts	  began	  to	  see	  these	  complete	  factories	  emerging	  during	  the	  Great	  Leap	  Forward	  as	  a	  broader	  model	  for	  Chinese	  industrialization.	  As	  the	  complete	  factories	  developed	  multiple	  product	  lines	  to	  fill	  in	  various	  gaps	  in	  their	  supply	  chains,	  they	  started	  to	  expand	  into	  the	  production	  of	  a	  greater	  variety	  of	  products.	  This	  led	  to	  a	  diversification	  of	  production	  capacities,	  and	  under	  the	  logic	  of	  making	  maximum	  use	  of	  existing	  equipment	  and	  resources,	  complete	  factories	  began	  to	  develop	  multiple	  product	  lines.1	  Therefore,	  the	  complete	  factory	  model	  led	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  diversified	  complete	  enterprises,	  and	  diversification	  became	  a	  prevalent	  model	  followed	  by	  factories	  in	  every	  industry.	  Although	  complete	  factories	  emerged	  as	  makeshift	  solutions	  to	  the	  challenge	  of	  broad	  front	  development,	  Chinese	  economic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Discussions	  on	  the	  emergence	  of	  diversification	  as	  an	  explicit	  development	  strategy	  in	  American	  business	  history	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Alfred	  D.	  Chandler,	  The	  Visible	  Hand:	  The	  Managerial	  
Revolution	  in	  American	  Business	  (Cambridge:	  The	  Belknap	  Press	  of	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1977),	  473-­‐283.	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actors	  made	  a	  virtue	  of	  this	  model	  and	  turned	  the	  diversified	  complete	  factory	  model	  into	  a	  more	  general	  model	  for	  industrialization	  in	  China.	  	  Consider	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Harbin	  Bearing	  Factory	  introduced	  as	  an	  example	  of	  a	  complete	  factory.	  The	  factory	  started	  making	  meters	  and	  instruments	  for	  its	  own	  use,	  after	  the	  import	  of	  these	  products	  could	  not	  keep	  up	  with	  its	  demand.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  it	  integrated	  backwards	  to	  fill	  in	  the	  gaps	  of	  its	  own	  supply	  chain,	  because	  it	  could	  not	  obtain	  meters	  and	  instruments	  from	  other	  sources.	  The	  effort	  at	  filling	  the	  gaps	  in	  production,	  however,	  soon	  turned	  into	  product	  lines	  in	  their	  own	  right.	  The	  bearing	  factory	  not	  only	  made	  meters	  and	  instruments	  for	  itself,	  but	  also	  started	  to	  supply	  these	  products	  for	  the	  use	  of	  other	  factories:	  By	  1959,	  they	  were	  completely	  self-­‐sufficient	  in	  instruments	  and	  meters,	  and	  they	  were	  able	  to	  supply	  61	  other	  factories	  and	  export	  part	  of	  the	  output.	  They	  also	  solved	  the	  problem	  of	  an	  inadequate	  supply	  of	  grinding	  wheels	  and	  cut	  the	  production	  cost	  in	  half.	  Now,	  they	  are	  in	  the	  process	  of	  establishing	  workshops	  and	  work	  units	  for	  over	  seventy	  products,	  including	  iron	  and	  steel,	  construction	  materials,	  abrasive	  materials,	  high-­‐frequency	  motor	  spindles,	  air-­‐powered	  clamps,	  rubber	  tubes,	  etc.2	  	  Therefore,	  what	  started	  out	  as	  a	  makeshift	  solution	  to	  an	  inadequate	  supply	  of	  instruments	  and	  meters	  created	  opportunities	  for	  diversification.	  Having	  become	  self-­‐sufficient	  in	  manufacturing	  certain	  products	  that	  were	  originally	  for	  its	  own	  use,	  the	  bearing	  factory	  started	  to	  "export"	  what	  was	  not	  needed	  for	  in-­‐house	  use	  in	  order	  to	  make	  maximum	  use	  of	  its	  equipment	  and	  facilities.	  In	  order	  to	  exploit	  the	  newly	  developed	  production	  capacities,	  diversification	  became	  a	  logical	  step	  undertaken	  by	  Chinese	  enterprises.	  The	  bearing	  factory	  illustrated	  a	  clear	  transition	  of	  the	  complete	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2 Li	  Ximu, “Duozhong	  jingying	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  gongye	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  de	  fazhan	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  zhilu,”	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factory	  model	  that	  started	  out	  as	  simple	  backward	  integration	  and	  later	  evolved	  into	  a	  more	  evolved	  model	  of	  diversification.	  	  Both	  small-­‐scale,	  local	  factories	  and	  larger,	  state	  enterprises	  started	  to	  diversify	  as	  well	  during	  the	  GLF.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  Harbin	  Bearing	  Factory,	  the	  No.1	  Automobile	  Factory	  (Diyi	  qiche	  zhizao	  chang)	  gave	  an	  example	  of	  how	  the	  complete	  factory	  model	  evolved	  into	  diversification	  on	  a	  broader	  scale.	  Similar	  to	  the	  previous	  two	  factories	  described	  above,	  the	  automobile	  factory	  faced	  similar	  challenges	  of	  incomplete	  supply	  chains:	  In	  the	  production	  of	  automobiles,	  some	  materials	  are	  used	  in	  limited	  quantity.	  If	  we	  rely	  on	  the	  supply	  from	  outside	  factories,	  production	  costs	  will	  be	  high	  and	  timely	  supply	  cannot	  be	  guaranteed.	  However,	  if	  we	  produce	  the	  materials	  by	  ourselves	  with	  existing	  resources	  and	  facilities,	  we	  can	  not	  only	  ensure	  timely	  supply,	  but	  also	  cut	  production	  cost.4	  	  The	  automobile	  factory	  turned	  to	  backward	  integration	  to	  fill	  in	  gaps	  of	  its	  supply	  chains.	  The	  article	  highlighted	  the	  fact	  that	  one	  of	  the	  primary	  reasons	  for	  backward	  integration	  was	  to	  make	  efficient	  use	  of	  the	  existing	  resources	  and	  equipment	  of	  the	  factory.	  Therefore,	  in	  response,	  the	  automobile	  factory	  started	  to	  develop	  more	  excess	  production	  capacities	  than	  many	  other	  factories	  that	  made	  simpler	  products:	  Building	  on	  multipurpose	  utilization	  of	  resources,	  we	  have	  further	  diversified.	  Currently,	  we	  have	  established	  a	  group	  of	  small-­‐scale,	  half-­‐foreign	  and	  half-­‐indigenous	  factories,	  such	  as	  a	  rolling	  mill,	  a	  chemical	  factory,	  a	  fiberboard	  plant,	  an	  iron	  powder	  factory,	  an	  asbestos	  factory,	  etc.	  With	  multipurpose	  utilization	  of	  raw	  materials	  and	  diversification,	  we	  can	  not	  only	  meet	  part	  of	  the	  needs	  from	  automobile	  production,	  but	  also	  supply	  many	  more	  product	  types	  to	  the	  market	  and	  facilitate	  state	  construction	  projects;	  we	  can	  also	  help	  improve	  automobile	  production	  and	  alleviate	  the	  burden	  for	  other	  factories.	  In	  the	  past,	  some	  machine	  parts	  required	  for	  our	  production,	  such	  as	  flywheel	  ring	  wheels	  or	  lock	  detachable	  rings	  were	  difficult	  to	  make	  and	  needed	  in	  small	  quantities.	  For	  other	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4 Zhonggong	  diyiqiche	  zhizaochang	  weiyuanhui,	  “Dagao	  zonghe	  liyong,	  fazhan	  duozhong	  jingying,”	  Xinhua	  banyue	  kan	  21	  (1960).	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factories	  that	  mass	  produce,	  making	  these	  machine	  tools	  are	  costly	  and	  low	  in	  return.	  In	  the	  future,	  we	  can	  slowly	  address	  the	  inadequate	  supply	  of	  these	  specific	  machine	  tools	  by	  making	  use	  of	  our	  own	  small	  steel	  factories.5	  	  In	  essence,	  every	  effort	  to	  fill	  supply	  chain	  gaps	  by	  the	  automobile	  factory	  created	  new	  capacity,	  which	  was	  then	  exploited	  to	  create	  new	  product	  lines.	  The	  author	  of	  the	  editorial	  noted	  that	  the	  automobile	  factory	  diversified	  for	  maximum	  utilization	  of	  existing	  resources.	  More	  importantly,	  the	  automobile	  factory	  served	  as	  another	  example	  of	  a	  complete	  factory	  that	  transitioned	  from	  making	  products	  for	  the	  its	  internal	  use	  to	  external	  use	  of	  other	  factories.	  As	  multiple	  product	  lines	  started	  to	  emerge,	  the	  factory	  started	  to	  realize	  that	  by	  exploiting	  its	  expanded	  production	  capacities,	  it	  could	  fulfill	  broader	  demand	  as	  well.	  Through	  diversification,	  the	  automobile	  factory	  supplied	  other	  factories	  as	  well	  as	  filling	  in	  supply-­‐chain	  gaps	  of	  its	  own.	  	  Diversification	  was	  a	  strategy	  promoted	  widely,	  not	  limited	  to	  complete	  factories	  that	  had	  added	  new	  capabilities	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  fill	  gaps	  in	  the	  supply	  chain.	  	  Diversification	  was	  also	  driven	  by	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  efforts	  to	  make	  maximum	  use	  of	  existing	  resources	  and	  equipment,	  including	  wastes	  and	  by-­‐products.	  Take	  the	  example	  of	  Guangzhou	  Papermaking	  Factory	  (Guangzhou	  zaozhi	  chang),	  that	  expanded	  into	  the	  manufacturing	  of	  pig	  iron,	  clinker-­‐free	  cement,	  as	  well	  as	  alcohol	  for	  the	  maximum	  utilization	  of	  its	  waste	  products	  and	  by-­‐products6:	  	  Originally,	  the	  Guangzhou	  Papermaking	  Factory	  daily	  dumped	  20	  to	  40	  tons	  of	  waste	  slag	  of	  pyrite	  that	  arose	  with	  the	  production	  of	  precipitated	  calcium	  carbonate	  for	  papermaking.	  Recently,	  they	  discovered	  that	  the	  waste	  slag	  of	  pyrite	  contained	  high	  levels	  of	  iron,	  so	  they	  decided	  to	  set	  up	  a	  “Iron	  Refining	  Research	  Group”	  and	  successfully	  refined	  pig	  iron	  out	  of	  the	  waste.	  If	  they	  choose	  to	  make	  use	  of	  the	  waste	  slag	  of	  pyrite,	  they	  will	  be	  able	  to	  produce	  12	  to	  15	  tons	  of	  pig	  iron	  on	  a	  daily	  basis.	  Before,	  the	  furnaces	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Ibid.	  6	  “Guangzhou	  zaozhi	  chang	  liantie	  zhishuini,”	  Renmin	  ribao,	  July	  14,	  1958.	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papermaking	  company	  got	  rid	  of	  70	  to	  80	  tons	  of	  soot	  every	  day.	  Now,	  they	  mix	  the	  soot	  with	  lime	  and	  plaster	  to	  produce	  cement	  that	  are	  free	  of	  clinker	  and	  of	  good	  quality.	  Its	  production	  of	  cement	  can	  reach	  ten	  thousand	  tons	  a	  year.	  The	  factory	  produced	  1080	  cubic	  meters	  of	  sulfite	  waste	  liquor	  from	  the	  manufacturing	  of	  wood	  pulp	  for	  papermaking.	  It	  is	  currently	  in	  the	  process	  of	  building	  an	  alcohol	  factory	  to	  fully	  recycle	  the	  sulfite	  waste	  liquor	  as	  raw	  materials	  for	  making	  alcohol.	  It	  can	  produce	  	  approximately	  3000	  tons	  of	  alcohol	  per	  year.7	  	  The	  papermaking	  factory	  represented	  another	  variation	  of	  the	  same	  theme	  of	  making	  maximum	  use	  of	  existing	  capacities.	  As	  the	  factory	  started	  to	  think	  of	  ways	  to	  make	  use	  of	  its	  waste	  materials	  such	  as	  waste	  slag	  of	  pyrite,	  soot,	  sulfite	  waste	  liquor,	  it	  created	  new	  product	  lines	  based	  on	  the	  same	  principle	  of	  making	  use	  of	  excess	  capacities	  and	  resources.	  What	  was	  unique	  about	  the	  papermaking	  factory,	  however,	  was	  that	  diversification	  did	  not	  start	  out	  as	  a	  corollary	  of	  backward	  integration	  initially	  aimed	  at	  filling	  gaps	  in	  the	  supply	  chain,	  as	  the	  previous	  two	  examples	  described	  above.	  What	  they	  shared	  in	  common,	  though,	  was	  a	  strategy	  based	  on	  making	  maximum	  use	  of	  existing	  resources	  and	  equipment.	  	  This	  drive	  for	  greater	  efficiency	  fueled	  the	  broader	  application	  of	  the	  emerging	  diversified	  complete	  factory	  model.	  This	  pattern	  had	  started	  out	  with	  efforts	  to	  exploit	  the	  opportunities	  created	  by	  backward	  integration	  aimed	  at	  resolving	  supply-­‐chain	  problems,	  but	  the	  principle	  of	  diversification	  later	  found	  new	  uses.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  diversification	  started	  to	  take	  on	  a	  life	  of	  its	  own	  and	  became	  another	  positive	  model	  that	  was	  touted	  among	  factories	  across	  all	  industries.	  Previous	  examples	  of	  diversification	  involved	  the	  machine-­‐building	  industry,	  automobile	  industry,	  electricity	  industry,	  and	  the	  paper-­‐making	  industry.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  four	  industries	  discussed	  above,	  the	  diversified	  enterprise	  model	  expanded	  into	  many	  other	  industries,	  particularly	  the	  petrochemical	  industries	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  Ibid.	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and	  coal-­‐based	  industries.	  Diversification	  was	  particularly	  conducive	  to	  these	  two	  industries	  because	  of	  the	  proliferation	  of	  waste	  materials	  and	  by-­‐products	  in	  the	  making	  of	  chemical	  and	  other	  coal-­‐based	  products.	  Diversified	  enterprises	  shared	  an	  important	  line	  of	  logic	  with	  complete	  factories—the	  optimum	  use	  of	  all	  existing	  capacities	  and	  resources.	  This	  was	  the	  primary	  reason	  why	  Harbin	  Bearing	  Factory	  started	  to	  produce	  instruments	  and	  meters	  as	  a	  separate,	  independent	  product	  line.	  The	  broadened	  principle	  of	  diversification	  as	  a	  virtue	  was	  not	  a	  fundamental	  departure	  from	  self-­‐sufficiency.	  Diversified	  enterprises	  were	  still	  self-­‐sufficient	  industrial	  complexes	  that	  produced	  a	  variety	  of	  end	  products.	  	  In	  industries	  that	  made	  use	  of	  coal	  as	  primary	  materials,	  the	  multitude	  of	  coal-­‐related	  by-­‐products	  created	  ample	  opportunities	  for	  diversification.	  For	  example,	  in	  an	  electric	  power	  plant	  that	  generated	  electricity	  from	  coal,	  it	  expanded	  into	  the	  production	  of	  kerosene,	  	  gasoline,	  phenol,	  fertilizer,	  petroleum	  coke,	  clay	  cement,	  and	  many	  other	  chemical	  products.8	  These	  diversified	  products	  were	  not	  for	  its	  internal	  use,	  but	  for	  the	  agricultural	  use	  of	  its	  neighboring	  regions:	  This	  electric	  power	  plant	  not	  only	  generates	  electricity,	  but	  also	  produces	  a	  great	  variety	  of	  products.	  Before	  coal	  is	  sent	  to	  the	  boiler,	  it	  would	  first	  go	  through	  carbonization	  and	  coal	  tar	  could	  be	  extracted	  through	  the	  evaporation	  process;	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  coal	  would	  then	  be	  sent	  to	  the	  boiler	  to	  generate	  electricity.	  After	  processing,	  the	  coal	  tar	  could	  be	  turned	  into	  kerosene,	  	  gasoline,	  phenol,	  fertilizer,	  petroleum	  coke,	  clay	  cement,	  etc.	  When	  various	  types	  of	  petroleum	  and	  chemical	  products	  are	  dry	  distilled,	  much	  of	  the	  gas	  that	  is	  produced	  in	  the	  process	  could	  be	  utilized.9	  	  	  Multiple	  by-­‐products	  of	  coal	  were	  utilized	  and	  turned	  into	  finished	  products	  in	  different	  steps	  of	  the	  production	  process.	  While	  the	  factory	  remained	  primarily	  a	  generator	  of	  electricity,	  its	  products	  expanded	  into	  many	  other	  industries.	  To	  accommodate	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  “Yige	  zonghe	  liyong	  de	  shiyan	  dianchang,	  guojia	  jingwei	  shuilidianliju	  yige	  weixing,”	  Renmin	  
ribao,	  November	  18,	  1958.	  	  9	  Ibid.	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expansion	  of	  multiple	  product	  lines,	  the	  People’s	  Daily	  article	  indicated	  that	  the	  power	  plant	  had	  set	  up	  separate	  workshops	  for	  the	  manufacturing	  of	  certain	  products:	  The	  clinker	  that	  is	  left	  from	  the	  burning	  process	  of	  the	  boiler	  is	  not	  wasted	  either.	  It	  is	  mixed	  and	  ground	  with	  lime	  and	  plaster,	  and	  could	  be	  turned	  into	  slag	  cement.	  [The	  generator]	  has	  set	  up	  another	  improvised,	  alternatively	  cut.workshop	  that	  could	  take	  in	  clay,	  lime	  and	  plaster.	  With	  the	  heat	  from	  gas	  or	  the	  smoke	  from	  the	  chimney	  of	  the	  boiler,	  they	  can	  then	  be	  burnt	  and	  ground,	  and	  later	  turned	  into	  clay	  cement;	  the	  lukewarm	  water	  that	  is	  discarded	  from	  the	  electric	  generator	  could	  also	  be	  used	  to	  irrigate	  the	  neighboring	  rice	  paddies.	  This	  could	  increase	  the	  production	  of	  the	  crops	  and	  take	  the	  place	  of	  a	  pumping	  station	  for	  irrigation.10	  	  	  Not	  only	  by	  products	  and	  waste	  materials	  from	  the	  processing	  of	  coal	  were	  utilized,	  heat	  and	  lukewarm	  water	  generated	  from	  the	  production	  process	  were	  put	  to	  use	  as	  well.	  As	  indicated	  by	  author	  of	  the	  editorial,	  almost	  all	  of	  the	  products	  that	  came	  from	  the	  diversification	  of	  the	  power	  plant	  were	  for	  the	  agricultural	  use	  of	  neighboring	  regions,	  for	  “export”	  rather	  than	  simply	  for	  in-­‐house	  use.	  As	  covered	  in	  the	  People’s	  Daily,	  the	  diversified	  power	  plant	  was	  not	  only	  presented	  as	  an	  innovative	  one-­‐off	  initiative,	  but	  also	  as	  a	  broader	  model	  to	  be	  followed	  by	  other	  factories.	  The	  status	  of	  diversified	  enterprises	  was	  elevated	  to	  the	  status	  of	  indigenous	  steel	  furnaces	  to	  be	  followed	  by	  all	  factories	  across	  the	  country:	  The	  ‘satellite’	  of	  the	  cross-­‐industry	  power	  plant	  has	  been	  successfully	  launched.	  It	  is	  a	  great	  feat	  for	  the	  power	  industry.	  We	  hope	  to	  launch	  more	  and	  more	  ‘satellites’	  (especially	  the	  localization	  of	  power	  plants)	  after	  this	  ‘satellite’,	  and	  promote	  the	  establishment	  of	  indigenous	  power	  plants	  as	  we	  have	  promoted	  indigenous	  steel	  furnaces,	  and	  let	  them	  flourish	  everywhere.11	  	  In	  addition	  to	  coal-­‐related	  industries,	  diversification	  was	  actively	  pursued	  by	  various	  factories	  in	  the	  petrochemical	  industry.	  Following	  the	  same	  logic	  of	  optimizing	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the	  use	  of	  resources,	  various	  local	  factories	  that	  originally	  had	  limited	  variety	  of	  products	  started	  to	  be	  more	  aggressive	  in	  the	  utilization	  of	  by	  products	  as	  a	  way	  to	  achieve	  higher	  level	  of	  diversification.	  The	  Shanghai	  Oil	  Refinery	  (Shanghai	  lianyou	  
chang)	  represented	  an	  example	  of	  diversified	  enterprises	  in	  the	  petrochemical	  industry.	  It	  was	  featured	  in	  an	  editorial	  from	  the	  People’s	  Daily	  in	  1960:	  Take	  the	  example	  of	  Shanghai	  Oil	  Refinery:	  in	  the	  years	  between	  1954	  and	  1958,	  it	  only	  made	  17	  types	  of	  petroleum	  products,	  including:	  gasoline,	  diesel	  fuel,	  kerosene,	  asphalt,	  etc.	  Much	  of	  the	  gas	  in	  the	  manufacturing	  process	  was	  either	  discharged	  in	  the	  air	  or	  burnt	  as	  fuels;	  starting	  from	  1959,	  the	  factory	  adopted	  the	  strategy	  of	  diversification	  and	  came	  up	  with	  the	  slogan	  “eat	  all,	  extract	  all,	  plough	  deeply,	  make	  carefully”.	  New	  products	  that	  went	  into	  trial	  manufacture	  and	  production	  increased	  to	  75	  kinds,	  and	  this	  year	  they	  made	  an	  additional	  92	  new	  kinds	  of	  products.	  This	  allowed	  them	  to	  supply	  the	  much	  needed	  fuel	  oil	  and	  lubricant	  oil	  for	  many	  industries,	  as	  well	  as	  chemical	  raw	  materials	  for	  the	  chemical	  and	  medical	  industries.12	  	  	  Within	  a	  year,	  the	  product	  types	  produced	  by	  the	  oil	  refinery	  more	  than	  quadrupled.	  The	  multitude	  of	  by	  products	  from	  the	  oil	  refining	  process	  created	  many	  opportunities	  for	  diversification.	  In	  addition,	  the	  People’s	  Daily	  article	  noted	  that	  many	  of	  the	  diversified	  products	  produced	  by	  the	  factory	  were	  used	  to	  supply	  to	  factories	  of	  other	  industries,	  for	  “export”	  rather	  than	  for	  internal	  use.	  	  	  	   The	  Dalian	  Gas	  Company	  (Dalian	  meiqi	  gongsi)	  was	  another	  factory	  in	  the	  petrochemical	  industry	  that	  diversified	  to	  make	  more	  efficient	  use	  of	  by-­‐products.	  In	  1960,	  it	  expanded	  its	  production	  of	  by-­‐products	  from	  two	  types	  to	  thirteen:	  The	  workers	  at	  the	  Dalian	  Gas	  Company	  modified	  some	  old	  equipment	  and	  added	  some	  new	  equipment	  in	  order	  to	  expand	  the	  factory’s	  capacity	  to	  recycle	  by-­‐products.	  Before,	  they	  could	  only	  recycle	  two	  types;	  now,	  they	  can	  recycle	  thirteen	  product	  types,	  and	  create	  an	  additional	  5.7	  million	  yuan	  of	  income	  to	  the	  country.	  They	  built	  a	  set	  of	  coke	  tar	  processing	  equipment	  from	  two	  older	  workshops,	  and	  were	  able	  to	  manufacture	  more	  than	  ten	  product	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  “Shanghai	  gongchang	  qiye	  zonghe	  liyong	  ziyuan,”	  Renmin	  ribao,	  March	  6,	  1960.	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types	  [from	  the	  modified	  equipment],	  including:	  anthracene,	  cosmoline,	  phenol,	  gasoline...13	  	  	  The	  diversified	  products	  that	  were	  made	  by	  the	  Dalian	  Gas	  Company	  were	  not	  only	  for	  local	  use	  but	  were	  transported	  to	  supply	  other	  major	  cities	  as	  well.	  The	  author	  of	  the	  editorial	  pointed	  out	  that:	  “One	  of	  the	  half-­‐indigenous,	  half-­‐foreign	  carbon	  soot	  workshops	  of	  the	  factory	  produced	  593	  tons	  of	  carbon	  soot	  last	  year.	  Its	  products	  were	  shipped	  to	  places	  such	  as	  Shanghai,	  Tianjin,	  Qingdao,	  etc.”14	  	  	   	   All	  of	  the	  factories	  described	  were	  clear-­‐cut	  examples	  of	  diversification	  that	  arose	  from	  the	  logic	  of	  maximizing	  the	  use	  of	  existing	  production	  capacities.	  When	  the	  model	  of	  diversification	  began	  to	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  iron	  and	  steel	  industry,	  a	  new	  business	  rationale	  emerged.	  In	  addition	  to	  optimizing	  resource	  utilization,	  Chinese	  policy	  makers	  recognized	  that	  a	  bigger	  reason	  for	  diversification	  in	  the	  iron	  and	  steel	  industry	  was	  the	  need	  to	  reduce	  transportation	  costs.	  By	  integrating	  the	  production	  of	  crude	  iron,	  refined	  steel,	  and	  various	  steel-­‐related	  products	  within	  an	  enterprise,	  an	  integrated	  iron	  and	  steel	  enterprise	  could	  eliminate	  transportation	  costs,	  and	  local	  demand	  for	  steel	  could	  be	  met	  more	  easily.	  Therefore,	  crude	  iron	  producers	  were	  encouraged	  to	  diversify	  and	  expand	  into	  steel	  rolling	  and	  the	  manufacturing	  of	  steel	  products	  as	  a	  way	  to	  lower	  transportation	  costs	  and	  address	  local	  needs	  for	  steel.	  	  	   	   The	  demand	  for	  steel	  	  was	  an	  acute	  need	  that	  had	  be	  addressed	  during	  China’s	  rapid	  industrialization.	  Chinese	  economic	  policy	  makers	  recognized	  that	  local,	  indigenous,	  integrated	  iron	  and	  steel	  enterprises	  presented	  a	  solution	  to	  local	  needs.	  Therefore,	  they	  encouraged	  local	  raw	  iron	  producers	  to	  diversify	  into	  the	  production	  of	  steel.	  Once	  the	  needs	  for	  steel	  could	  be	  addressed	  locally	  by	  the	  xiao	  er	  quan	  (small-­‐scale	  and	  self-­‐sufficient)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  “Chongfen	  liyong	  xianyou	  shebei,	  kuoda	  meitan	  zonghe	  liyong,	  lüda	  qianfang	  baiji	  xiang	  ‘wujin’	  qubao,”	  Renmin	  ribao,	  March	  29,	  1960.	  14	  Ibid.	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enterprises,	  the	  demand	  for	  steel	  on	  the	  national	  level	  could	  then	  be	  addressed.	  A	  publication	  of	  an	  iron	  and	  steel	  study	  group	  outlined	  the	  logic	  behind	  promoting	  diversification	  in	  the	  local	  iron	  and	  steel	  industry:	  …	  [diversification]	  meets	  the	  demand	  for	  various	  products	  from	  the	  national	  economy	  and	  supports	  local	  industry	  and	  agriculture	  by	  providing	  a	  large	  number	  of	  products	  of	  great	  variety.	  At	  the	  initial	  development	  stage	  of	  xiaoyangqun	  (small-­‐scale,	  local)	  enterprises,	  most	  of	  them	  only	  made	  a	  single	  product:	  they	  were	  iron	  refining	  factories	  that	  specialized	  in	  the	  production	  of	  raw	  iron.	  Making	  only	  one	  product	  was	  far	  from	  meeting	  the	  demand	  of	  fast	  growing	  local	  industries	  and	  agriculture…for	  a	  country	  that	  has	  a	  population	  of	  500,000,	  it	  requires	  approximately	  310,000	  tons	  of	  pig	  iron	  and	  steel,	  most	  of	  which	  are	  needed	  in	  the	  form	  of	  machine	  tools,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  construction	  materials	  and	  fuel.	  This	  requires	  the	  integrated	  enterprises	  to	  produce	  more	  and	  better	  pig	  iron,	  as	  well	  as	  turn	  iron	  into	  steel,	  turn	  steel	  into	  machinery,	  and	  produce	  as	  many	  types	  of	  products	  as	  possible	  with	  existing	  resources,	  such	  as	  machine	  tools	  for	  agriculture,	  construction	  materials,	  chemicals,	  etc.	  The	  iron	  and	  steel	  enterprises	  must	  diversify	  into	  the	  direction	  of	  integrated	  enterprises—they	  must	  produce	  not	  only	  pig	  iron,	  but	  also	  steel	  and	  rolled	  steel;	  not	  only	  iron	  and	  steel,	  but	  also	  the	  production	  of	  machinery,	  chemical	  products,	  construction	  materials,	  etc.	  15	  	  The	  study	  group	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  local	  iron	  producers	  must	  diversify	  to	  meet	  local	  needs	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  steel	  products.	  What	  was	  unique	  about	  the	  iron	  and	  steel	  integrated	  enterprises,	  however,	  was	  that	  diversification	  did	  not	  emerge	  originally	  to	  fill	  their	  supply	  chain	  gaps.	  By	  the	  time	  the	  steel	  and	  iron	  enterprises	  started	  diversifying,	  the	  complete	  factory	  model	  had	  already	  evolved	  into	  the	  model	  of	  diversification.	  Therefore,	  as	  the	  study	  group	  above	  indicated,	  diversification	  was	  adopted	  primarily	  as	  a	  solution	  to	  address	  the	  local	  needs	  for	  steel	  products.	  	  	   Economic	  analysts	  argued	  that	  if	  local	  factories	  could	  meet	  local	  demand,	  the	  small,	  diversified,	  enterprises	  were	  superior	  to	  large,	  state	  enterprises	  located	  further	  from	  the	  countryside,	  where	  most	  of	  the	  demand	  for	  steel	  products	  came	  from:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Gongye	  jingjixi	  56	  ji	  gangtie	  xiaoyangqun	  diaochazu,	  “Dagao	  duozhong	  jingying	  shi	  gaosu	  fazhan	  gongye	  shengchan	  shixian	  chijiu	  dayuejin	  de	  zhanlue	  fangzhen—Sichuan	  gangtie	  xiaoyangqun	  de	  zonghe	  jingying”,	  62-­‐63.	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Most	  of	  the	  steel	  products	  needed	  in	  agriculture	  are	  small	  in	  size…	  if	  the	  indigenous	  integrated	  steel	  and	  iron	  enterprises	  can	  satisfy	  the	  demand,	  what’s	  wrong	  with	  that?	  Why	  do	  we	  have	  to	  roll	  tons	  of	  steel	  from	  big	  corporations	  in	  the	  city	  and	  ship	  them	  into	  the	  countryside?16	  	  	  	   One	  clear-­‐cut	  example	  of	  how	  iron	  producers	  diversified	  into	  the	  production	  of	  steel	  products	  was	  the	  Shangcheng	  County	  Small	  Integrated	  Steel	  and	  Iron	  Enterprise	  (Shangchengxian	  xiaoxin	  gangtie	  lianhe	  qiye).	  Starting	  out	  as	  an	  small-­‐scale,	  local	  iron	  furnace	  that	  only	  produced	  raw	  iron	  in	  1957,	  the	  factory	  was	  later	  transformed	  into	  an	  integrated	  enterprise	  that	  could	  produce	  iron,	  steel	  as	  well	  as	  a	  variety	  of	  steel-­‐based	  products:	  	   within	  half	  a	  month,	  [the	  Shangcheng	  County	  enterprise]	  turned	  from	  an	  xiaotuqun	  (small-­‐scale,	  local)	  furnace	  into	  a	  factory	  with	  seven	  workshops,	  including:	  a	  pulverizing	  workshop,	  two	  steel	  furnaces,	  a	  low-­‐temperature	  steel-­‐smelting	  furnace,	  a	  steel-­‐hammering	  workshop,	  a	  rolling	  mill,	  and	  a	  power	  supply	  workshop.	  It	  is	  able	  to	  integrate	  the	  processes	  from	  handling	  raw	  materials	  to	  finished	  products.	  It	  can	  now	  produce	  raw	  iron,	  steel	  ingot,	  steel	  billet,	  round	  steel,	  square	  steel,	  flat	  steel,	  steel	  sheet,	  steel	  blade	  for	  spades,	  wire	  cable,	  nails,	  etc.17	  	  The	  author	  used	  the	  term	  xiaotuqun,	  the	  literal	  translation	  of	  which	  was	  “small-­‐scale,	  ‘homemade’,	  and	  from	  the	  masses”.	  This	  was	  a	  term	  that	  emerged	  specifically	  to	  describe	  the	  iron	  and	  steel	  integrated	  enterprises.	  The	  xiaotuqun	  factory	  diversified	  primarily	  to	  meet	  the	  demand	  for	  instruments	  and	  machinery	  from	  the	  local	  agricultural	  sector.	  After	  diversification,	  the	  factory	  could	  then	  produce	  a	  variety	  of	  steel	  and	  steel	  products	  to	  meet	  local	  demand.	  In	  another	  example,	  the	  No.1	  Iron	  and	  Steel	  Factory	  (Diyi	  gangtie	  chang)	  reiterates	  the	  goal	  of	  supplying	  adequate	  machinery	  and	  equipment	  to	  the	  county	  the	  factory	  was	  located	  in:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  “Jianli	  tuyang	  jiehe	  de	  xiaoxing	  gangtie	  lianhe	  qiye—zailun	  gangtie	  gongye	  ‘xiaotuqun’	  de	  gonggu	  he	  tigao,”	  Renmin	  ribao,	  December	  7,	  1959.	  17	  Henansheng	  yejin	  gongyeju,	  ed.	  Shangchengxian	  xiaoxing	  gangtie	  lianhe	  qiye	  zuzhi	  guanli	  
jingyan	  (Zhengzhou:	  Henan	  renmin	  chubanshe,	  February	  1959),	  1-­‐2.	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Currently,	  this	  factory	  has	  used	  a	  two-­‐ton,	  half-­‐foreign,	  half-­‐indigenous,	  small	  rolling	  mill	  to	  produce	  thin	  steel	  plates,	  steel	  rod,	  round	  steel,	  flat	  steel	  and	  various	  other	  steel	  products;	  use	  a	  simplified	  wire	  drawing	  machine	  to	  make	  steel	  wire.	  After	  	  the	  integrated	  steel	  and	  iron	  enterprise	  is	  fully	  established,	  it	  will	  manufacture	  10,000	  tons	  of	  steel,	  120,000	  tons	  of	  raw	  iron,	  and	  7,000	  tons	  of	  rolled	  steel	  annually;	  in	  the	  meantime,	  it	  can	  make	  some	  production	  tools	  and	  machinery	  equipment.	  In	  the	  future,	  this	  factory	  will	  be	  the	  industrial	  center	  of	  the	  country.	  Along	  with	  other	  industries,	  they	  will	  form	  a	  relatively	  complete	  industrial	  system	  and	  allow	  the	  Shangcheng	  County	  to	  be	  self-­‐sufficient	  in	  most	  of	  the	  required	  equipment.18	  	  The	  No.1	  Iron	  and	  Steel	  Factory	  not	  only	  diversified	  into	  the	  production	  of	  rolled	  steel,	  but	  also	  a	  variety	  of	  machinery	  and	  equipment.	  Compared	  to	  the	  previous	  factory	  that	  expanded	  into	  the	  making	  of	  various	  steel	  products,	  this	  factory	  achieved	  a	  higher	  level	  of	  diversification.	  Both	  steel	  and	  iron	  factories	  were	  located	  in	  the	  Shangcheng	  County,	  and	  the	  primary	  goal	  of	  all	  diversified	  enterprises	  was	  to	  make	  the	  county	  self-­‐sufficient	  in	  “most	  of	  the	  required	  equipment”.	  In	  other	  words,	  factories	  diversified	  to	  produce	  iron	  and	  steel	  equipment	  for	  the	  external	  use	  of	  others.	  This	  represented	  the	  Chinese	  economic	  thinkers’	  vision	  for	  integrated	  enterprises	  during	  the	  Great	  Leap	  Forward:	  the	  xiaotuqun	  iron	  and	  steel	  factories	  would	  achieve	  a	  high	  level	  of	  diversification	  and	  fully	  address	  the	  shortage	  of	  steel	  products	  on	  a	  local	  scale.	  With	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  these	  local	  integrated	  enterprises,	  the	  shortage	  of	  steel	  and	  steel	  products	  could	  then	  be	  addressed	  on	  a	  national	  scale.	  	  	   In	  addition,	  Chinese	  economic	  writers	  noted	  that	  much	  of	  the	  raw	  iron	  production	  was	  small	  in	  scale	  and	  widely	  scattered.	  Therefore,	  the	  creation	  of	  integrated	  iron	  and	  steel	  enterprises	  was	  a	  way	  to	  consolidate	  the	  production	  of	  iron	  on	  the	  local	  scale	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Wuhan	  daxue	  jingjixi	  sannianji	  gongye	  diaochazu,	  “Cong	  shangchengxian	  daban	  gangtie	  kan	  xiaotuqun	  de	  weili	  jiqi	  fazhan—chaoying	  renmin	  gongshe	  diaocha	  baogao	  zhi’er,”	  in	  Wuhan	  
daxue	  xuebao	  (renwen	  kexueban)	  1	  (1959),	  55.	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produce	  steel	  products	  that	  would	  be	  consumed	  locally.	  In	  an	  editorial	  published	  in	  the	  
People’s	  Daily	  in	  1958,	  for	  example,	  the	  author	  highlighted	  this	  point	  :	  These	  small-­‐scale,	  foreign-­‐and-­‐indigenous-­‐hybrid,	  iron	  and	  steel	  industrial	  bases	  can	  transform	  the	  previously	  specialized,	  scattered	  iron-­‐making	  and	  steel-­‐making	  centers	  into	  concentrated,	  completed	  enterprises.	  This	  would	  allow	  the	  factory	  to	  perform	  various	  tasks	  in-­‐house	  without	  incurring	  any	  transportation	  costs,	  including	  turning	  minerals	  into	  iron,	  turning	  iron	  into	  steel,	  rolling	  steel,	  making	  machines,	  producing	  coke,	  and	  extracting	  various	  by	  products	  from	  coal.	  These	  “small	  but	  complete”	  iron	  and	  steel	  industrial	  bases	  can	  be	  built	  in	  a	  relatively	  short	  amount	  of	  time.	  They	  can	  gradually	  form	  industrial	  centers	  in	  places	  with	  weak	  industrial	  base	  and	  have	  a	  huge	  impact	  on	  the	  surrounding	  rural	  areas.19	  	  	  The	  author	  also	  highlighted	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  products	  of	  iron	  and	  steel	  enterprises	  were	  not	  constrained	  to	  the	  production	  of	  steel	  and	  other	  kinds	  of	  equipment	  and	  machinery.	  Following	  the	  logic	  of	  maximizing	  use	  of	  resources,	  they	  were	  encouraged	  to	  expand	  into	  the	  production	  of	  coke	  and	  various	  by-­‐products	  as	  well.	  In	  addition,	  he	  reiterated	  the	  impact	  of	  indigenous	  iron	  and	  steel	  enterprises	  on	  their	  surrounding	  regions:	  as	  they	  started	  to	  diversify	  and	  supply	  steel	  as	  well	  as	  various	  types	  of	  equipment	  and	  machinery	  to	  factories	  in	  other	  industries,	  the	  integrated	  enterprises	  would	  serve	  as	  a	  driving	  force	  in	  the	  industrialization	  of	  surrounding	  areas.	  	  	  	   The	  logic	  behind	  diversification	  was	  embedded	  in	  many	  of	  the	  examples	  of	  individual	  enterprises	  discussed	  above.	  One	  major	  reason	  given	  by	  Chinese	  economic	  thinkers	  was	  that	  diversification	  was	  conducive	  to	  the	  maximum	  utilization	  of	  resources.	  This	  was	  a	  shared	  logic	  among	  many	  enterprises	  described	  above.	  In	  the	  following	  article	  on	  the	  development	  of	  integrated	  enterprises	  in	  the	  Sichuan	  province,	  the	  author	  elaborated	  on	  how	  diversification	  could	  promote	  the	  optimum	  use	  of	  raw	  materials:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  “Zhengdun,	  gonggu	  he	  tigao—gangtie	  zhanxian	  ‘xiaotuqun’	  de	  xinjieduan,”	  Renmin	  ribao,	  November	  25,	  1958. 
	   35	  
Maximum	  utilization	  of	  resources	  is	  an	  important	  measure	  of	  modern	  industries,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  major	  standard	  in	  evaluating	  the	  industrial	  level	  of	  a	  country.	  The	  more	  advanced	  industries	  are,	  the	  more	  efficiently	  one	  can	  use	  the	  resources;	  the	  higher	  the	  level	  of	  industrialization	  is,	  the	  more	  comprehensive	  the	  utilization	  of	  resources	  is.	  However,	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  comprehensive	  utilization,	  one	  must	  break	  through	  the	  rigid	  boundaries	  of	  specialization	  and	  promote	  diversification.	  For	  a	  steel	  and	  iron	  factory,	  only	  after	  it	  diversifies	  and	  expands	  into	  the	  production	  of	  chemicals	  and	  construction	  materials	  can	  it	  make	  use	  of	  mineral	  waste	  and	  coal	  tar.20	  	  He	  highlighted	  that	  one	  major	  way	  to	  make	  maximum	  use	  of	  resources	  was	  through	  diversification.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  utilization	  of	  raw	  materials,	  another	  major	  reason	  for	  diversification	  was	  to	  make	  use	  of	  existing	  equipment,	  machinery	  and	  various	  other	  production	  capacities:	  …	  diversification	  could	  make	  full	  use	  of	  facilities,	  capital,	  technologies	  and	  other	  economic	  potential,	  making	  the	  best	  use	  of	  existing	  resources	  and	  increasing	  social	  wealth.	  First	  of	  all,	  once	  factories	  diversify,	  	  they	  transform	  from	  the	  manufacturing	  of	  one	  product	  to	  multiple	  products.	  This	  is	  equivalent	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  new	  enterprises	  on	  a	  massive	  scale.	  In	  addition,	  diversified	  enterprises	  can	  extract	  useful	  materials	  from	  waste	  products.	  This	  is	  equivalent	  to	  ‘turning	  stone	  into	  gold’…	  [diversification]	  greatly	  increases	  product	  types	  and	  enlarges	  social	  wealth.21	  	  The	  author	  argued	  that	  diversification	  would	  bring	  greater	  variety	  of	  products	  to	  the	  country	  at	  relatively	  low	  cost,	  since	  no	  new	  enterprises	  needed	  to	  be	  built.	  In	  other	  words,	  since	  existing	  factories	  could	  add	  new	  product	  lines,	  it	  would	  be	  much	  cheaper	  than	  building	  new	  enterprises	  to	  undertake	  the	  production	  of	  the	  added	  products.	  	  	   In	  addition	  to	  elaborating	  on	  specific	  examples	  of	  diversified	  enterprises	  and	  the	  logic	  behind	  diversification,	  Chinese	  economic	  writers	  also	  discussed	  how	  the	  model	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Gongye	  jingjixi	  56	  ji	  gangtie	  xiaoyangqun	  diaochazu,	  “Dagao	  duozhong	  jingying	  shi	  gaosu	  fazhan	  gongye	  shengchan	  shixian	  chijiu	  dayuejin	  de	  zhanlue	  fangzhen—Sichuan	  gangtie	  xiaoyangqun	  de	  zonghe	  jingying,”	  64. 21	  Li	  Ximu, “Duozhong	  jingying	  shi	  gongye	  qiye	  duokuaihaosheng	  de	  fazhan	  shengchan	  zhilu,”	  
Renmin	  ribao,	  October	  8,	  1960. 
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diversification	  was	  promoted	  on	  the	  provincial	  level.	  The	  local	  enterprises	  described	  above	  were	  not	  unique	  instances	  of	  diversification;	  they	  represented	  a	  much	  larger	  trend	  of	  diversification	  pursued	  by	  factories	  all	  across	  the	  country.	  One	  of	  the	  provinces	  that	  was	  featured	  in	  the	  People’s	  Daily	  was	  Heilongjiang:	  In	  the	  past	  two	  years,	  many	  large	  enterprises	  in	  different	  regions	  have	  moved	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  diversified,	  integrated	  enterprises.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  June	  this	  year,	  more	  than	  2100	  of	  the	  2900	  enterprises	  in	  Heilongjiang	  Province	  have	  diversified,	  and	  a	  total	  of	  13,945	  diversified	  production	  units	  of	  established.	  On	  average,	  every	  enterprise	  built	  more	  than	  six	  diversified	  production	  units.	  Some	  enterprises	  even	  built	  dozens	  of	  even	  more	  than	  a	  hundred	  smaller	  factories,	  workshops,	  or	  departments.22	  	  	  The	  author	  indicated	  the	  prevalence	  of	  diversification	  among	  enterprises	  in	  Heilongjiang.	  More	  than	  seventy	  percent	  of	  the	  enterprises	  had	  diversified,	  and	  had	  expanded	  into	  multiple	  product	  lines.	  On	  the	  enterprise	  level,	  the	  	  extent	  of	  diversification	  was	  astounding—some	  factories	  had	  diversified	  into	  the	  production	  of	  hundreds	  of	  finished	  products.	  	  Furthermore,	  diversification	  was	  not	  only	  followed	  by	  larger	  enterprises;	  smaller	  factories	  started	  to	  diversify	  as	  well:	  “Now,	  many	  smaller	  enterprises…	  in	  basic	  construction,	  transportation,	  commerce,	  agriculture,	  etc.	  have	  begun	  to	  diversify.”23	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  prevalence	  of	  diversification,	  diversified	  products	  made	  up	  of	  a	  bigger	  percentage	  of	  the	  overall	  industrial	  output	  of	  the	  province:	  “In	  1959,	  output	  from	  diversification	  made	  up	  of	  only	  5%	  of	  the	  overall	  industrial	  output	  of	  the	  province;	  in	  the	  first	  half	  year	  of	  1960,	  this	  number	  has	  gone	  up	  to	  roughly	  10%.”24	  For	  individual	  factories,	  diversified	  products	  also	  made	  up	  of	  more	  and	  more	  of	  a	  factory’s	  output.	  The	  editorial	  gave	  an	  example	  of	  the	  Jiamusi	  Sugar	  Factory	  (Jiamusi	  youyi	  tangchang),	  which	  established	  66	  work	  units	  that	  specialized	  in	  the	  production	  of	  iron	  and	  steel,	  coke,	  machinery,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22 Ibid. 23 Ibid.	  24	  Ibid.	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construction	  materials,	  phosphate	  fertilizers,	  nitric	  acid,	  etc.	  From	  January	  to	  June	  1960,	  the	  output	  from	  the	  diversification	  work	  units	  made	  up	  45.43%	  of	  the	  factory’s	  total	  output.25	  For	  a	  given	  factory,	  diversified	  products	  could	  make	  up	  as	  high	  as	  half	  of	  its	  total	  output.	  	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Great	  Leap	  Forward,	  complete	  factories	  had	  emerged	  from	  makeshift	  solutions	  to	  filling	  in	  gaps	  of	  incomplete	  supply	  chains	  to	  a	  more	  evolved	  business	  model	  followed	  by	  factories	  across	  all	  industries.	  The	  belief	  in	  economic	  benefits	  became	  an	  ideological	  commitment,	  along	  with	  other	  things,	  such	  as	  the	  virtues	  of	  walking	  on	  two	  legs,	  national	  self-­‐sufficiency...	  In	  an	  editorial	  published	  on	  
People’s	  Daily	  in	  1958,	  the	  commentator	  argued	  that	  diversified	  enterprises	  were	  not	  makeshift	  solutions,	  but	  were	  intended	  as	  long-­‐term	  solutions:	  “the	  xiaotuqun	  iron	  and	  steel	  integrated	  enterprises	  are	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  expediency;	  instead,	  they	  are	  a	  long-­‐term	  strategy	  in	  our	  country’s	  industrialization	  process.”26	  Diversification	  became	  an	  ideological	  commitment	  when	  advocated	  by	  Chairman	  Mao.	  In	  an	  editorial	  published	  in	  People’s	  Daily	  entitled	  “An	  Important	  Direction”,	  it	  encouraged	  all	  existing	  enterprises	  to	  develop	  into	  the	  direction	  of	  integration	  and	  diversification.27	  The	  editorial	  opened	  its	  discussion	  with	  a	  quotation	  from	  Chairman	  Mao,	  which	  presented	  diversification	  as	  an	  important	  direction	  to	  be	  followed	  by	  all	  enterprises:	  In	  September	  of	  1958,	  while	  Chairman	  Mao	  was	  touring	  and	  conducting	  inspections	  in	  Hubei	  Province,	  he	  once	  said:	  “For	  large	  enterprises	  such	  as	  the	  Wuhan	  Iron	  and	  Steel	  Corporation	  (wugang),	  they	  can	  gradually	  develop	  into	  diversified	  and	  integrated	  enterprises.	  In	  addition	  to	  producing	  steel	  and	  iron-­‐related	  products,	  they	  can	  also	  expand	  into	  the	  machine-­‐building	  industry,	  chemical	  industry,	  construction	  industry,	  etc.”	  Now,	  a	  year	  later,	  the	  great	  vision	  of	  Chairman	  Mao	  has	  been	  realized.	  Factories	  such	  as	  the	  Wuhan	  Iron	  and	  Steel	  Corporation	  and	  the	  Baotou	  Iron	  and	  Steel	  Company	  not	  only	  produce	  iron	  and	  steel,	  but	  also	  cement,	  refractory	  materials,	  and	  machinery.	  Yesterday,	  in	  a	  piece	  of	  news	  published	  by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Ibid.	  26	  “Zhengdun,	  gonggu	  he	  tigao—gangtie	  zhanxian	  ‘xiaotuqun’	  de	  xinjieduan,”	  Renmin	  ribao,	  November	  25,	  1958. 27	  Benbao	  pinglun	  yuan,	  “Yige	  zhongyao	  de	  fangxiang,”	  Renmin	  ribao,	  April	  22,	  1960.	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our	  newspaper	  on	  Huainan	  City,	  we	  can	  see	  how	  a	  city	  that	  used	  to	  produce	  only	  coal	  is	  now	  transformed	  into	  a	  diversified	  industrial	  city	  with	  the	  coal	  industry	  at	  the	  center	  and	  various	  other	  industries,	  including	  the	  steel	  and	  iron,	  coke,	  machinery	  and	  chemicals.	  	  This	  is	  an	  important	  event.	  It	  marks	  an	  important	  direction.	  All	  the	  large	  enterprises	  must	  develop	  into	  the	  direction	  of	  diversified,	  integrated	  enterprises.	  28	  	  Just	  as	  diversification	  had	  evolved	  into	  a	  well-­‐established	  business	  model	  and	  an	  ideological	  commitment,	  however,	  a	  new	  movement	  that	  emerged	  between	  1960	  and	  1965	  challenged	  the	  complete	  factory	  model	  and	  principle	  of	  diversification.	  As	  the	  Specialization	  and	  Coordination	  Movement	  unfolded	  in	  Chinese	  economy,	  factories	  were	  encouraged	  to	  develop	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction	  of	  diversification—to	  specialize	  and	  to	  spin	  off	  the	  diversified	  production	  capacities.	  With	  the	  promotion	  of	  specialization,	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  became	  a	  central	  topic	  of	  debate	  among	  Chinese	  economic	  thinkers.	  	  	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Ibid.	  





The	  Specialization	  and	  Coordination	  Movement	  (1961-­‐1965)	  
	  	   Complete	  factories,	  which	  started	  out	  as	  makeshift	  solutions	  to	  supply-­‐chain	  and	  transportation	  bottlenecks	  in	  the	  Chinese	  industrialization	  process,	  had	  become	  a	  much	  celebrated	  and	  positive	  model	  for	  Chinese	  enterprises	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Great	  Leap	  Forward	  .	  Factories	  in	  various	  industries	  were	  encouraged	  to	  complete	  their	  own	  supply	  chains	  and	  produce	  everything	  in-­‐house.	  With	  the	  development	  of	  multiple	  product	  lines,	  many	  decided	  to	  diversify	  and	  turn	  the	  complete	  factory	  model	  into	  a	  virtue.	  In	  the	  early	  1960s,	  however,	  criticisms	  of	  complete	  factories	  started	  to	  surface,	  and	  by	  mid-­‐1960s,	  the	  Specialization	  and	  Coordination	  Movement	  came	  into	  full	  swing.	  The	  complete	  factory	  model	  was	  dismantled,	  and	  Chinese	  economic	  thinkers	  started	  calling	  for	  factories	  to	  break	  down	  complete	  factories	  and	  transform	  them	  into	  smaller,	  specialized	  ones.	  	  	   In	  late	  1950s	  and	  early	  1960s,	  when	  the	  complete	  factory	  model	  was	  still	  touted	  all	  over	  the	  country,	  some	  economic	  policy	  thinkers	  had	  already	  started	  to	  question	  the	  model	  and	  came	  up	  with	  alternative	  solutions	  to	  the	  bottlenecks	  faced	  by	  the	  Chinese	  economy.	  Increased	  specialization	  in	  production,	  they	  believed,	  was	  the	  pathway	  for	  all	  advanced	  economies.	  Specialization	  allowed	  for	  economies	  of	  scale,	  improvement	  of	  quality	  through	  experience	  and	  stricter	  quality	  control,	  and	  greater	  flexibility	  in	  the	  range	  of	  goods	  produced.	  For	  example,	  in	  1960,	  when	  the	  GLF	  was	  still	  underway,	  supporters	  of	  specialization	  started	  to	  point	  out	  various	  benefits	  that	  came	  with	  higher	  level	  of	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specialization.	  They	  believed	  that	  “once	  enterprises	  specialize,	  they	  can	  then	  make	  use	  of	  assembly	  lines	  and	  advanced	  technologies	  to	  increase	  productivity.”1	  The	  xiao	  er	  quan	  or	  
xiaotuqun	  factories	  might	  provide	  a	  temporary	  solution	  to	  some	  of	  the	  challenges	  of	  broad	  front	  development	  confronting	  the	  Chinese	  economy,	  but	  they	  ought	  not	  to	  be	  regarded	  as	  long-­‐term,	  permanent	  solutions.	  With	  the	  proliferation	  of	  complete	  factories,	  flaws	  of	  self-­‐sufficiency	  started	  to	  emerge	  and	  became	  increasingly	  hard	  to	  overlook.	  	  	   Criticisms	  of	  the	  complete	  factory	  model	  began	  to	  surface	  in	  increasing	  volume	  from	  early	  1960s.	  These	  criticisms	  included:	  inflexibility	  in	  product	  lines,	  high	  costs	  of	  production,	  low	  product	  quality,	  low	  utilization	  of	  resources	  and	  production	  capacities,	  redundancy,	  and	  the	  inadequate	  supply	  of	  secondary	  machine	  parts	  and	  components.	  One	  of	  the	  major	  criticisms	  was	  the	  inflexibility	  of	  product	  lines	  and	  limited	  scope	  of	  product	  types.	  As	  complete	  factories	  grew	  in	  size	  and	  started	  to	  produce	  more	  complicated	  forms	  of	  machinery,	  it	  became	  increasingly	  hard	  to	  add	  new	  product	  types	  or	  modify	  existing	  products.	  In	  a	  complete	  factory,	  for	  example,	  a	  whole	  complete	  chain	  would	  be	  devoted	  to	  the	  production	  of	  one	  finished	  product.	  In	  order	  to	  modify	  the	  finished	  product,	  many	  interconnected	  steps	  of	  the	  production	  process	  needed	  to	  be	  changed.	  This	  caused	  great	  difficulty	  to	  many	  enterprises.	  As	  the	  Chinese	  economy	  underwent	  rapid	  industrialization,	  the	  addition	  of	  new	  product	  types	  was	  constant.	  Moreover,	  high	  production	  costs	  and	  low	  product	  quality	  became	  major	  challenges	  as	  well.	  A	  complete	  factory	  usually	  possessed	  several	  workshops	  that	  would	  were	  responsible	  for	  different	  stages	  of	  the	  production	  process.	  Nearly	  all	  of	  these	  workshops	  were	  underutilized,	  since	  the	  manufacturing	  of	  a	  finished	  product	  only	  required	  the	  use	  of	  a	  workshop	  at	  specified	  times	  of	  the	  production	  process.	  The	  maintenance	  of	  all	  workshops	  could	  be	  costly	  for	  a	  complete	  factory.	  In	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1 Li	  Ximu,	  “Duozhong	  jingying	  shi	  gongye	  qiye	  duokuai	  haosheng	  de	  fazhan	  shengchan	  zhilu,	  
Renmin	  ribao,	  October	  8,	  1960.	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addition,	  the	  factory	  was	  unable	  to	  devote	  equal	  attention	  to	  every	  step	  of	  the	  production	  process	  and,	  therefore,	  product	  quality	  could	  not	  be	  gauranteed.	  One	  of	  the	  major	  characteristics	  of	  modern	  industrial	  production	  was	  the	  ability	  to	  mass	  produce.	  With	  the	  proliferation	  of	  complete	  factories,	  productivity	  remained	  low	  and	  economies	  of	  scale	  could	  not	  be	  achieved.	  This	  posed	  a	  serious	  challenge	  to	  China’s	  industrialization	  process.	  	   By	  the	  mid-­‐1960s,	  the	  Specialization	  and	  Coordination	  Movement	  put	  an	  end	  to	  the	  prevalence	  of	  complete	  factories	  and	  a	  newer	  business	  model	  was	  touted.	  Factories	  were	  encouraged	  to	  specialize	  and	  to	  outsource	  the	  manufacturing	  of	  intermediate	  goods	  and	  components	  to	  others.	  The	  Specialization	  and	  Coordination	  Movement	  unfolded	  on	  both	  municipal	  and	  provincial	  levels,	  along	  with	  experiments	  undertaken	  by	  individual	  enterprises.	  Chinese	  economic	  critics	  and	  commentators	  described	  how	  the	  movement	  developed	  on	  provincial	  levels	  and	  gave	  anecdotes	  of	  how	  individual	  factories	  broke	  up	  complete	  factories,	  increased	  outsourcing,	  and	  started	  to	  specialize.	  	  One	  factory	  that	  exemplified	  the	  dismantling	  of	  complete	  factories	  during	  the	  Specialization	  and	  Coordination	  Movement	  was	  the	  Shenyang	  No.1	  Machine	  Tool	  Factory	  (Shenyang	  diyi	  jichuang	  chang).	  In	  October	  1964,	  an	  article	  was	  published	  on	  the	  People’s	  Daily	  featuring	  how	  the	  machine	  tool	  factory	  underwent	  the	  transformation.2	  Entitled	  “Shenyang	  No.1	  Machine	  Tool	  Factory	  Found	  Ways	  to	  Increase	  Volume	  and	  Efficiency	  of	  Production—Discarding	  the	  Complete	  Factory	  Model	  and	  Adopting	  Specialization	  and	  Coordination”,	  the	  article	  first	  gave	  an	  overview	  of	  factory’s	  previous	  business	  model	  and	  offered	  a	  critique	  of	  self-­‐sufficiency:	  Shenyang	  No.1	  Machine	  Tool	  Factory	  has	  been	  a	  complete	  factory	  since	  the	  completion	  of	  restructuring	  and	  start	  of	  production	  in	  1956.	  In	  recent	  years,	  it	  continued	  going	  into	  the	  direction	  “self-­‐reliance	  in	  all	  things”	  .	  Up	  to	  now,	  this	  factory	  can	  complete	  most	  of	  its	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  “Shengyang	  diyi	  jichuang	  chang	  zhaodao	  duokuai	  haosheng	  fazhan	  shengchan	  daolu,	  tiaochu	  quanneng	  chang,	  shixing	  zhuanyehua	  xiezuo,”	  Renmin	  ribao,	  October	  23,	  1964.	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production	  on	  its	  own	  and	  is	  able	  to	  manufacture	  almost	  all	  the	  machine	  parts	  of	  a	  machine	  tool	  except	  for	  a	  few	  components,	  including	  large	  machine	  part	  such	  as	  lathe	  beds,	  small	  parts	  such	  as	  neoprene	  washers	  and	  screws,	  as	  well	  as	  wooden	  cases	  and	  metal	  straps	  for	  packing—all	  of	  these	  are	  produced	  in-­‐house.	  The	  consequence	  of	  going	  into	  the	  direction	  of	  an	  omnipotent	  factory,	  however,	  is	  that	  as	  the	  factory	  grows	  larger	  size,	  an	  addition	  of	  a	  new	  product	  requires	  adjustments	  in	  thousands	  of	  steps	  in	  the	  production	  process.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  extremely	  hard	  to	  develop	  new	  product	  types;	  the	  utilization	  rate	  of	  raw	  materials	  is	  low;	  since	  the	  factory	  managers	  try	  to	  be	  in	  charge	  of	  everything,	  the	  multitude	  of	  production	  steps	  create	  many	  obstacles	  and	  makes	  management	  increasingly	  hard.3	  
	  The	  author	  of	  the	  editorial	  highlighted	  three	  major	  disadvantages	  of	  the	  complete	  factory	  model:	  inflexibility	  of	  production,	  inefficient	  use	  of	  raw	  materials,	  and	  challenge	  to	  management.	  The	  inflexibility	  of	  production	  was	  particularly	  relevant	  to	  the	  manufacturing	  of	  machine	  tools.	  As	  the	  factory	  expanded	  its	  production	  and	  started	  to	  make	  more	  complicated	  machine	  tools,	  it	  would	  have	  to	  create	  new	  complete	  product	  chains	  for	  new	  product	  types,	  or	  modify	  the	  current	  product	  chains	  extensively	  to	  accommodate	  the	  production	  of	  new	  goods.	  Both	  methods	  would	  be	  costly	  to	  undertake	  by	  the	  machine	  tool	  factory.	  As	  the	  writer	  above	  accurately	  point	  out,	  adding	  a	  new	  product	  would	  entail	  changes	  in	  “thousands	  of	  steps	  in	  the	  production	  process”,	  since	  the	  making	  of	  one	  machine	  tool	  probably	  involved	  hundreds	  of	  machine	  parts	  and	  components.	  	  	   In	  addition,	  as	  the	  machine	  tool	  factory	  expanded	  its	  production,	  it	  became	  increasingly	  hard	  to	  implement	  quality	  control	  over	  thousands	  of	  its	  products.	  Therefore,	  some	  “secondary”	  components	  remained	  low	  in	  quality:	  Many	  of	  the	  “secondary”	  machine	  parts	  that	  do	  not	  get	  enough	  attention	  in	  complete	  factories	  become	  “primary”	  machine	  parts	  once	  they	  are	  produced	  by	  specialized	  factories.	  Their	  technical	  problems	  are	  solved	  and	  quality	  improved	  rapidly.	  Take	  the	  example	  of	  a	  small	  component	  in	  machine	  tool	  production—mechanical	  springs.	  In	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Ibid.	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past,	  springs	  were	  never	  the	  priority	  of	  Shenyang	  No.1	  Machine	  Tool	  Factory.	  It	  had	  been	  making	  mechanical	  springs	  for	  its	  own	  use	  for	  the	  past	  ten	  years,	  yet	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  springs	  was	  never	  up	  to	  standard.	  In	  the	  earlier	  part	  of	  this	  year,	  it	  outsourced	  the	  production	  of	  all	  springs	  to	  Heping	  Spring	  Factory	  and	  quality	  immediately	  improved.4	  	  One	  of	  the	  components	  that	  remained	  low	  in	  quality	  was	  mechanical	  springs.	  Although	  the	  machine	  tool	  factory	  had	  become	  self-­‐sufficient	  in	  making	  its	  own	  springs	  for	  the	  past	  ten	  years,	  it	  was	  not	  able	  to	  specialize	  in	  spring	  production,	  increase	  the	  quality	  of	  springs	  or	  lower	  production	  costs.	  	  This	  was	  mainly	  due	  to	  the	  complete	  factory	  model	  it	  followed.	  Improved	  product	  quality	  and	  lower	  production	  costs	  only	  came	  with	  experience	  and	  economies	  of	  scale.	  Therefore,	  mechanical	  springs	  remained	  a	  bottleneck	  in	  the	  overall	  making	  of	  machine	  tools.	  The	  solution	  that	  factory	  managers	  came	  up	  with	  was	  to	  outsource	  spring	  production	  to	  Heping	  Spring	  Factory—one	  that	  was	  able	  to	  specialize	  in	  the	  manufacturing	  of	  mechanical	  springs.	  As	  the	  author	  of	  the	  editorial	  highlighted	  above,	  outsourcing	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  an	  effective	  solution	  and	  quality	  of	  springs	  immediately	  improved.	  	  	   In	  addition	  to	  the	  outsourcing	  of	  spring	  production,	  the	  machine	  tool	  factory	  improved	  its	  level	  of	  specialization	  by	  outsourcing	  the	  production	  of	  various	  components	  to	  over	  twenty	  specialized	  factories.	  This	  practice	  allowed	  the	  machine	  tool	  factory	  to	  benefit	  more	  from	  an	  improved	  level	  of	  specialization:	  Twenty	  specialized	  factories	  and	  cooperatives	  are	  currently	  supplying	  Shenyang	  No.1	  Machine	  Tool	  Factory	  with	  many	  components	  at	  a	  cost	  lower	  than	  the	  main	  engine	  plant	  [had	  it	  undertaken	  the	  production	  on	  its	  own].	  Since	  specialized	  factories	  and	  cooperatives	  can	  manufacture	  components	  on	  a	  large	  scale,	  they	  can	  make	  use	  of	  more	  advanced	  technologies	  and	  manufacturing	  techniques.	  Therefore,	  they	  can	  produce	  with	  higher	  efficiency,	  fewer	  raw	  materials,	  and	  lower	  cost.5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Ibid.	  5	  Ibid.	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  The	  machine	  tool	  factory	  outsourced	  much	  of	  the	  production	  of	  components	  to	  specialized	  factories.	  Production	  costs	  were	  lowered	  once	  the	  manufacturing	  of	  components	  was	  outsourced.	  This	  was	  because	  the	  specialized	  factories	  could	  achieve	  economies	  of	  scale	  through	  increasing	  level	  of	  specialization.	  In	  return,	  they	  were	  able	  to	  supply	  components	  at	  a	  lower	  cost	  than	  if	  they	  were	  produced	  in-­‐house	  by	  the	  machine	  tool	  factory.	  In	  addition,	  with	  higher	  volume	  of	  production,	  specialized	  factories	  were	  able	  to	  make	  use	  of	  more	  advanced	  technologies	  that	  would	  otherwise	  be	  inapplicable	  to	  small	  production	  volumes:	  “The	  Shenyang	  No.1	  Machine	  Tool	  Factory	  made	  fasteners	  using	  lathes	  while	  Shenyang	  Standard	  Component	  Factory	  was	  able	  to	  make	  use	  of	  cold	  forging	  techniques	  because	  of	  its	  production	  scale.	  This	  allows	  it	  to	  shorten	  production	  span	  with	  lower	  cost.”6	  The	  machine	  tool	  factory	  was	  unable	  to	  use	  cold	  forging	  techniques,	  while	  the	  specialized	  factory	  that	  it	  outsourced	  the	  production	  of	  fasteners	  to	  was	  able	  to	  make	  use	  of	  the	  more	  advanced	  technology.	  This	  demonstrated	  that	  specialization	  could	  lower	  production	  costs	  through	  adopting	  production	  techniques	  that	  were	  economical	  when	  applied	  on	  a	  large	  scale..	  Overall,	  production	  costs	  for	  the	  machine	  tool	  factory	  were	  lowered	  after	  outsourcing,	  as	  the	  same	  journal	  article	  noted:	  According	  to	  statistics	  from	  earlier	  this	  year,	  in	  manufacturing	  the	  same	  quantity	  of	  fasteners,	  Shenyang	  Standard	  Component	  Factory	  can	  save	  8	  tons	  of	  steel,	  22,000	  hours	  in	  production,	  as	  well	  as	  lower	  production	  cost	  by	  55,000	  yuan	  compared	  to	  Shenyang	  No.1	  Machine	  Tool	  Factory.	  When	  the	  No.1	  Factory	  used	  to	  produce	  wire	  terminal	  connectors	  for	  its	  own	  use,	  the	  production	  cost	  was	  12	  cents	  per	  unit,	  while	  the	  cost	  was	  only	  5	  cents	  for	  specialized	  factories;	  likewise	  for	  double-­‐ended	  wrenches,	  the	  cost	  was	  56	  yuan	  per	  unit	  for	  No.1	  Factory,	  while	  the	  number	  went	  down	  to	  7	  yuan	  for	  specialized	  factories.7	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The	  reduction	  of	  production	  costs	  was	  dramatic—the	  cost	  of	  terminal	  connectors	  was	  cut	  down	  by	  half,	  and	  the	  cost	  of	  wrenches	  was	  cut	  down	  to	  1/8	  of	  their	  original	  cost,	  once	  specialization	  was	  improved.	  Through	  outsourcing,	  the	  machine	  tool	  factory	  was	  able	  to	  address	  the	  major	  challenges	  resulting	  from	  the	  complete	  factory	  model,	  by	  improving	  product	  quality	  and	  cutting	  production	  costs.	  	  	   Another	  example	  that	  was	  highlighted	  by	  Chinese	  economic	  writers	  during	  the	  Specialization	  and	  Coordination	  Movement	  was	  the	  transformation	  of	  Qingshan	  Valve	  Factory	  (Qingshan	  famen	  chang).	  This	  was	  a	  small	  local	  factory	  whose	  main	  product	  was	  valves.	  Prior	  to	  the	  Specialization	  and	  Coordination	  Movement,	  the	  valve	  factory	  was	  exemplified	  a	  typical	  complete	  factory	  that	  internalized	  the	  complete	  chain	  of	  valve	  production:	  Qingshan	  Valve	  Factory	  is	  a	  small	  factory	  with	  only	  a	  hundred	  or	  more	  workers,	  and	  it	  is	  in	  charge	  of	  manufacturing	  valves	  for	  the	  oil	  industry	  and	  the	  construction	  industry.	  In	  the	  past,	  this	  factory	  owned	  a	  casting	  workshop,	  a	  metal	  processing	  workshop	  and	  an	  assembly	  workshop.	  Workers	  believed	  that	  although	  the	  factory	  was	  small,	  it	  possessed	  all	  the	  necessary	  workshops.	  From	  feeding	  materials	  into	  the	  casting	  workshop	  to	  the	  completion	  of	  finished	  products,	  	  there	  was	  no	  need	  to	  step	  out	  of	  the	  factory.	  Therefore,	  such	  a	  factory	  could	  achieve	  “self-­‐reliance	  in	  all	  things”,	  and	  it	  was	  considered	  an	  expedient	  business	  model.8	  	  	  The	  valve	  factory	  incorporated	  casting,	  metal	  processing,	  and	  assembly	  all	  in	  one	  place	  and	  was	  completely	  self-­‐sufficient	  in	  the	  making	  of	  valves.	  However,	  it	  soon	  ran	  into	  a	  major	  roadblock	  with	  its	  casting	  workshop:	  “First	  of	  all,	  there	  is	  a	  shortage	  of	  personnel	  who	  are	  proficient	  in	  casting	  and	  other	  technologies;	  secondly,	  there	  is	  no	  testing	  equipment	  for	  casting.	  Therefore,	  the	  internal	  quality	  of	  castings	  cannot	  be	  managed.”9	  The	  casting	  	  process	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  a	  bottleneck	  in	  the	  production	  of	  valves.	  In	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  “Qingshan	  famen	  chang	  gaibian	  ‘wanshi	  buqiuren’	  zuofa	  chanping	  zhiliang	  tigao	  chengben	  xiajiang,”	  Renmin	  ribao,	  October	  23,	  1964.	  9	  Ibid.	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complete	  factory,	  technologies	  for	  casting	  were	  insufficient,	  and	  it	  was	  unable	  to	  implement	  high	  quality	  control	  over	  the	  casting	  goods	  it	  produced	  for	  internal	  use.	  This	  was	  parallel	  to	  the	  challenge	  of	  manufacturing	  mechanical	  springs	  that	  the	  Shenyang	  No.1	  Machine	  Tool	  Factory	  ran	  into	  in	  the	  previous	  example.	  To	  address	  the	  problem,	  the	  valve	  factory	  decided	  to	  outsource	  the	  casting	  process	  to	  a	  specialized	  casting	  factory—Wuhan	  Casting	  Factory.	  This	  factory	  would	  be	  in	  charge	  of	  all	  the	  casting	  tasks	  for	  the	  valve	  factory,	  and	  benefits	  that	  came	  with	  this	  practice	  was	  immediate:	  Starting	  from	  October	  last	  year,	  Qingshan	  Valve	  Factory	  got	  rid	  of	  its	  casting	  workshop	  and	  outsourced	  the	  manufacturing	  of	  cast	  goods	  to	  Wuhan	  Casting	  Factory.	  The	  casting	  factory	  is	  responsible	  providing	  all	  the	  cast	  goods	  and	  the	  valve	  factory	  is	  now	  only	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  processing	  and	  assembly	  of	  valves…	  Currently,	  the	  inventory	  of	  the	  valve	  factory	  contains	  many	  smooth-­‐surfaced,	  high-­‐quality	  casting	  goods	  from	  the	  cast	  factory,	  and	  it	  usually	  has	  more	  than	  a	  month’s	  stock	  of	  semi-­‐finished	  products.	  It	  no	  longer	  runs	  into	  the	  bottleneck	  of	  not	  having	  enough	  casting	  goods	  in	  production.10	  	  	  The	  bottleneck	  of	  casting	  was	  addressed	  through	  outsourcing.	  The	  valve	  factory	  solved	  the	  problem	  of	  insufficient	  supply	  of	  casting	  goods.	  The	  author	  also	  highlighted	  additional	  benefits	  that	  came	  with	  increasing	  level	  of	  specialization—improved	  product	  quality	  and	  lowered	  production	  costs:	  After	  they	  outsourced	  the	  manufacturing	  of	  casting	  goods	  to	  specialized	  casting	  factories,	  their	  product	  quality	  improved	  dramatically,	  and	  production	  costs	  were	  lowered	  by	  more	  than	  forty	  percent;	  in	  addition,	  the	  hours	  spent	  on	  producing	  every	  valve	  also	  reduced	  by	  twenty	  percent.	  Before,	  Qingshan	  Valve	  Factory	  hired	  over	  thirty	  workers	  to	  be	  in	  charge	  of	  casting;	  now,	  the	  specialized	  factory	  hired	  only	  twenty	  workers	  to	  fulfill	  Qingshan	  Factory’s	  needs.11	  	  	  Here,	  he	  made	  similar	  arguments	  on	  the	  benefits	  of	  specialization	  as	  the	  previous	  author	  of	  the	  machine	  tool	  factory.	  Though	  specialization,	  the	  Wuhan	  Casting	  Factory	  became	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Ibid.	  11	  Ibid.	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more	  efficient	  in	  casting.	  It	  was	  also	  able	  to	  manufacture	  cast	  goods	  at	  a	  lower	  cost	  once	  it	  gained	  enough	  experience	  in	  production	  and	  the	  economies	  of	  scale	  started	  to	  kick	  in.	  Through	  outsourcing	  and	  specialization,	  the	  flaws	  of	  the	  complete	  factory	  model	  were	  addressed.	  	   The	  Specialization	  and	  Coordination	  Movement	  not	  only	  unfolded	  on	  the	  enterprise	  level,	  but	  also	  on	  municipal	  and	  provincial	  levels	  as	  well.	  According	  to	  the	  mayor	  of	  Tianjin,	  Yang	  Zhengmin,	  who	  published	  an	  editorial	  in	  People’s	  Daily	  in	  1965,	  he	  described	  how	  the	  movement	  took	  place	  on	  a	  broader	  scale:	  We	  have	  adjusted	  the	  production	  structure	  of	  some	  machine-­‐building	  factories,	  and	  have	  started	  to	  transform	  ‘big	  and	  complete’,	  ‘small	  and	  complete’	  enterprises	  into	  ‘small	  and	  specialized’,	  ‘medium	  and	  specialized’	  ones.	  This	  is	  a	  revolution	  in	  the	  production	  structure	  of	  the	  machine-­‐building	  industry.	  Although	  it	  is	  yet	  incomplete,	  it	  has	  demonstrated	  its	  superiority	  in	  the	  newly	  structured	  small	  and	  medium-­‐sized	  specialized	  factories.12	  	  Yang	  noted	  that	  the	  movement	  entailed	  breaking	  up	  of	  big	  and	  medium-­‐sized	  complete	  factories	  into	  smaller,	  more	  specialized	  ones.	  On	  the	  enterprise	  level,	  the	  movement	  involved	  discarding	  some	  workshops	  and	  the	  manufacturing	  of	  certain	  components	  by	  outsourcing	  their	  production	  to	  more	  specialized	  factories.	  He	  indicated	  that	  what	  happened	  to	  the	  Shenyang	  No.1	  Machine	  Tool	  Factory	  and	  Qingshan	  Valve	  Factory	  were	  not	  unique	  instances	  of	  transformation,	  but	  were	  representative	  of	  the	  Specialization	  and	  Coordination	  Movement	  that	  was	  unfolding	  on	  a	  broader	  scale.	  	  	   With	  the	  advance	  of	  the	  movement,	  benefits	  of	  specialization	  kicked	  in	  shortly.	  He	  noted	  that	  on	  average,	  production	  increased	  and	  costs	  were	  lowered:	  According	  to	  the	  survey	  on	  thirty	  factories	  that	  recently	  became	  independent	  from	  their	  parent	  factory,	  on	  average,	  their	  production	  increased	  thirty	  to	  forty	  percent	  in	  comparison	  to	  when	  they	  were	  not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Yang	  Zhengmin,	  “Zai	  ‘xiaoerzhuan’,	  ‘daerzhuan’	  de	  jichushang	  zuzhi	  jixie	  gongye	  shengchan,”	  
Renmin	  ribao,	  March	  13,	  1965.	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independent.	  For	  example,	  the	  welding	  workshop	  of	  	  a	  machine	  tool	  factory	  used	  to	  be	  part	  of	  the	  process	  of	  manufacturing	  machine	  tools,	  and	  was	  to	  be	  in	  charge	  of	  only	  a	  part	  of	  the	  welding	  work.	  After	  the	  workshop	  became	  independent,	  it	  now	  took	  charge	  of	  all	  the	  welding	  from	  machine	  tool	  factories,	  as	  well	  as	  from	  forging	  press	  factories	  and	  from	  grinding	  machine	  tool	  factories.	  Its	  productivity	  increased	  by	  forty-­‐five	  percent,	  and	  production	  costs	  were	  lowered	  by	  thirty-­‐four	  percent.13	  	  	  Yang	  suggested	  that	  lowered	  production	  costs	  were	  not	  unique	  to	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  machine	  tool	  factory	  or	  the	  valve	  factory.	  On	  average,	  production	  costs	  of	  specialized	  factories	  were	  lowered.	  He	  specifically	  pointed	  out	  how	  expansion	  of	  production	  volume	  lowered	  costs	  for	  a	  welding	  workshop	  that	  spun	  off	  from	  a	  machine	  tool	  factory.	  Before,	  the	  workshop	  was	  only	  able	  to	  do	  welding	  work	  for	  the	  one	  machine	  tool	  factory	  it	  was	  affiliated	  to.	  After	  it	  became	  independent	  and	  could	  take	  orders	  from	  multiple	  factories,	  the	  welding	  work	  shop	  then	  could	  expand	  production,	  gain	  more	  experience	  from	  welding,	  and	  improve	  production.	  Economies	  of	  scale	  then	  kicked	  in,	  and	  it	  lowered	  its	  production	  costs	  dramatically.	  	  	   Finally,	  Yang	  summarized	  some	  basic	  ideas	  on	  how	  a	  complete	  factory	  could	  be	  broken	  up	  into	  smaller,	  more	  specialized	  production	  units,	  and	  how	  specialized	  factories	  could	  coordinate	  with	  each	  other:	  First,	  one	  can	  divide	  a	  factory	  into	  several	  smaller	  ones:	  we	  can	  divide	  a	  “big	  and	  complete”,	  or	  “small	  and	  complete”	  machine-­‐building	  factory	  into	  several	  “small	  and	  specialized”,	  “medium	  and	  specialized”	  ones.	  In	  some	  cases,	  we	  can	  remove	  individual	  workshops	  and	  establish	  them	  as	  specialized	  factories;	  in	  other	  cases,	  we	  can	  turn	  the	  scattered	  production	  units	  into	  individual	  factories.	  Secondly,	  we	  can	  outsource	  the	  production	  of	  certain	  products.	  While	  the	  main	  factory	  remains	  intact,	  we	  can	  outsource	  the	  manufacturing	  of	  certain	  machine	  parts	  to	  factories	  that	  are	  more	  efficient	  in	  the	  making	  of	  these	  components.	  This	  is	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  challenge	  that	  a	  factory	  is	  in	  charge	  of	  manufacturing	  too	  many	  product	  types,	  and	  the	  redundancy	  in	  production	  of	  factories	  that	  produce	  the	  same	  types	  of	  products.	  This	  can	  lead	  to	  specialization.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Ibid.	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Thirdly,	  we	  can	  specialize	  the	  manufacturing	  of	  components.	  For	  some	  enterprises,	  although	  they	  do	  not	  produce	  many	  finished	  product	  types,	  they	  are	  in	  charge	  of	  making	  all	  of	  their	  components.	  For	  this	  type	  of	  enterprise,	  it	  should	  outsource	  the	  manufacturing	  of	  these	  components,	  coordinate	  with	  specialized	  production	  units	  and	  achieve	  specialization.	  Fourthly,	  many	  factories	  should	  remove	  their	  workshops	  for	  forging,	  casting,	  repair,	  electroplating,	  heat	  treatment,	  and	  establish	  specialized	  factories	  by	  consolidating	  separate	  workshops.14	  	  Yang	  proposed	  several	  possibilities	  on	  how	  a	  complete	  factory	  could	  be	  broken	  up,	  as	  well	  as	  how	  specialization	  could	  be	  improved	  on	  the	  enterprise	  level.	  The	  Shenyang	  No.1	  Machine	  Tool	  Factory	  followed	  the	  third	  model	  described	  above—by	  outsourcing	  the	  production	  of	  certain	  components	  to	  more	  than	  20	  specialized	  factories,	  it	  was	  able	  to	  specialize	  in	  the	  making	  of	  machine	  tools.	  The	  Qingshan	  Valve	  Factory,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  seemed	  to	  belong	  to	  the	  fourth	  model.	  It	  removed	  its	  casting	  workshop,	  and	  outsourced	  the	  production	  of	  all	  casting	  goods	  to	  Wuhan	  Casting	  Factory.	  After	  outsourcing,	  the	  specialization	  of	  both	  factories	  could	  improve:	  while	  the	  valve	  factory	  was	  then	  able	  to	  specialize	  in	  the	  making	  of	  valves,	  the	  casting	  factory	  could	  more	  easily	  achieve	  economies	  of	  scale	  once	  it	  received	  more	  and	  more	  orders	  of	  casting	  goods.	  With	  expansion	  in	  production	  volume,	  the	  level	  of	  specialization	  would	  improve	  more	  rapidly.	  
	   All	  the	  examples	  of	  specialization	  presented	  above	  entailed	  outsourcing,	  cooperation,	  and	  coordination	  with	  other	  specialized	  factories.	  Indeed,	  Chinese	  economic	  writers	  came	  to	  realize	  that	  the	  full	  development	  of	  specialization	  could	  not	  be	  achieved	  without	  major	  attention	  to	  developing	  mechanisms	  of	  coordination.	  Coordination	  had	  been	  brought	  up	  a	  number	  of	  times	  in	  the	  precious	  discussion	  of	  this	  chapter	  in	  the	  context	  of	  specialization,	  but	  they	  presented	  challenges	  in	  their	  own	  right	  in	  a	  planned	  economy.	  Policy	  makers	  had	  to	  go	  through	  additional	  hurdles	  to	  bring	  about	  enterprise-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Ibid.	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level	  coordination	  in	  China,	  where	  national	  planning	  was	  the	  dominant	  way	  of	  allocating	  resources.	  They	  came	  to	  realize	  that	  to	  reap	  the	  full	  benefits	  of	  specialization,	  they	  need	  to	  improve	  coordination	  first	  and	  foremost.	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  more	  specialized	  factories	  became,	  the	  more	  they	  became	  dependent	  on	  each	  other	  in	  order	  to	  make	  the	  finished	  product,	  and	  the	  more	  they	  needed	  to	  coordinate	  with	  each	  other	  in	  production.	  As	  one	  economic	  writer	  Qiao	  Rongzhang	  noted,	  relationships	  between	  every	  enterprise	  in	  the	  economy	  grew	  more	  intertwined	  as	  they	  became	  more	  specialized:	  Industrial	  coordination	  and	  industrial	  specialization	  are	  the	  prerequisites	  for	  each	  other	  and	  are	  beneficial	  to	  each	  other.	  Industrial	  specialization	  is	  to	  divide	  industrial	  production	  	  into	  independent,	  specialized	  production	  units	  based	  on	  different	  sectors	  they	  are	  in;	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  industrial	  coordination	  is	  to	  integrate	  various	  specialized	  production	  units	  into	  a	  united	  and	  complete	  entity.	  Industrial	  specialization	  is	  the	  necessary	  condition	  for	  industrial	  coordination—without	  specialization	  or	  division	  of	  labor,	  there	  would	  be	  no	  industrial	  coordination;	  while	  industrial	  coordination	  is	  the	  premise	  for	  specialization.	  Without	  coordination,	  specialized	  production	  units	  will	  be	  unable	  to	  develop	  smoothly.	  Industrial	  coordination	  develops	  on	  the	  foundation	  of	  industrial	  specialization,	  while	  it	  also	  promotes	  specialization.15	  	  Previous	  examples	  of	  the	  machine	  tool	  factory	  and	  the	  valve	  factory	  demonstrated	  how	  specialization	  was	  achieved	  on	  the	  enterprise	  level	  in	  China.	  With	  improvement	  in	  specialization,	  economies	  of	  scale	  would	  eventually	  kick	  in	  and	  benefits	  such	  as	  improved	  product	  quality	  and	  lower	  production	  costs	  would	  inevitably	  follow.	  The	  greater	  challenge	  was	  that	  of	  coordination.	  The	  complete	  factory	  model	  and	  diversification	  were	  ways	  to	  get	  around	  the	  problem	  without	  confronting	  it	  directly.	  They	  were,	  as	  the	  Chinese	  economic	  thinkers	  acknowledged,	  not	  sustainable	  or	  long-­‐term	  solutions.	  Another	  economic	  commentator	  Dan	  Gu	  wrote	  in	  1964:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Qiao	  Rogzhang,	  “Shilun	  woguo	  gongye	  shengchan	  xiezuo	  de	  xingzhi	  he	  zuoyong,”	  Jingji	  yanjiu	  5	  (1965),	  20.	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In	  order	  to	  bring	  about	  specialized	  production,	  one	  must	  secure	  the	  indispensable	  coordination	  relationships,	  such	  as	  the	  supply	  of	  raw	  materials,	  machine	  parts,	  provision	  of	  some	  manufacturing	  processes,	  molds,	  repair	  services,	  or	  backup	  components.	  This	  is	  because	  with	  increasing	  level	  of	  specialization,	  enterprises	  become	  more	  interconnected	  with	  each	  other;	  if	  such	  relationship	  terminates	  occasionally	  or	  is	  modified	  constantly,	  it	  would	  cause	  great	  distress	  to	  the	  production	  process,	  or	  even	  disrupt	  the	  entire	  production.	  Only	  if	  all	  the	  coordination	  relationships	  are	  secured	  can	  specialized	  production	  move	  forward	  smoothly…	  Once	  a	  coordination	  relationship	  is	  established	  [between	  two	  factories],	  they	  should	  try	  to	  make	  such	  relationship	  long-­‐term	  and	  fix	  the	  timing	  and	  volume.16	  	  	  Dan	  reiterated	  the	  intertwined	  relationship	  between	  specialization	  and	  coordination.	  More	  importantly,	  he	  started	  to	  call	  attention	  to	  the	  significance	  of	  securing	  long-­‐term	  coordination	  relationships	  between	  individual	  enterprises	  that	  should	  be	  modified	  easily	  or	  constantly.	  He	  highlighted	  how	  a	  terminated	  or	  modified	  coordination	  relationship	  could	  cause	  great	  distress	  to	  production,	  or	  even	  disrupt	  the	  entire	  coordination	  process.	  Although	  the	  ideas	  	  on	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  were	  not	  fully	  developed	  in	  the	  discussion	  above,	  Chinese	  economic	  thinkers	  had	  started	  to	  explore	  solutions	  to	  the	  challenge	  of	  systematic	  coordination	  on	  the	  enterprise	  level.	  	  	   Coordination	  was	  crucial	  to	  specialization	  and	  outsourcing.	  However,	  as	  Dan	  suggested	  above,	  ways	  to	  achieve	  coordination	  were	  easier	  said	  than	  done.	  As	  the	  Specialization	  and	  Coordination	  Movement	  unfolded,	  Chinese	  writers	  started	  to	  propose	  solutions	  that	  could	  improve	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination,	  under	  a	  planned	  socialist	  economy.	  	  	   According	  to	  Fan	  Muhan,	  an	  economist	  who	  wrote	  extensively	  on	  the	  problem	  of	  coordination	  at	  this	  time,	  the	  simplest	  form	  of	  coordination	  that	  could	  be	  formed	  between	  enterprises	  included	  users	  and	  producers	  of	  certain	  raw	  materials	  or	  intermediate	  goods	  in	  production:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Dan	  Gu,	  “Qing	  gongye	  de	  zhuanyehua,”	  Dagongbao,	  May	  8,	  1964.	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One	  category	  is	  a	  vertical	  coordinating	  relationship—that	  is,	  when	  one	  factories	  is	  completing	  the	  production	  process,	  it	  always	  requires	  a	  variety	  of	  raw	  materials	  that	  are	  supplied	  from	  other	  factories;	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  final	  product	  of	  this	  enterprise	  is	  usually	  the	  raw	  material	  or	  semi-­‐finished	  product	  for	  others.17	  	  In	  non-­‐socialist	  economies,	  this	  kind	  of	  coordination	  was	  achieved	  through	  the	  market	  almost	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  course.	  The	  case	  of	  coordination	  was	  not	  as	  straightforward	  in	  a	  planned	  socialist	  economy.	  Fan	  gave	  follow-­‐up	  examples	  to	  illustrate	  what	  he	  meant	  by	  vertical	  coordination:	  Take	  the	  example	  of	  an	  iron	  factory,	  that	  requires	  the	  supply	  of	  iron	  ore,	  coke,	  and	  other	  necessary	  supplemental	  raw	  materials	  from	  other	  factories.	  In	  the	  meantime,	  its	  product	  of	  the	  smelting	  iron	  ore—pig	  iron—comprises	  the	  raw	  materials	  for	  other	  factories.	  Similarly,	  any	  product	  manufactured	  in	  machine-­‐building	  factories	  requires	  the	  supply	  of	  metal	  and	  non-­‐metal	  raw	  materials	  from	  other	  enterprises.	  The	  processed	  products,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  	  are	  usually	  intermediate	  products	  for	  other	  factories.	  Therefore,	  in	  the	  sequence	  of	  completing	  a	  production	  process,	  there	  exist	  extremely	  complicated	  vertical	  coordination	  relationships	  between	  enterprises.18	  	  The	  iron	  factory	  in	  the	  example	  above	  was	  a	  user	  of	  iron	  ore,	  coke,	  and	  various	  other	  raw	  materials.	  In	  the	  meantime,	  it	  was	  also	  a	  producer	  of	  pig	  iron	  that	  constituted	  raw	  materials	  for	  other	  factories.	  The	  relationship	  between	  the	  iron	  factory	  and	  other	  specialized	  suppliers	  demonstrated	  the	  simplest	  form	  of	  coordination	  described	  by	  the	  writer	  above.	  Similarly,	  the	  machine-­‐building	  factories	  mentioned	  in	  the	  example	  undertook	  the	  same	  form	  of	  coordination	  as	  well.	  The	  only	  difference	  was	  the	  objects	  of	  coordination:	  they	  were	  intermediate	  goods	  in	  the	  making	  of	  machine	  tools.	  	   In	  describing	  the	  same	  type	  of	  coordination,	  Chinese	  economic	  writers	  sometimes	  used	  different	  terminologies.	  This	  indicated	  that	  ideas	  on	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Fan	  Muhan,	  “Lun	  gongye	  shengchan	  zhuanyehua,”	  Jingji	  yanjiu	  10	  (1963),	  1.	  18	  Ibid.	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were	  relatively	  new	  in	  the	  Chinese	  economy	  during	  the	  Specialization	  and	  Coordination	  Movement.	  At	  the	  time	  when	  these	  journal	  articles	  were	  published,	  there	  was	  not	  yet	  universally	  agreed	  terminologies	  in	  describing	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination.	  Ji	  Ming,	  another	  prominent	  economic	  commentator,	  described	  exactly	  the	  same	  type	  of	  coordination	  that	  was	  explored	  by	  the	  previous	  excerpt.	  However,	  he	  used	  a	  completely	  different	  expression:	  Coordination	  broadly	  defined	  refers	  to	  the	  basic	  form	  of	  coordination	  based	  on	  specialization.	  It	  is	  the	  routine	  coordination	  between	  various	  production	  sections	  in	  an	  economy.	  In	  this	  type	  of	  coordination,	  the	  products	  supplied	  by	  a	  factory	  are	  demanded	  	  by	  a	  variety	  of	  factories.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  recipient	  of	  the	  products	  requires	  only	  a	  generic	  version	  of	  the	  product	  on	  a	  regular	  basis,	  without	  any	  specific	  design	  that	  is	  particular	  to	  the	  product.	  For	  example,	  a	  rivet	  factory	  produces	  rivets	  that	  can	  be	  used	  across	  all	  machine-­‐building	  factories	  and	  can	  satisfy	  all	  demand	  with	  the	  same	  product.	  The	  coordination	  between	  the	  rivet	  factory	  and	  the	  machinery	  factories	  is	  called	  broad	  coordination.	  19	  	  Ji	  highlighted	  a	  different	  aspect	  of	  the	  coordination	  described	  above.	  Instead	  of	  emphasizing	  the	  intertwined	  relationship	  between	  users	  and	  producers	  in	  the	  production	  of	  a	  finished	  product,	  he	  pointed	  out	  that	  in	  the	  simplest	  form	  of	  coordination,	  the	  goods	  of	  exchange	  were	  generic	  goods	  that	  could	  be	  utilized	  in	  any	  factory	  in	  the	  economy.	  In	  other	  words,	  what	  both	  writers	  described	  were	  simple	  exchanges	  of	  goods	  in	  a	  planned	  socialist	  economy	  that	  could	  find	  its	  direct	  counterpart	  in	  a	  market	  economy.	  	  	   In	  addition	  to	  coordination	  of	  raw	  materials	  and	  intermediate	  goods,	  Chinese	  economic	  writers	  also	  explored	  complex	  forms	  of	  coordination.	  Fan,	  for	  example,	  pointed	  out	  that	  coordination	  among	  enterprises	  should	  not	  be	  limited	  to	  the	  exchange	  of	  goods.	  The	  outsourcing	  of	  production	  processes	  and	  services	  to	  specialized	  factories	  constituted	  another	  form	  coordination	  as	  well:	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The	  other	  type	  is	  horizontal	  coordination	  relationships,	  which	  means	  that	  as	  an	  enterprise	  completes	  the	  production	  of	  a	  product,	  it	  always	  requires	  the	  coordination	  (or	  input)	  of	  others,	  in	  terms	  of	  production	  techniques	  or	  the	  supply	  of	  semi-­‐finished	  products	  or	  components.	  Take	  the	  example	  of	  a	  machine-­‐building	  factory,	  whether	  it	  is	  in	  charge	  of	  assembling	  a	  finished	  piece	  of	  machinery,	  or	  it	  is	  in	  charge	  of	  supplying	  components	  to	  a	  assemble	  plant,	  it	  usually	  requires	  coordination	  from	  other	  factories	  in	  production	  tasks	  such	  as	  heat	  treatment,	  surface	  treatment,	  specialized	  welding,	  forging	  and	  casting,	  etc.	  When	  it	  is	  in	  charge	  of	  assembling	  components	  for	  a	  primary	  piece	  of	  machinery,	  it	  usually	  requires	  the	  supply	  of	  standardized	  items	  or	  sub-­‐components	  from	  other	  factories.20	  	  Fan	  gave	  the	  example	  of	  a	  machine-­‐building	  factory	  that	  specialized	  in	  the	  assembly	  of	  a	  finished	  product.	  As	  it	  became	  more	  specialized,	  it	  started	  to	  outsource	  certain	  production	  techniques	  for	  other	  factories	  to	  be	  in	  charge	  of.	  The	  coordination	  relationship	  described	  above	  was	  no	  longer	  an	  exchange	  of	  raw	  materials	  or	  intermediate	  goods,	  but	  an	  exchange	  of	  service.	  	  	  	   A	  yet	  more	  complicated	  form	  of	  coordination	  that	  came	  up	  in	  the	  debate	  was	  the	  coordination	  between	  users	  and	  producers	  of	  customized	  machine	  parts	  or	  components.	  This	  was	  a	  more	  advanced	  form	  of	  coordination,	  because	  the	  goods	  had	  to	  be	  customized	  by	  the	  producers	  according	  to	  the	  users’	  needs.	  Therefore,	  as	  Ji	  Ming	  argued	  it	  was	  not	  a	  simple	  of	  goods	  between	  two	  specialized	  factories,	  but	  required	  a	  higher	  level	  of	  coordination:	  	  Coordination	  narrowly	  defined	  differs	  from	  broad	  coordination	  in	  that	  it	  is	  a	  more	  secure	  and	  permanent	  type	  of	  relationship	  between	  various	  enterprises	  that	  are	  in	  the	  production	  of	  a	  single	  good.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  production	  of	  Jiefang-­‐brand	  vehicles,	  the	  long-­‐term	  relationship	  between	  No.1	  Automobile	  Factory	  and	  hundreds	  of	  its	  auxiliary	  plants	  can	  be	  called	  narrow	  coordination.	  These	  auxiliary	  plants	  provided	  specific	  components	  used	  by	  Jiefang	  vehicles.21	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  Ibid.,	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  Ibid.,	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Ji	  highlighted	  how	  users	  and	  producers	  of	  customized	  machine	  parts	  coordinated	  with	  each	  other.	  He	  gave	  the	  example	  of	  No.1	  Automobile	  Factory	  and	  all	  of	  the	  auxiliary	  plants	  that	  supplied	  it	  with	  specialized	  components.	  The	  goods	  produced	  by	  the	  auxiliary	  plants	  had	  to	  be	  based	  on	  the	  specific	  requests	  by	  the	  automobile	  factory,	  because	  it	  was	  the	  only	  user	  of	  the	  customized	  goods.	  The	  manufacturing	  of	  customized	  goods	  required	  extensive	  interaction	  between	  the	  users	  and	  producers,	  as	  Ji	  pointed	  out	  in	  the	  same	  journal	  article:	  In	  this	  type	  of	  coordination,	  the	  products	  manufactured	  by	  the	  auxiliary	  plants	  were	  only	  used	  by	  the	  recipient.	  Therefore,	  they	  had	  to	  be	  produced	  based	  on	  the	  conditions	  and	  blueprints	  provided	  by	  the	  factory	  that	  placed	  the	  order.	  Take	  the	  example	  of	  the	  tire	  factory	  that	  provided	  tires	  to	  No.1	  Automobile	  Factory.	  The	  tires	  it	  manufactured	  had	  to	  be	  based	  on	  the	  specifications	  and	  conditions	  determined	  by	  the	  automobile	  factory.22	  	  Therefore,	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  smooth	  production	  of	  automobiles,	  the	  coordination	  relationship	  between	  the	  automobile	  factory	  and	  its	  various	  auxiliary	  plants	  had	  to	  be	  secured	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  	  	   From	  the	  coordination	  of	  generic	  goods,	  raw	  materials,	  and	  intermediate	  goods,	  to	  the	  coordination	  of	  production	  technologies,	  and	  finally,	  the	  coordination	  of	  customized	  goods,	  the	  production	  needs	  from	  enterprises	  became	  more	  specific.	  Therefore,	  coordination	  among	  factories	  had	  to	  improve	  so	  that	  producers	  could	  accommodate	  individual	  needs	  and	  requests	  from	  the	  users	  of	  their	  products.	  During	  the	  Specialization	  and	  Coordination	  Movement,	  Chinese	  economic	  thinkers	  came	  to	  realize	  that	  rapid	  industrialization	  of	  the	  country	  required	  mass	  production	  and	  economies	  of	  scale,	  which	  could	  only	  be	  achieved	  by	  improvement	  in	  the	  level	  of	  specialization.	  The	  previous	  model	  of	  complete	  factories	  and	  diversification	  was	  dismissed	  as	  a	  short-­‐term,	  imperfect	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solution	  to	  the	  challenge	  of	  broad	  front	  development.	  To	  address	  the	  challenge	  directly,	  Chinese	  economic	  thinkers	  recognized	  that	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  had	  to	  be	  improved.	  During	  the	  movement	  in	  1960s,	  the	  debate	  demonstrated	  that	  ways	  to	  improve	  coordination	  among	  enterprises	  might	  not	  be	  as	  straightforward	  as	  it	  seemed	  in	  a	  socialist	  planned	  economy.	  	  	  	   	  





Contracts	  and	  Coordination	  Conferences	  
	  Between	  1960	  and	  1965,	  the	  most	  active	  years	  of	  the	  Specialization	  and	  Coordination	  Movement,	  Chinese	  economic	  analysts	  and	  commentators	  elaborated	  on	  the	  benefits	  of	  specialization	  and	  coordination	  and	  came	  to	  realize	  that	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  was	  crucial	  to	  bring	  about	  the	  various	  advantages	  of	  specialization,	  including	  the	  economies	  of	  scale,	  lower	  production	  costs,	  improved	  product	  quality,	  and	  greater	  product	  variety.	  Initiating	  and	  enforcing	  coordination	  among	  enterprises,	  however,	  was	  not	  as	  straightforward	  in	  a	  socialist	  economy	  as	  in	  a	  Western	  economy	  with	  developed	  markets.	  In	  the	  Chinese	  economy,	  where	  allocation	  of	  resources	  was	  done	  on	  the	  national	  level,	  direct	  coordination	  among	  enterprises	  was	  unusual,	  and	  market	  mechanisms	  for	  allocation	  were	  non-­‐existent.	  Therefore,	  policy-­‐makers	  needed	  to	  take	  initiatives	  to	  create	  venues	  and	  opportunities	  for	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  to	  occur.	  As	  discussions	  during	  the	  Specialization	  and	  Coordination	  Movement	  advanced,	  Chinese	  economic	  policy	  makers	  on	  the	  state	  and	  provincial	  level	  started	  promoting	  contractual	  relationships	  between	  individual	  enterprises.	  They	  encouraged	  enterprises	  and	  factories	  to	  coordinate	  among	  themselves;	  they	  organized	  coordination	  conferences	  for	  the	  users	  and	  producers	  of	  various	  industries	  to	  meet	  and	  specify	  their	  production	  needs;	  they	  also	  educated	  the	  public	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  contracts	  and	  underscored	  the	  legal	  binding	  power	  of	  contractual	  relationships.	  State	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and	  provincial	  bureaus	  undertook	  a	  leading	  role	  in	  improving	  contractual	  coordination	  between	  individual	  enterprises,	  and	  started	  to	  prioritize	  such	  coordination	  over	  national	  planning.	  Moreover,	  various	  economic	  analysts	  and	  commentators	  called	  for	  the	  national	  plan	  to	  accommodate	  needs	  specified	  by	  individual	  enterprises	  and	  factories.	  They	  argued	  that	  enterprise-­‐level	  supply	  and	  demand	  should	  constitute	  the	  foundation	  of	  national	  planning,	  not	  the	  other	  way	  around.	  By	  mid-­‐1960s,	  the	  Chinese	  economy	  was	  moving	  toward	  the	  direction	  of	  market-­‐like	  coordination	  on	  the	  enterprise	  level.	  	  Toward	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Specialization	  and	  Coordination	  Movement,	  Chinese	  economic	  actors	  started	  to	  grapple	  with	  the	  challenge	  of	  creating	  a	  more	  concrete	  framework	  for	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination.	  In	  1964,	  for	  example,	  two	  economic	  writers,	  Li	  Biqiang	  and	  Ren	  Yan,	  noted	  the	  complexity	  of	  this	  major	  undertaking:	  “Each	  enterprise	  is	  an	  individual	  unit	  in	  charge	  of	  its	  own	  production	  activities,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  influenced	  and	  constrained	  by	  other	  enterprises	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  supply	  of	  raw	  materials,	  semi-­‐finished	  products,	  and	  machine	  parts.	  Therefore,	  coordination	  among	  enterprises	  is	  much	  more	  complicated	  than	  coordination	  within	  an	  enterprise.”1	  In	  a	  complete	  factory,	  coordination	  was	  achieved	  internally—different	  divisions	  of	  the	  factory	  coordinated	  with	  each	  other	  to	  produce	  a	  finished	  product.	  However,	  in	  order	  to	  take	  full	  advantage	  of	  the	  benefits	  of	  specialization,	  enterprises	  required	  coordination	  with	  each	  other	  to	  achieve	  satisfactory	  outcomes.	  The	  authors	  of	  the	  article	  identified	  the	  complexity	  of	  such	  coordination	  and	  pointed	  out	  that	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination,	  though	  desirable,	  required	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  framework	  and	  infrastructure	  to	  make	  such	  coordination	  available	  to	  individual	  enterprises.	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Additionally,	  many	  economic	  analysts	  and	  commentators	  recognized	  that	  national	  planning	  was	  a	  major	  roadblock	  to	  coordination	  between	  enterprises.	  With	  the	  central	  planning	  apparatus	  in	  place,	  	  individual	  enterprises	  had	  no	  means	  to	  coordinate	  with	  each	  other.	  Economic	  actors	  and	  policy-­‐makers	  not	  only	  needed	  to	  create	  a	  framework	  to	  initiate	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  from	  scratch,	  but	  also	  needed	  to	  come	  up	  with	  ways	  to	  solidify	  and	  execute	  coordination	  among	  enterprises	  outside	  the	  national	  plan.	  In	  other	  words,	  they	  had	  to	  determine	  how	  state	  and	  local	  governments	  could	  acknowledge	  and	  enforce	  coordination	  between	  individual	  enterprises	  and	  accommodate	  individual	  needs	  from	  specific	  factories	  in	  a	  planned	  economy.	  	  Fan	  Muhan,	  the	  specialist	  on	  coordination,	  elaborated	  on	  how	  the	  challenge	  of	  coordination	  unfolded	  in	  a	  planned	  economy.	  Fan	  underscored	  the	  difficulty	  of	  meeting	  individual	  needs	  of	  enterprises	  through	  allocation	  of	  resources	  on	  the	  national	  level.	  A	  planned	  economy	  was	  unable	  to	  accommodate	  or	  incorporate	  specific	  production	  needs,	  because	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  relationships	  could	  not	  be	  honored	  under	  an	  overarching	  national	  plan.	  Fan	  gave	  the	  example	  of	  a	  boiler	  in	  a	  generator	  that	  required	  the	  supply	  of	  a	  specific	  type	  of	  coal.	  Despite	  of	  a	  formal	  contract	  between	  the	  boiler	  and	  a	  specific	  coal	  mine,	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  generator	  could	  not	  be	  met	  due	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  national	  plan:	  	  Take	  the	  example	  of	  a	  boiler	  in	  a	  generator,	  which	  is	  designed	  based	  on	  the	  use	  of	  a	  specific	  type	  of	  coal.	  If	  it	  can	  make	  use	  of	  such	  coal,	  it	  would	  consume	  the	  least	  amount	  of	  coal,	  utilize	  energy	  most	  efficiently,	  lower	  production	  costs,	  and	  improve	  its	  major	  indices	  every	  year.	  During	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  generator,	  the	  Design	  Contract	  (Renwu	  jihua	  shu)	  already	  specified	  the	  coal	  mine	  that	  would	  supply	  the	  generator	  with	  the	  coal,	  and	  the	  coordination	  between	  them	  was	  established.	  The	  challenge,	  however,	  is	  to	  acknowledge	  and	  honor	  the	  coordination	  relationships.	  Usually,	  the	  allocation	  of	  coal	  means	  to	  concentrate	  all	  the	  coal	  produced	  in	  the	  country	  as	  overall	  coal	  resources	  for	  the	  year,	  and	  then	  proceed	  to	  allocation	  based	  on	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bureaus	  and	  regions	  to	  individual	  enterprises.	  However,	  this	  can	  only	  ensure	  the	  quantity	  specified	  by	  the	  boiler,	  but	  cannot	  guarantee	  the	  specific	  type	  required	  by	  it.3	  	  Fan	  pointed	  out	  that	  even	  though	  two	  factories	  might	  have	  specified	  a	  coordination	  relationship	  through	  the	  Design	  Contract,	  the	  national	  plan	  remained	  a	  major	  roadblock	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  contractual	  relationship.	  In	  other	  words,	  though	  factories	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  meet	  each	  other	  and	  sign	  contracts	  among	  themselves,	  there	  was	  no	  established	  mechanisms	  in	  place	  that	  could	  accommodate	  supply	  and	  demand	  on	  the	  level	  of	  individual	  enterprises.	  In	  a	  developed	  market	  economy,	  users	  and	  producers	  could	  depend	  on	  market	  mechanism	  to	  channel	  resources	  to	  the	  most	  efficient	  use	  and	  respond	  to	  individual	  needs.	  However,	  in	  a	  strictly	  planned	  economy,	  no	  planning	  apparatus,	  however	  sophisticated,	  could	  accommodate	  all	  contracts	  between	  millions	  of	  enterprises	  and	  factories	  all	  across	  the	  country.	  The	  example	  of	  the	  boiler	  demonstrated	  that	  despite	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  enterprise-­‐level	  contractual	  coordination	  was	  already	  in	  place	  between	  the	  boiler	  and	  the	  coal	  mine	  at	  the	  time	  when	  the	  boiler	  was	  built,	  the	  central	  planning	  apparatus	  was	  unable	  to	  accommodate	  the	  needs	  specified	  by	  the	  boiler	  for	  a	  certain	  type	  of	  coal.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  boiler	  was	  unable	  to	  operate	  at	  its	  maximum	  capacity,	  nor	  could	  it	  make	  the	  most	  efficient	  use	  of	  its	  raw	  materials.	  	  	   The	  Chinese	  economic	  actors	  were	  not	  only	  keenly	  aware	  of	  the	  challenges	  of	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination,	  but	  also	  came	  up	  with	  ways	  to	  address	  it.	  Toward	  mid-­‐1960s,	  they	  started	  to	  promote	  the	  use	  of	  contracts	  and	  encourage	  enterprises	  to	  enter	  contractual	  coordination	  with	  each	  other.	  They	  also	  created	  venues	  and	  opportunities	  for	  individual	  factories	  to	  meet	  and	  sign	  contracts	  and,	  most	  importantly,	  prioritized	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Fan	  Muhan,	  “Lun	  gongye	  shengchan	  xiezuohua,”	  Jingji	  yanjiu	  11	  (1963),	  5.	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contractual	  coordination	  over	  national	  planning.	  In	  many	  of	  the	  journal	  articles	  published	  between	  1960	  and	  1965,	  Chinese	  economic	  critics	  and	  commentators	  called	  for	  the	  national	  plan	  to	  accommodate	  contractual	  coordination.	  	  	   Discussion	  on	  contracts	  was	  prevalent	  in	  economic	  literature	  in	  China	  in	  the	  1960s.	  Economic	  analysts	  wrote	  about	  the	  desirability	  of	  contracts,	  explained	  to	  the	  public	  the	  use	  of	  contracts	  as	  an	  important	  tool	  to	  carry	  out	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination,	  and	  underscored	  the	  legal	  binding	  power	  of	  contracts.	  Two	  major	  types	  of	  contracts	  were	  in	  use	  at	  that	  time.	  The	  first	  type	  was	  called	  “Design	  Contract”,	  which	  was	  referred	  to	  by	  the	  economic	  writer	  Fan	  in	  his	  discussion	  on	  the	  flaws	  of	  national	  planning—the	  “Design	  Contract”	  represented	  a	  series	  of	  contracts	  binding	  an	  enterprise	  at	  the	  time	  when	  it	  was	  built,	  or	  when	  an	  existing	  enterprise	  underwent	  major	  reform	  or	  expansion.	  The	  Design	  Contracts	  would	  outline	  all	  the	  factories	  that	  were	  in	  such	  coordination	  relationship	  with	  the	  plant,	  including	  “the	  suppliers	  of	  major	  raw	  materials,	  fuel,	  electric	  power,	  the	  subcontractors	  of	  certain	  production	  tasks,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  factories	  that	  supply	  major	  semi-­‐finished	  products,	  components	  and	  auxiliary	  parts”.4	  They	  served	  as	  series	  of	  contracts	  that	  would	  enforce	  all	  the	  contractual	  relationships	  an	  enterprise	  would	  enter	  into.	  Chinese	  economic	  writers	  not	  only	  called	  for	  the	  greater	  use	  of	  Design	  Contracts,	  but	  also	  argued	  that	  they	  ought	  to	  be	  incorporated	  into	  national	  planning	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  contracts	  would	  be	  enforced.	  	  Design	  Contracts,	  similar	  to	  contracts	  between	  individual	  enterprises,	  had	  legal	  binding	  power.	  Any	  contractual	  coordination	  specified	  in	  the	  Design	  Contracts	  had	  bindingly	  power	  and	  should	  not	  be	  modified	  constantly.	  The	  economist	  Fan	  elaborated	  on	  the	  binding	  power	  of	  Design	  Contracts	  in	  1963:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Ibid.,	  2.	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Therefore,	  once	  the	  Design	  Contracts	  are	  ratified,	  a	  coordination	  relationship	  in	  industrial	  production	  is	  formed,	  and	  it	  has	  legal	  binding	  power.	  The	  industrial	  coordination	  that	  is	  formed	  this	  way	  will	  be	  realized	  through	  state	  planning,	  and	  it	  demonstrates	  the	  superiority	  of	  a	  planned	  economy	  as	  well	  as	  the	  rationality	  behind	  coordination;	  in	  the	  production	  process,	  such	  relationship	  is	  relatively	  the	  most	  stable	  form	  of	  relationship.	  Enterprises	  and	  various	  administrative	  bureaus	  must	  adhere	  to	  it.	  It	  cannot	  be	  modified	  without	  approval	  from	  the	  original	  ratifying	  authority,	  and	  this	  reflects	  the	  stability	  of	  the	  coordination	  relationships.5	  	  	   Another	  type	  of	  contract	  advocated	  by	  analysts	  addressing	  the	  issue	  of	  coordination	  was	  contracts	  signed	  between	  individual	  enterprises,	  which	  were	  promoted	  as	  a	  major	  tool	  for	  enforcing	  newly	  established	  coordination	  between	  users	  and	  producers	  in	  the	  economy.	  Two	  writers,	  Liu	  Jiannana	  and	  Zhang	  Chunkai,	  used	  the	  analogy	  of	  “big	  contract”	  and	  “small	  contract”	  to	  illustrate	  the	  difference	  between	  these	  two	  types	  of	  coordination.6	  Liu	  and	  Zhang	  sought	  to	  introduce	  their	  idea	  of	  direct	  contracts	  between	  individual	  enterprises	  by	  comparing	  them	  to	  allocation	  through	  national	  planning.	  	  They	  referred	  to	  allocation	  and	  coordination	  through	  national	  planning	  in	  terms	  of	  "big	  contracts"	  while	  characterizing	  their	  ideas	  about	  coordination	  at	  the	  enterprise	  level	  as	  "small	  contracts."	  “Small	  contracts”	  referred	  to	  direct	  contractual	  coordination	  established	  between	  individual	  enterprises.	  Liu	  and	  Zhang	  introduced	  national	  planning	  under	  the	  framework	  of	  contracts	  as	  a	  way	  to	  reconcile	  market-­‐like	  relationships	  (contractual	  coordination)	  with	  socialist	  planning	  ideologies.	  In	  juxtaposing	  the	  “small	  contracts”	  and	  “big	  contracts”,	  they	  emphasized	  that	  “big	  contracts”	  were	  coordination	  through	  national	  planning,	  not	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination:	  	  For	  example,	  the	  state	  allocated	  2000	  tons	  of	  thin	  sheet	  metal	  to	  Shanghai	  Light	  Industry	  Bureau.	  In	  the	  past,	  it	  is	  usually	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Ibid.,	  3.	  6	  Liu	  Jiannan,	  Zhang	  Chunkai,	  “Dingdian	  gongying,	  chanping	  duilu—Shanghai	  gangtie	  qiye	  tigao	  zhiliang	  kuoda	  pingzhong	  jianwen,”	  Yejinbao,	  January	  16,	  1963.	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Metallurgical	  Bureau	  and	  the	  Light	  Industry	  Bureau	  that	  made	  the	  contracts	  directly	  between	  themselves,	  and	  one	  contract	  would	  be	  2000	  tons.	  People	  call	  such	  contracts	  ‘big	  contracts’.	  In	  this	  type	  of	  contract,	  users	  and	  producers	  rarely	  see	  each	  other.”7	  	  	  	  One	  major	  disadvantage	  identified	  by	  the	  writers	  was	  that	  	  “big	  contracts”	  could	  not	  satisfy	  individual	  requirements	  from	  users.	  For	  example,	  the	  steel	  supplied	  may	  not	  be	  the	  right	  type,	  or	  the	  required	  quality	  requested	  by	  the	  users.	  Under	  this	  situation,	  small	  contracts	  were	  promoted	  in	  Shanghai	  starting	  from	  1962.	  Liu	  and	  Zhang	  elaborated	  on	  how	  “small	  contracts”	  could	  improve	  coordination	  between	  users	  and	  producers	  in	  the	  steel	  industry	  in	  Shanghai:	  For	  example,	  if	  the	  state	  allocated	  2000	  tons	  of	  thin	  sheet	  metal	  to	  Shanghai	  Light	  Industry	  Bureau,	  and	  these	  metal	  is	  supplied	  by	  Shanghai	  Metallurgical	  Bureau,	  then	  these	  two	  bureaus	  would	  convene	  a	  group	  of	  producers	  and	  users,	  and	  create	  opportunities	  for	  them	  to	  discuss	  their	  specifications	  on	  the	  technologies	  and	  types	  of	  the	  product,	  and	  encourage	  them	  to	  sign	  contracts	  among	  themselves.	  The	  users	  of	  the	  product	  no	  longer	  need	  to	  go	  to	  the	  light	  industry	  bureau	  for	  the	  metal,	  but	  can	  directly	  go	  to	  the	  producers	  for	  supply.8	  	  	  In	  essence,	  the	  small	  contracts	  that	  the	  authors	  elaborated	  on	  above	  represented	  coordination	  among	  factories	  initiated	  on	  their	  own	  without	  state	  intervention.	  While	  the	  government	  bureau	  might	  create	  venues	  and	  opportunities	  for	  users	  and	  producers	  of	  certain	  products	  to	  meet,	  they	  were	  encouraged	  to	  initiate	  coordination	  among	  themselves	  to	  achieve	  efficiency	  and	  accuracy	  in	  coordination.	  Contracts,	  therefore,	  served	  as	  an	  indispensable	  tool	  in	  promoting	  specialization	  and	  coordination.	  	   Various	  economic	  commentators	  also	  elaborated	  on	  the	  details	  of	  signing	  contracts—they	  explained	  to	  the	  readers	  what	  terms	  should	  be	  specified	  in	  a	  contract,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Ibid.,	  196.	  8	  Ibid.,	  197.	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how	  often	  a	  contract	  was	  usually	  signed,	  and	  also	  underscored	  the	  legal	  binding	  power	  of	  contracts.	  An	  editorial	  published	  in	  People’s	  Daily	  in	  1961,	  for	  example,	  fleshed	  out	  the	  use	  and	  significance	  of	  contracts:	  All	  coordination	  relationships	  must	  be	  fixed	  by	  the	  signing	  of	  contracts	  on	  both	  sides.	  The	  contracts	  that	  are	  signed	  based	  on	  mutual	  consent	  must	  specify	  the	  type,	  size,	  quality,	  quantity,	  price	  and	  delivery	  deadline	  of	  the	  desired	  product.	  In	  addition,	  they	  must	  also	  specify	  the	  responsibilities	  on	  both	  sides.	  These	  contracts	  have	  legal	  binding	  power	  and	  must	  be	  strictly	  enforced.	  No	  one	  side	  can	  cancel	  the	  contract	  on	  its	  own.	  If	  one	  side	  does	  not	  abide	  by	  the	  contract,	  it	  must	  face	  the	  consequence	  of	  making	  compensations	  to	  the	  other.	  Contracts	  should	  specify	  the	  obligations	  of	  coordination	  and	  clarify	  on	  responsibilities	  on	  both	  sides	  to	  ensure	  the	  legal	  status	  of	  the	  contract.9	  	  The	  binding	  power	  of	  contracts	  was	  emphasized	  in	  China	  in	  the	  1960s	  because	  there	  was	  yet	  no	  legal	  infrastructure	  in	  place	  that	  ensured	  the	  implementation	  of	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination.	  Therefore,	  contracts	  served	  as	  an	  important	  framework	  that	  legitimized	  the	  coordination	  between	  enterprises	  in	  the	  economy.	  	   In	  a	  journal	  article	  on	  the	  use	  of	  contracts	  published	  in	  Economic	  Research,	  the	  economic	  writer	  Qiao	  Rongzhang	  presented	  similar	  arguments	  on	  the	  use	  of	  contracts	  and	  emphasized	  their	  legal	  binding	  power:	  	  In	  our	  country,	  the	  coordination	  relationships	  in	  industrial	  production	  are	  usually	  fixed	  by	  contracts	  signed	  by	  the	  two	  sides	  of	  the	  coordination	  relationship.	  Contracts	  are	  an	  important	  way	  to	  organize	  and	  manage	  coordination	  in	  production.	  In	  contracts,	  one	  must	  specify	  the	  type,	  quantity,	  quality	  size,	  price,	  delivery	  date,	  delivery	  location,	  method	  of	  payment,	  as	  well	  as	  various	  rights	  and	  obligations	  from	  both	  sides.	  Contracts	  have	  legal	  binding	  power.	  Both	  sides	  should	  adhere	  to	  it	  strictly,	  and	  no	  one	  side	  can	  modify	  or	  nullify	  the	  contract	  on	  its	  own.	  The	  authorization,	  modification	  or	  nullification	  of	  a	  contract	  must	  be	  based	  on	  mutual	  consent.	  In	  order	  to	  enforce	  economic	  discipline	  in	  a	  socialist	  economy	  and	  ensure	  industrial	  production,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  carry	  out	  some	  guidelines	  to	  guarantee	  the	  execution	  of	  contracts.10	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  “Jiaqiang	  jingji	  xiezuo,”	  Renmin	  ribao,	  December	  15,	  1961.	  10 Qiao	  Rongzhang,	  “Shilun	  woguo	  gongye	  shengchan	  xiezuo	  de	  xingzhi	  he	  zuoyong,”	  Jingji	  yanjiu	  5	  (1965),	  21.	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  Qiao	  reiterated	  the	  binding	  power	  of	  contracts,	  and	  pointed	  out	  that	  timely	  execution	  and	  implementation	  of	  contracts	  were	  essential	  to	  the	  smooth	  running	  of	  the	  economy.	  The	  use	  of	  contracts	  was	  necessary	  yet	  not	  sufficient	  to	  bring	  about	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  on	  a	  national	  scale.	  Despite	  of	  the	  desirability	  of	  contracts,	  there	  was	  no	  framework	  in	  place	  for	  Chinese	  factories	  and	  enterprises	  to	  communicate	  and	  be	  informed	  of	  the	  supply	  and	  demand	  of	  each	  other.	  The	  solution	  that	  Chinese	  economic	  writers	  and	  actors	  came	  up	  with	  was	  to	  create	  such	  opportunities.	  In	  the	  1960s,	  they	  created	  fairs	  on	  the	  regional	  level	  and	  took	  the	  lead	  in	  helping	  enterprises	  coordinate	  with	  each	  other.	  	  	   Examples	  of	  such	  fairs	  that	  were	  organized	  to	  improve	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  emerged	  in	  the	  early	  1960s.	  In	  an	  article	  published	  in	  People’s	  Daily	  in	  1962,	  for	  example,	  the	  author	  described	  how	  the	  No.1	  Machinery	  Bureau	  (Diyi	  jixie	  
gongye	  bu)	  undertook	  the	  task	  of	  organizing	  fairs	  for	  factories	  to	  come	  together	  and	  coordinate	  among	  each	  other	  to	  channel	  individual	  supply	  and	  demand.11	  Participants	  of	  the	  fair	  included	  over	  100	  assembly	  plants,	  including	  the	  No.1	  Automobile	  Factory,	  the	  Wuhan	  Heavy	  Machine	  Tool	  Factory,	  the	  Shenyang	  Water	  Pump	  Factory,	  the	  Shanghai	  Machine	  Tool	  Factory,	  and	  over	  300	  auxiliary	  plants	  that	  supplied	  components	  and	  machine	  parts.	  This	  was	  a	  national	  fair	  that	  encouraged	  the	  major	  assembly	  plants	  to	  initiate	  and	  enhance	  coordination	  relationships	  with	  specialized	  production	  units	  that	  manufactured	  machine	  components	  in	  demand.	  In	  order	  to	  underscore	  the	  necessity	  of	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination,	  the	  author	  of	  the	  editorial	  contrasted	  how	  coordination	  was	  achieved	  before	  factories	  could	  coordinate	  directly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  “Shiying	  jixie	  chanping	  xizuo	  fuza	  de	  shengchan	  yaoqiu,	  yipi	  zhongdian	  gongchang	  guding	  peitao	  xiezuo	  guanxi,”	  Renmin	  ribao,	  January	  30,	  1962.	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with	  each	  other.	  Under	  the	  framework	  of	  national	  planning,	  an	  assembly	  plant	  would	  come	  up	  with	  a	  list	  of	  required	  components	  and	  reported	  it	  to	  the	  machine-­‐building	  bureau.	  In	  turn,	  various	  bureaus	  would	  coordinate	  the	  request	  among	  themselves	  and	  distribute	  the	  demand	  across	  specialized	  component	  factories.	  However,	  he	  observed	  that	  the	  framework	  of	  coordination	  under	  national	  planning	  was	  problematic	  for	  the	  machine-­‐building	  industry,	  which	  relied	  extensively	  on	  the	  coordination	  of	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  components.	  He	  reiterated	  the	  flaws	  of	  national	  planning	  that	  had	  been	  discussed	  by	  several	  authors	  above,	  including	  the	  inadequacy	  of	  the	  national	  plan	  in	  accommodating	  the	  needs	  of	  individual	  enterprises:	  “since	  the	  user	  and	  producer	  were	  unable	  to	  meet	  each	  other,	  and	  there	  were	  usually	  various	  sizes	  of	  one	  single	  product,	  it	  was	  common	  that	  many	  components	  produced	  were	  not	  what	  the	  assembled	  machine	  required.”	  He	  also	  noted	  that	  the	  absence	  of	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  created	  increasing	  challenges	  for	  Chinese	  industry,	  as	  the	  pace	  of	  industrialization	  hastened	  and	  the	  need	  for	  coordination	  intensified:	  After	  several	  years	  of	  rapid	  development,	  the	  size	  and	  technological	  level	  of	  the	  machine-­‐building	  industry	  have	  greatly	  improved;	  for	  example,	  most	  of	  the	  machinery	  equipment	  now	  must	  be	  produced	  on	  our	  own;	  the	  specialization	  and	  division	  of	  function	  among	  factories	  became	  more	  sophisticated;	  especially	  for	  some	  large	  and	  complicated	  pieces	  of	  machinery,	  the	  requirement	  for	  components	  became	  increasingly	  stringent	  and	  the	  demand	  for	  product	  type	  and	  size	  became	  more	  complicated	  than	  before.	  Therefore,	  the	  older	  way	  of	  organizing	  machine	  sets	  can	  no	  longer	  accommodate	  current	  production	  needs.12	  	  It	  was	  under	  the	  pressure	  of	  need	  for	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  that	  No.1	  Machinery	  Bureau	  started	  taking	  the	  lead	  in	  promoting	  coordination	  among	  enterprises.	  From	  October	  1961,	  the	  bureau	  organized	  fairs	  that	  sought	  to	  initiate	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  between	  assembly	  plants	  and	  their	  corresponding	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Ibid.	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auxiliary	  plants	  that	  manufactured	  machine	  parts.	  The	  actual	  term	  they	  used	  was	  "conference"	  rather	  than	  "fair,"	  but	  the	  purpose	  of	  these	  meetings	  was	  quite	  clear:	  a	  venue	  specifically	  designed	  for	  factories	  to	  meet	  and	  sign	  contracts,	  serving	  a	  market-­‐like	  function.	  The	  author	  of	  the	  editorial	  described	  such	  conferences	  in	  detail:	  They	  [the	  No.1	  Machinery	  Bureau]	  chose	  a	  total	  of	  around	  100	  assembly	  plants	  that	  had	  heavy	  workloads,	  and	  asked	  them	  to	  come	  up	  with	  the	  machine	  parts	  and	  specialized	  factories	  requiring	  coordination	  arrangements,,	  the	  quantity	  required	  for	  the	  year	  1962,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  size	  and	  quality	  for	  the	  machine	  parts.	  After	  an	  initial	  discussion	  by	  the	  corresponding	  bureaus,	  they	  would	  hold	  conferences	  for	  assembly	  and	  auxiliary	  plants.	  They	  would	  create	  opportunities	  for	  the	  enterprises	  to	  coordinate	  with	  each	  other	  directly,	  sign	  agreements	  regarding	  the	  supply	  of	  components	  and	  contracts	  for	  the	  supply	  of	  raw	  materials.13	  	  	  The	  No.1	  Machinery	  Bureau	  organized	  such	  fairs	  to	  target	  assembly	  and	  auxiliary	  plants	  in	  the	  machine-­‐building	  industry	  and	  encourage	  them	  to	  sign	  contracts	  with	  each	  other	  directly	  on	  the	  spot,	  during	  the	  coordination	  conferences.	  The	  conference,	  therefore,	  was	  equivalent	  to	  a	  government-­‐sponsored	  fair.	  	  	   In	  1964,	  two	  years	  after	  the	  article	  above	  was	  published	  in	  People’s	  Daily,	  another	  author	  published	  an	  article	  on	  the	  use	  of	  fairs	  in	  promoting	  contractual	  coordination.14	  In	  this	  article,	  the	  economic	  writer	  Weng	  Zhan	  focused	  on	  the	  need	  for	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  in	  Jiangsu	  Province.	  Weng	  also	  described	  a	  large-­‐scale	  “conference”	  for	  enterprises	  that	  was,	  in	  essence,	  a	  provincial-­‐level	  fair	  that	  allowed	  factories	  on	  the	  supply	  and	  demand	  side	  to	  meet	  and	  coordinate	  with	  each	  other:	  In	  the	  Provincial	  Industrial	  Production	  Working	  Conference	  organized	  by	  the	  Provincial	  Party	  Committee…	  enterprises	  on	  the	  supply	  and	  demand	  side	  were	  able	  to	  meet	  each	  other	  directly	  and	  come	  up	  with	  production	  requirements	  for	  each	  other.	  The	  conference	  organized	  hundreds	  of	  enterprises	  on	  both	  the	  demand	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Ibid.	  14	  Weng	  Zhan,	  “Difang	  gongye	  fazhan	  guding	  xiezuo,	  dingdian	  gongying	  wenti,”	  Jingji	  yanjiu	  4	  (1965).	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and	  supply	  side,	  which	  signed	  over	  2000	  coordination	  agreements	  and	  contracts	  with	  each	  other.15	  	  In	  addition	  to	  fairs	  held	  on	  the	  provincial	  level,	  they	  were	  held	  on	  the	  city	  level	  as	  well.	  Various	  cities	  in	  Jiangsu	  province	  organized	  fairs	  within	  the	  city	  to	  promote	  coordination	  among	  local	  enterprises.	  Weng	  gave	  the	  example	  of	  cities	  like	  Changzhou	  and	  Suzhou	  to	  illustrate	  how	  fairs	  were	  used	  as	  an	  important	  tool	  to	  enhance	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination.	  Participants	  on	  the	  supply	  side	  not	  only	  exhibited	  their	  products	  at	  the	  fair,	  but	  were	  also	  encouraged	  to	  coordinate	  with	  factories	  on	  the	  demand	  side	  directly	  and	  sign	  contracts	  on	  the	  spot.	  He	  wrote:	  Starting	  from	  June	  1964,	  the	  city	  of	  Changzhou	  responded	  to	  the	  call	  from	  local	  enterprises	  that	  sought	  coordination	  arrangements	  by	  arranging	  users	  and	  suppliers	  to	  meet	  and	  coordinate	  with	  each	  other	  directly	  at	  the	  fair,	  where	  products	  [of	  the	  suppliers]	  were	  exhibited.	  Within	  less	  than	  twenty	  days,	  more	  than	  1000	  contracts	  and	  agreements	  were	  achieved,	  and	  many	  problems	  that	  had	  evaded	  resolution	  for	  a	  long	  time	  were	  resolved.	  Similarly,	  in	  Suzhou,	  the	  city	  also	  organized	  specialized	  conferences	  in	  which	  manufactured	  products	  were	  exhibited.	  Between	  September	  and	  November,	  these	  conferences	  helped	  satisfy	  the	  needs	  of	  local	  enterprises	  for	  coordination,	  and	  establish	  hundreds	  of	  new	  contractual	  coordination	  relationships.	  Using	  the	  method	  of	  “exhibiting	  manufactured	  goods	  and	  organizing	  contractual	  coordination	  on	  the	  spot”	  (shiwu	  zhanlan,	  xianchang	  
zuzhi	  dingdian),	  we	  were	  able	  to	  improve	  the	  previous	  situation	  in	  which	  enterprises	  rarely	  communicated	  with	  each	  other,	  did	  not	  trust	  each	  other,	  and	  blindly	  sought	  to	  develop	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  “big	  and	  complete”.16	  	  	  The	  most	  intriguing	  part	  of	  Weng’s	  account	  was	  that	  of	  the	  exhibition	  of	  manufactured	  goods.	  He	  pointed	  out	  that	  in	  both	  Changzhou	  and	  Suzhou,	  enterprises	  on	  the	  supply	  side	  would	  exhibit	  their	  products	  at	  the	  coordination	  conferences.	  Therefore,	  users	  and	  suppliers	  were	  not	  only	  able	  to	  meet	  each	  other,	  but	  with	  the	  exhibition	  of	  manufactured	  goods,	  users	  were	  also	  able	  to	  determine	  if	  the	  products	  being	  offered	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Ibid.,	  1.	  16	  Ibid.	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at	  the	  fair	  met	  their	  needs.	  They	  could	  also	  compare	  same	  type	  of	  products	  from	  different	  producers.	  The	  emergence	  of	  fairs	  where	  objects	  of	  exchange	  were	  exhibited	  	  indicated	  a	  clear	  trend	  toward	  market-­‐like	  coordination.	  	  	   The	  coordination	  conferences	  described	  above	  were	  not	  one-­‐off	  events.	  In	  1964,	  for	  example,	  a	  collection	  of	  reports	  was	  published	  on	  the	  topic	  of	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  and	  coordination	  conferences.	  In	  the	  collection,	  eight	  provinces	  published	  reports	  on	  their	  experiences	  in	  organizing	  conferences	  to	  promote	  coordination.17	  In	  Northeast	  China,	  	  the	  first	  coordination	  conference	  took	  place	  from	  June	  28	  to	  July	  5	  in	  1963,	  in	  which	  429	  enterprises	  on	  the	  demand	  side	  signed	  1237	  agreements	  and	  contracts	  with	  295	  enterprises	  on	  the	  supplier	  side.18	  In	  Heilongjiang	  Province,	  a	  similar	  conference	  was	  held	  in	  the	  city	  of	  Jiamusi,	  in	  which	  266	  enterprises	  from	  the	  user	  side	  and	  190	  enterprises	  on	  the	  supply	  side	  signed	  a	  total	  of	  4289	  agreements	  regarding	  the	  coordination	  of	  raw	  materials,	  and	  over	  300	  contracts.19	  In	  Jilin	  Province,	  a	  coordination	  conference	  was	  held	  for	  a	  second	  time	  in	  June	  1963,	  in	  which	  201	  users	  and	  138	  producers	  signed	  a	  total	  of	  531	  agreements	  and	  contracts.20	  In	  addition,	  the	  No.1	  Machinery	  Bureau	  also	  held	  a	  coordination	  conference	  in	  Beijing	  between	  assembly	  plants	  and	  specialized	  factories	  that	  supplied	  components	  and	  machine	  parts.	  During	  the	  conference,	  134	  assembly	  plants	  signed	  a	  total	  of	  2590	  coordination	  agreements	  with	  309	  specialized	  factories.	  	  	   By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Specialization	  and	  Coordination	  Movement,	  contracts	  and	  fairs	  had	  been	  identified	  as	  important	  ways	  to	  improve	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination.	  The	  	  emphasis	  on	  coordination	  between	  enterprises,	  however,	  directly	  conflicted	  with	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Guojia	  jiguan	  nianji	  weiyuanhui	  qiye	  guanliju,	  ed.	  Guding	  xiezuo	  dingdian	  gongying,	  zuzhi	  
gongye	  qiye	  guding	  xiezuo	  dingdian	  gongying	  gongzuo	  jingyan	  huibian	  (Beijing:	  Zhongguo	  gongye	  chubanshe,	  July	  1964).	  18	  Ibid., 8.	  19	  Ibid.	  23.	  	  20	  Ibid.,	  52-­‐53.	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ideological	  commitment	  to	  national	  planning	  in	  a	  socialist	  economy.	  Therefore,	  in	  addition	  to	  coming	  up	  with	  ways	  to	  enhance	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  under	  the	  framework	  of	  national	  planning,	  advocates	  of	  this	  form	  of	  coordination	  were	  presented	  the	  additional	  challenge	  of	  reconciling	  such	  coordination	  with	  the	  central	  planning	  apparatus.	  In	  the	  1960s,	  it	  was	  yet	  not	  possible	  to	  openly	  offer	  critiques	  on	  the	  national	  plan;	  economic	  writers,	  however,	  found	  alternative	  ways	  to	  offer	  arguments	  that	  prioritized	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  over	  central	  planning.	  They	  argued	  that	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  national	  plan	  ought	  to	  be	  contractual	  relationships	  between	  enterprises.	  They	  also	  argued	  that	  top-­‐down	  planning	  must	  accommodate	  needs	  from	  individual	  enterprises.	  	  	   In	  an	  editorial	  published	  in	  People’s	  Daily	  in	  1963	  on	  strengthening	  contractual	  coordination,	  the	  author	  prioritized	  coordination	  and	  made	  the	  argument	  that	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  must	  form	  the	  foundation	  of	  national	  planning:21	  	  	   Due	  to	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  national	  economy,	  national	  planning	  can	  only	  give	  a	  rough	  estimate	  of	  the	  type	  of	  products,	  quality	  and	  quantity	  of	  production.	  It	  is	  impossible	  for	  the	  national	  plan	  to	  enumerate	  and	  include	  all	  the	  products	  and	  projects.	  Therefore,	  the	  establishment	  of	  contractual	  coordination	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  an	  important	  addition	  to	  national	  planning.	  Specifying	  contractual	  coordination	  is	  the	  most	  meticulous	  part	  of	  organizing	  the	  national	  economy,	  and	  it	  is	  the	  fundamental	  way	  to	  improve	  planning	  and	  management	  in	  production,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  ensure	  stability	  in	  production.	  If	  we	  can	  build	  up	  and	  enhance	  contractual	  coordination	  step	  by	  step	  according	  to	  our	  plan	  and	  turn	  the	  national	  economy	  into	  an	  integrated	  entity	  through	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  long-­‐term	  contracts	  or	  contracts,	  then	  the	  figures	  we	  draft	  in	  the	  national	  plan	  will	  be	  more	  concrete,	  and	  various	  industrial	  sectors	  in	  the	  economy	  would	  be	  able	  to	  develop	  to	  the	  fullest.	  	  	  The	  author	  reiterated	  the	  argument	  that	  coordination	  on	  a	  national	  level	  would	  never	  be	  sufficiently	  exhaustive	  to	  encompass	  all	  the	  individual	  coordination	  relationships	  in	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  “Jiaqiang	  jingji	  xiezuo,”	  Renmin	  ribao,	  April	  2,	  1963.	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the	  economy.	  Therefore,	  the	  Chinese	  economy	  would	  have	  to	  rely	  on	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  to	  “improve	  planning	  and	  management	  in	  production,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  ensure	  stability	  in	  production”.	  As	  an	  alternative	  to	  openly	  criticizing	  of	  the	  planning	  apparatus,	  the	  author	  of	  the	  editorial	  argued	  that	  the	  foundation	  of	  national	  economy	  would	  be	  contractual	  coordination,	  instead	  of	  top-­‐down	  national	  planning.	  He	  envisioned	  an	  integrated	  economy	  interconnected	  through	  “tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  long-­‐term	  contracts”.	  	  	  	   In	  another	  editorial	  on	  the	  priority	  of	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  published	  in	  the	  People’s	  Daily,	  the	  author	  argued	  that	  national	  planning	  must	  accommodate	  the	  needs	  of	  contractual	  coordination	  relationships.22	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  would	  be	  included	  in	  the	  national	  plan	  to	  ensure	  timely	  execution	  of	  contracts	  and	  agreements	  between	  enterprises.	  In	  order	  to	  address	  the	  challenge	  that	  some	  enterprises	  still	  prioritized	  planning	  targets	  over	  the	  fulfillment	  of	  contractual	  coordination,	  the	  writer	  elaborated	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  coordination	  among	  enterprises:	  Some	  comrades	  separated	  contractual	  coordination	  from	  planning	  targets	  and	  did	  not	  take	  the	  fulfillment	  of	  contracts	  seriously.	  Some	  enterprises	  only	  chose	  to	  complete	  coordination	  tasks	  with	  large	  production	  volumes	  and	  few	  working	  hours,	  or	  came	  up	  with	  various	  excuses	  to	  evade	  coordination	  tasks.	  All	  of	  such	  behavior	  was	  wrong.	  All	  contractual	  coordination,	  once	  specified,	  must	  be	  completed.	  All	  contractual	  coordination	  that	  was	  included	  in	  national	  and	  local	  plan	  would	  be	  part	  of	  the	  plan;	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  these	  coordination	  relationships	  constituted	  the	  actual	  implementation	  of	  the	  plan.	  Even	  though	  some	  coordination	  projects	  were	  not	  included	  in	  the	  plan	  or	  were	  not	  specified,	  they	  still	  needed	  to	  be	  taken	  seriously.	  This	  is	  because	  national	  and	  local	  production	  plans	  can	  only	  give	  rough	  estimates	  of	  the	  product	  type,	  quality,	  production	  volume	  required	  from	  individual	  enterprises;	  however,	  contractual	  coordination	  would	  give	  concrete	  numbers	  to	  these	  requirements,	  and	  specify	  what	  enterprise	  would	  produce	  which	  products,	  their	  production	  quantity,	  the	  required	  quality	  and	  sizes,	  as	  well	  as	  delivery	  deadlines,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  “Jiaqiang	  jingji	  xiezuo,”	  Renmin	  ribao,	  December	  15,	  1961.	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etc.	  Therefore,	  whether	  an	  enterprise	  can	  fulfill	  production	  targets	  could	  not	  be	  separated	  from	  its	  fulfillment	  of	  contractual	  coordination.	  Only	  when	  enterprises	  could	  complete	  all	  coordination	  tasks	  can	  we	  say	  they	  completed	  national	  planning	  targets.23	  	  	  	  The	  author	  reiterated	  the	  argument	  that	  national	  planning	  could	  not	  encompass	  all	  contractual	  relationships	  on	  the	  enterprise	  level.	  Therefore,	  the	  enforcement	  of	  contracts	  and	  agreements	  among	  enterprises	  was	  the	  fundamental	  way	  of	  allocating	  resources.	  Although	  national	  planning	  was	  envisioned	  as	  the	  dominant	  way	  of	  managing	  coordination	  in	  a	  socialist	  economy,	  the	  author	  argued	  that	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  was	  the	  building	  block	  of	  national	  planning.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  actual	  coordination	  among	  individual	  production	  units	  was	  achieved	  through	  contracts,	  instead	  of	  national	  plans.	  Suggesting	  that	  national	  planning	  would	  serve	  to	  ensure	  the	  fulfillment	  of	  contracts	  among	  enterprises,	  he	  appeared	  to	  make	  the	  argument	  that	  national	  planning	  served	  more	  as	  a	  way	  to	  legitimize	  and	  ensure	  the	  fulfillment	  of	  contracts	  than	  a	  way	  to	  coordinate	  raw	  materials	  and	  resources	  among	  enterprises.	  	  	   Fan	  Muhan,	  the	  expert	  on	  coordination,	  made	  a	  stronger	  case	  for	  the	  priority	  of	  contractual	  coordination	  over	  planning.	  Recall	  that	  Fan	  gave	  an	  example	  of	  a	  boiler	  in	  an	  electric	  generator	  was	  given	  to	  illustrate	  the	  challenge	  of	  meeting	  individual	  needs	  through	  national	  planning	  in	  Chinese	  economy.	  In	  the	  same	  article	  published	  in	  
Economic	  Research	  in	  1965,	  Fan	  gave	  another	  example	  of	  a	  machine	  tool	  factory	  whose	  needs	  for	  specialized	  electric	  generators	  cannot	  be	  met	  by	  national	  planning.	  He	  wrote:	  Take	  the	  example	  of	  a	  machine	  tool	  factory	  specializing	  in	  metal	  cutting.	  For	  every	  machine	  tool	  it	  manufactured,	  it	  required	  specific	  electric	  generators	  and	  electric	  control	  equipment	  produced	  by	  other	  specialized	  factories.	  Such	  coordination	  relationships	  were	  already	  specified	  in	  its	  Special	  Contracts.	  If	  one	  can	  enforce	  and	  implement	  this	  coordination,	  then	  the	  machine	  tool	  factory	  would	  be	  guaranteed	  good-­‐quality	  electric	  generators	  and	  electric	  control	  equipment.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Ibid.	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However,	  the	  customary	  way	  of	  coordinating	  cannot	  ensure	  this	  type	  of	  contractual	  relationships,	  because	  in	  national	  planning,	  all	  the	  electric	  generators	  produced	  were	  allocated	  as	  resources	  of	  the	  year	  to	  individual	  enterprises	  by	  department	  and	  then	  by	  region.	  This	  can	  only	  guarantee	  the	  quantity	  of	  electric	  generators	  required	  by	  the	  machine	  tool	  factory,	  but	  cannot	  ensure	  the	  type	  and	  quality	  it	  needed,	  which	  can	  cause	  fluctuations	  in	  its	  production	  and	  the	  quality	  of	  machine	  tools	  produced.24	  	  	  	  Fan	  reiterated	  the	  challenge	  of	  reconciling	  national	  planning	  and	  contractual	  coordination.	  Even	  though	  contractual	  relationships	  might	  have	  been	  established	  through	  the	  specification	  of	  contracts,	  they	  could	  not	  be	  honored	  through	  national	  planning.	  Therefore,	  Fan	  argued	  that	  the	  national	  plan	  must	  acknowledge	  and	  execute	  contractual	  coordination	  between	  enterprises:	  …accommodating	  coordination	  relationships	  in	  production	  into	  national	  planning	  is	  a	  dominant	  factor;	  without	  this	  aspect,	  any	  enterprise	  can	  only	  acknowledge	  special	  coordination	  relationships	  but	  cannot	  actually	  fulfill	  them.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  products	  manufactured	  by	  nationally	  owned	  enterprises	  must	  be	  allocated	  through	  national	  planning;	  these	  enterprise	  have	  no	  right	  to	  allocate	  their	  own	  products.”25	  	  	  He	  reiterated	  the	  point	  that	  national	  planning	  must	  serve	  to	  fulfill	  contractual	  relationships	  and	  accommodate	  coordination	  needs	  from	  individual	  enterprises.	  Implicitly,	  Fan	  also	  advocated	  for	  greater	  enterprise	  autonomy.	  Under	  the	  national	  plan,	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  could	  not	  be	  achieved	  not	  only	  because	  factories	  had	  difficult	  communicating	  with	  each	  other,	  but	  also	  because	  they	  had	  no	  autonomy	  to	  do	  so.	  	  	   Fan	  further	  argued	  that	  national	  allocation	  of	  resources	  must	  be	  based	  on	  existing	  contractual	  relationships	  between	  enterprises.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  national	  planning	  could	  not	  be	  isolated	  from	  individual	  needs	  from	  enterprises:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Fan	  Muhan,	  “Lun	  gongye	  shengchan	  xiezuohua,”	  Jingji	  yanjiu	  11	  (1963),	  5.	  25	  Ibid.	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Therefore,	  in	  order	  to	  enhance	  and	  solidify	  coordination	  in	  production,	  [we]	  must	  study	  and	  improve	  the	  current	  methods	  of	  allocating	  resources	  based	  on	  plan.	  We	  must	  allocate	  products	  in	  the	  society	  based	  on	  existing	  coordination	  relationships	  between	  enterprises,	  instead	  of	  allocating	  resources	  in	  isolation	  from	  the	  pre-­‐existing	  coordination	  relationships….	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  first	  layer	  of	  national	  planning	  should	  be	  based	  on	  contractual	  coordination	  between	  enterprises	  and	  be	  allocated	  through	  enterprises,	  while	  the	  second	  layer	  of	  planning	  can	  be	  fulfilled	  through	  the	  allocation	  of	  resources	  from	  management	  bureaus.	  Therefore,	  [we]	  can	  truly	  solidify	  and	  implement	  industrial	  coordination	  relationships	  between	  enterprises.26	  	  	  Fan	  explicitly	  stated	  that	  enterprises	  should	  take	  the	  initiative	  to	  allocate	  resources	  as	  part	  of	  national	  planning.	  While	  individual	  production	  units	  would	  take	  the	  lead	  in	  coordinating	  among	  themselves	  based	  on	  their	  production	  needs,	  government	  bureaus	  and	  agencies	  would	  be	  responsible	  for	  allocating	  resources	  after	  enterprise-­‐level	  supply	  and	  demand	  had	  been	  coordinated	  based	  on	  their	  initiatives.	  Although	  Fan	  did	  not	  argue	  for	  the	  replacement	  of	  national	  planning	  by	  contractual	  coordination,	  he	  was	  clearly	  in	  favor	  of	  coordination	  based	  on	  first	  and	  foremost	  individual	  needs	  of	  enterprises.	  	  	   By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Specialization	  and	  Coordination	  Movement	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1960s,	  Chinese	  economic	  actors	  had	  experimented	  with	  ways	  to	  improve	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  through	  the	  use	  of	  contracts	  and	  the	  organization	  of	  coordination	  conferences	  (fairs).	  They	  had	  also	  come	  up	  with	  arguments	  to	  reconcile	  the	  emphasis	  on	  contractual	  coordination	  with	  the	  ideological	  commitment	  to	  national	  planning	  in	  a	  socialist	  economy.	  The	  emergence	  and	  development	  of	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  indicated	  that	  the	  Chinese	  economy	  was	  moving	  in	  market-­‐like	  directions	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1960s,	  more	  than	  a	  decade	  earlier	  than	  the	  market	  reform	  of	  1978.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Ibid.,	  6.	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   The	  Specialization	  and	  Coordination	  Movement	  came	  to	  an	  abrupt	  end	  with	  the	  onset	  of	  Cultural	  Revolution,	  which	  was	  “a	  movement	  that	  profoundly	  affected	  nearly	  every	  aspect	  of	  life	  for	  hundreds	  of	  millions	  of	  Chinese	  citizens,	  tore	  apart	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party,	  fundamentally	  altered	  the	  organization	  of	  the	  economy,	  and	  propelled	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  (PRC)	  into	  deeper	  international	  isolation.”27	  As	  this	  new	  radical	  reform	  movement	  unfolded,	  specialization	  and	  coordination	  came	  under	  attack	  and	  were	  dismissed	  as	  capitalist	  practices.	  Previous	  models	  of	  complete	  factories	  and	  diversification	  were	  revived,	  and	  the	  principle	  of	  self-­‐sufficiency	  was	  again	  touted	  as	  positive	  guideline	  to	  follow.	  In	  short,	  just	  as	  Chinese	  economic	  actors	  started	  to	  experiment	  with	  contractual	  coordination	  and	  the	  use	  of	  fairs	  in	  promoting	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination,	  the	  Specialization	  and	  Coordination	  Movement	  was	  terminated,	  and	  older	  models	  were	  resuscitated.	  The	  complete	  factory	  model	  and	  principle	  of	  self-­‐sufficiency	  were	  again	  advocated	  as	  effective	  solutions	  to	  the	  challenge	  of	  broad	  front	  development.	  During	  the	  Cultural	  Revolution,	  discussions	  on	  specialization,	  economies	  of	  scale,	  or	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  almost	  disappeared.	  The	  discourse	  that	  emerged	  during	  the	  Cultural	  Revolution	  was	  almost	  indistinguishable	  from	  what	  was	  being	  promoted	  during	  the	  Great	  Leap	  Forward.	  	  	   One	  of	  the	  most	  important	  slogans	  during	  the	  GLF	  was	  “walking	  on	  two	  legs”,	  and	  small-­‐scale,	  local	  factories	  were	  presented	  as	  a	  crucial	  force	  in	  promoting	  the	  country’s	  industrialization.	  Similarly,	  during	  the	  Cultural	  Revolution,	  an	  almost	  identical	  slogan	  was	  revived—“Upholding	  Big,	  Medium	  and	  Small	  Enterprises”.	  Following	  the	  same	  logic,	  Chinese	  economic	  writers	  again	  advocated	  small	  factories	  as	  the	  backbone	  of	  China’s	  industrialization.	  One	  of	  the	  writers	  during	  the	  Cultural	  Revolution	  cited	  the	  following	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  William	  A.	  Joseph,	  Christine	  Wong,	  and	  David	  Zweig,	  ed.,	  “Introduction:	  New	  Perspectives	  on	  the	  Cultural	  Revolution,”	  in	  New	  Perspectives	  on	  the	  Cultural	  Revolution	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1991),	  1.	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quotation	  from	  Chairman	  Mao	  on	  the	  ideological	  commitment	  to	  reviving	  smaller	  enterprises:	  	  Our	  great	  Chairman	  Mao	  once	  pointed	  out:	  “We	  must	  gradually	  establish	  a	  group	  of	  large-­‐scale,	  modern	  enterprises	  as	  the	  foundation	  [of	  our	  country].	  Without	  such	  a	  foundation,	  our	  country	  would	  not	  be	  turned	  into	  a	  modernized,	  powerful	  nation	  within	  decades.	  However,	  most	  enterprises	  should	  not	  follow	  this	  development	  strategy.	  Instead,	  we	  should	  establish	  more	  medium	  and	  small	  enterprises,	  as	  well	  as	  make	  full	  use	  of	  the	  industrial	  legacies	  that	  are	  left	  from	  earlier	  periods.	  We	  should	  be	  thrifty	  and	  try	  to	  achieve	  more	  with	  less	  money.”28	  	  	  The	  promotion	  of	  small	  factories	  was	  based	  on	  both	  practical	  and	  ideological	  grounds	  during	  both	  periods.	  More	  importantly,	  during	  the	  Cultural	  Revolution,	  the	  xiaotuquan	  (small-­‐scale,	  local)	  factories	  were	  encouraged	  to	  become	  self-­‐sufficient	  in	  all	  areas.	  In	  Chapter	  1	  and	  Chapter	  2,	  different	  examples	  of	  complete	  and	  diversified	  factories	  during	  the	  GLF	  were	  introduced.	  One	  can	  almost	  find	  all	  of	  their	  counterparts	  during	  the	  Cultural	  Revolution.	  Complete	  factories	  started	  out	  as	  makeshift	  solutions	  to	  incomplete	  supply	  chains	  in	  the	  machine-­‐building	  industry.	  Originally,	  machine-­‐building	  factories	  started	  by	  making	  single-­‐purpose	  machine	  tools	  when	  they	  could	  not	  obtain	  the	  required	  machine	  tools	  from	  other	  specialized	  factories.	  During	  the	  Cultural	  Revolution,	  the	  Red	  Star	  Gauge	  Factory	  (Hongxing	  liangju	  chang)	  was	  a	  small	  factory	  that	  made	  many	  of	  its	  own	  machine	  tools	  and	  supplemental	  machinery	  during	  the	  production	  process.	  The	  Red	  Star	  Factory	  started	  out	  as	  a	  production	  unit	  that	  supplied	  grinding	  stones	  to	  other	  factories.	  As	  it	  was	  transformed	  into	  a	  gauge	  factory,	  it	  required	  more	  workshops,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  variety	  of	  machine	  tools	  for	  the	  manufacturing	  of	  specialized	  gauges.29	  The	  factory	  not	  only	  built	  more	  workshops	  on	  its	  own,	  but	  also	  undertook	  the	  making	  of	  machine	  tools	  by	  itself.	  For	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Zan	  difang	  xiaoxing	  qiye	  bianjizu,	  ed.	  Zan	  difang	  xiaoxing	  qiye	  (Beijing:	  Kexue	  chubanshe,	  1971),	  1.	  29	  Shanghai	  shi	  chuban	  geming	  zu,	  “Xiaochang	  zhiqida,	  shitou	  zao	  mochuang,”	  in	  Xiaochang	  
zouzai	  dalu	  shang	  (Shanghai:	  Shanghai	  shi	  chuban	  geming	  zu,	  1970),	  63.	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example,	  lacking	  a	  grinding	  machine,	  workers	  from	  the	  Red	  Star	  Factory	  decided	  to	  make	  one	  on	  their	  own:	  	  In	  the	  manufacturing	  process,	  without	  technological	  support,	  they	  [the	  workers]	  would	  study	  on	  their	  own;	  without	  blue	  prints,	  they	  would	  borrow	  them	  from	  their	  brother	  factories;	  without	  the	  necessary	  raw	  materials,	  they	  would	  purchase	  from	  second-­‐hand	  goods	  stores.	  When	  they	  could	  not	  understand	  the	  blueprints,	  they	  would	  visit	  other	  factories	  to	  study	  their	  grinding	  machines.	  If	  they	  forgot,	  they	  would	  go	  and	  visit	  multiple	  times	  in	  a	  day.	  In	  order	  to	  make	  the	  grinding	  machine	  from	  stones	  as	  quickly	  as	  possible,	  they	  eat	  and	  sleep	  in	  the	  factory,	  day	  and	  night….	  after	  three	  and	  four	  months	  of	  hard	  work,	  the	  “homemade”	  grinding	  machine	  (tumochuang)	  is	  put	  together.30	  	  	  	  	  The	  description	  of	  the	  Red	  Star	  Factory	  seemed	  to	  be	  more	  ideologically	  driven	  than	  how	  complete	  factories	  were	  portrayed	  during	  the	  GLF.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  logic	  behind	  the	  Red	  Star	  Factory	  and	  machine-­‐building	  factories	  during	  GLF	  was	  almost	  identical:	  factories	  from	  both	  periods	  integrated	  backwards	  to	  complete	  their	  supply	  chains	  on	  their	  own.	  The	  principle	  of	  self-­‐sufficiency	  was	  revived	  during	  the	  Cultural	  Revolution,	  and	  the	  Red	  Star	  Factory	  was	  promoted	  as	  a	  positive	  model	  to	  be	  followed	  by	  other	  small,	  local	  factories.	  	  	   In	  addition	  to	  manufacturing	  single-­‐purpose	  machine	  tools,	  factories	  during	  the	  Cultural	  Revolution	  made	  complicated	  machinery	  in-­‐house	  as	  well.	  Jiangxi	  Jinggangshan	  Automobile	  Factory	  (Jiangxi	  jinggangshan	  qiche	  chang)	  was	  a	  small	  factory	  that	  produced	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  machine	  tools	  it	  required	  on	  its	  own.	  The	  automobile	  factory	  started	  out	  as	  an	  “automobile	  repair	  factory	  with	  only	  six	  hundred	  workers	  and	  88	  machine	  tools	  and	  pieces	  of	  equipment”.	  During	  the	  Cultural	  Revolution,	  as	  an	  act	  of	  revolutionary	  commitment,	  the	  factory	  set	  up	  a	  production	  target	  of	  manufacturing	  five	  hundred	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Ibid.,	  61.	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automobiles	  per	  year.31	  In	  the	  process,	  they	  ran	  into	  serious	  bottlenecks	  of	  insufficient	  machine	  tools.	  In	  response,	  the	  factory	  started	  to	  make	  their	  own	  machine	  tools	  so	  that	  a	  variety	  of	  machine	  parts	  and	  components	  of	  automobiles	  could	  be	  produced	  in-­‐house:	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  they	  made	  use	  of	  existing	  equipment	  to	  manufacture	  automobiles;	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  they	  produced	  a	  series	  of	  specialized	  equipment	  for	  automobile	  production	  on	  their	  own	  to	  equip	  themselves.	  They	  manufactured	  automobiles	  as	  well	  as	  machine	  tools	  simultaneously,	  so	  as	  to	  accelerate	  the	  pace	  to	  equip	  themselves	  and	  expand	  production.	  [For	  example,]	  one	  workshop	  had	  only	  two	  air	  forging	  hammers,	  which	  were	  far	  from	  meeting	  their	  production	  needs.	  Workers	  continued	  with	  the	  manufacturing	  process,	  while	  producing	  machine	  tools	  on	  their	  own,	  including:	  rock	  drills,	  hydraulic	  riveters,	  radial	  drilling	  machines,	  crane	  trolleys,	  hoisting	  machines,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  series	  of	  jigs	  and	  fixture.	  All	  of	  these	  formed	  an	  assembly	  line	  and	  the	  factory	  was	  able	  to	  outperform	  the	  original	  production	  goal.32	  	  The	  automobile	  factory	  integrated	  backwards	  extensively,	  and	  made	  almost	  all	  of	  the	  auxiliary	  machine	  tools	  it	  needed	  in	  production.	  Starting	  from	  1968,	  it	  produced	  a	  total	  of	  97	  specialized	  machine	  tools,	  which	  made	  up	  more	  than	  45%	  of	  its	  existing	  equipment.33	  The	  Jinggangshan	  Automobile	  Factory	  was	  a	  smaller	  factory	  compared	  to	  the	  No.1	  Automobile	  Factory	  described	  in	  Chapter	  1.	  Nevertheless,	  both	  automobile	  factories	  followed	  the	  model	  of	  complete	  factories	  and	  pursued	  self-­‐sufficiency	  as	  their	  primary	  goal	  in	  managing	  production.	  	  	   The	  Cultural	  Revolution	  put	  an	  end	  to	  the	  Specialization	  and	  Coordination	  Movement	  that	  came	  into	  full	  swing	  by	  the	  mid-­‐1960s.	  The	  Cultural	  Revolution	  was,	  therefore,	  not	  only	  an	  ideological	  struggle	  with	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party,	  but	  also	  had	  deep	  implications	  for	  the	  country’s	  economy.	  By	  mid-­‐1960s,	  fairs	  and	  contracts	  emerged	  as	  possible	  solutions	  to	  the	  problems	  of	  coordination	  that	  Chinese	  economic	  actors	  had	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31Zan	  difang	  xiaoxing	  qiye	  bianjizu,	  ed.	  “Yige	  xiaochang	  shi	  zenyang	  nianchan	  wubailiang	  qichede?	  Jiangxi	  jinggangshan	  qichechang	  de	  diaocha	  baogao,”	  in	  Zan	  difang	  xiaoxing	  qiye	  (Beijing:	  Kexue	  chubanshe,	  1971).	  	  32 Ibid.,	  106-­‐107.	  33	  Ibid.,	  107.	  
	   79	  
been	  dealt	  with	  since	  the	  start	  of	  GLF.	  The	  Cultural	  Revolution,	  however,	  disrupted	  a	  series	  of	  full-­‐blown	  efforts	  to	  promote	  enterprise-­‐level	  contractual	  coordination.	  Not	  surprisingly,	  as	  the	  Cultural	  Revolution	  came	  to	  an	  end	  and	  the	  Gang	  of	  Four	  was	  deposed,	  the	  debate	  on	  specialization	  and	  coordination	  was	  revived	  and	  resumed	  in	  late	  1970s	  and	  1980s.	  Chinese	  economic	  thinkers	  continued	  to	  tackle	  with	  the	  problems	  of	  specialization	  and	  coordination,	  and	  the	  market	  reform	  in	  1978	  was	  an	  outgrowth	  of	  these	  efforts	  that	  started	  toward	  the	  end	  of	  the	  GLF	  and	  later	  were	  rehabilitated	  after	  the	  Cultural	  Revolution.	  	  	  	  





"Market	  Reforms":	  1978	  to	  the	  Present	  
	  	   The	  Cultural	  Revolution	  revised	  the	  shifts	  generated	  by	  the	  Specialization	  and	  Coordination	  Movement	  and	  restored	  the	  primacy	  of	  the	  complete	  factory	  model.	  The	  end	  of	  the	  Cultural	  Revolution	  led	  yet	  to	  another	  change	  of	  course	  that	  revived	  the	  Specialization	  and	  Coordination	  Movement	  with	  new	  vigor.	  Discussions	  on	  the	  topic	  of	  specialization	  and	  coordination	  resumed	  and	  taken	  to	  the	  next	  level	  by	  Chinese	  economic	  critics	  and	  commentators.	  The	  complete	  factory	  model	  and	  national	  planning	  faced	  renewed	  criticism	  in	  a	  much	  more	  systematic	  and	  open	  way.	  The	  market	  reform	  that	  unfolded	  in	  late-­‐1970s	  was,	  in	  essence,	  an	  outgrowth	  of	  the	  discussions	  on	  coordination	  that	  emerged	  as	  early	  as	  late	  1950s	  and	  early	  1960s.	  	  	  In	  the	  late	  1970s,	  the	  presentation	  of	  the	  materials	  was	  more	  systematic	  and	  structured	  than	  the	  discourse	  that	  emerged	  during	  the	  Specialization	  and	  Coordination	  Movement.	  Entire	  books	  were	  published	  on	  the	  topic	  of	  specialization	  and	  coordination,	  and	  Chinese	  economic	  thinkers	  treated	  the	  topic	  as	  major	  principles	  that	  constituted	  the	  core	  of	  their	  later	  arguments.	  The	  contents	  of	  the	  discussions	  remained	  similar	  to	  what	  emerged	  in	  1960s,	  including	  benefits	  and	  types	  of	  specialization	  and	  coordination,	  possible	  business	  organizations	  that	  can	  improve	  coordination,	  and	  the	  use	  of	  contracts	  to	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solidify	  coordination.	  Chinese	  scholars	  also	  studied	  how	  a	  high	  level	  of	  coordination	  was	  achieved	  in	  advanced	  capitalist	  economies.1	  	  As	  early	  as	  1979,	  Chinese	  economic	  writers	  launched	  into	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  complete	  factory	  model	  from	  the	  Cultural	  Revolution	  era	  and	  drew	  renewed	  attention	  to	  the	  virtues	  of	  specialization	  coupled	  with	  a	  system	  of	  coordination.	  They	  recognized	  that	  the	  prevalence	  of	  complete	  factories	  remained	  a	  major	  problem	  to	  the	  Chinese	  economy:	  The	  socialist	  economy	  is	  built	  on	  the	  foundation	  of	  socialized	  mass	  production.	  There	  is	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  relationships	  of	  specialization	  and	  coordination	  between	  enterprises,	  regions	  and	  departments.	  With	  the	  advance	  of	  science	  and	  technology,	  the	  specialization	  and	  coordination	  of	  production	  would	  develop	  as	  well.	  However,	  due	  to	  …	  the	  way	  we	  treat	  mass	  production	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  we	  manage	  small	  production,	  many	  of	  our	  enterprises	  no	  longer	  develop	  into	  the	  direction	  of	  specialization	  and	  coordination,	  but	  rather	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  self-­‐sufficiency	  in	  all	  aspects.	  Therefore,	  most	  of	  the	  enterprises	  in	  our	  country	  are	  “small	  and	  complete”	  or	  “big	  and	  complete”…2	  	  With	  the	  advancement	  of	  production	  technologies	  and	  increase	  in	  production	  volume,	  Chinese	  economic	  writers	  pointed	  out	  that	  complete	  factories	  became	  increasingly	  incompatible	  with	  the	  need	  for	  modern	  mass	  production.	  The	  economist	  Qiao	  Rongzhang,	  for	  example,	  offered	  the	  following	  critique	  on	  the	  complete	  factory	  model	  in	  1978:	  Organizing	  specialized	  production	  is	  an	  inevitable	  trend	  of	  the	  development	  of	  modern	  industries.	  The	  structure	  of	  modern	  products	  is	  very	  complicated,	  the	  level	  of	  precision	  required	  by	  components	  is	  high,	  and	  the	  demand	  from	  society	  for	  these	  products	  is	  increasing.	  These	  modern	  industrial	  products	  are	  produced	  in	  large	  volume,	  they	  are	  complicated	  in	  structure,	  and	  they	  require	  a	  high	  level	  of	  precision.	  If	  they	  are	  almost	  or	  all	  produced	  by	  complete	  factories,	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Xiao	  Liang	  and	  Rong	  Wenzuo,	  Shengchan	  zhuanyehua	  he	  xiezuo	  (Beijing:	  Qinggongye	  chubanshe,	  1979).	  Li	  Yue	  and	  Dong	  Shoucai,	  Gongye	  shengchan	  de	  zhuanyehua	  xiezuo	  (Shijiazhuang:	  Hebei	  renmin	  chubanshe,	  1981).	  Wang	  Guangzhen	  and	  Xue	  Zhaoying,	  Woguo	  gongye	  shengchan	  zhuanyehua	  yu	  xiezuo	  (Fuzhou:	  Fujian	  renmin	  chubanshe,	  1983).	  Wu	  Zhaohong	  and	  Lu	  wangcai,	  Gongye	  zhuanyehua	  yu	  xiandaihua	  (Nanjing:	  Jiangsu	  renmin	  chubanshe,	  1980).	  2	  Liu	  Guoguang	  and	  Zhao	  Renwei,	  “Lun	  shehui	  zhuyi	  jingjizhong	  jihua	  yu	  shichang	  de	  guanxi,”	  
Jingji	  yanjiu	  5	  (1979):	  47.	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production	  cycle	  would	  be	  very	  long,	  and	  much	  of	  the	  specialized	  production	  equipment	  cannot	  be	  fully	  utilized.	  This	  is	  not	  economically	  efficient.	  Specialization	  can	  overcome	  these	  drawbacks.	  The	  history	  of	  industrialization	  in	  various	  countries	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  model	  of	  complete	  factory	  was	  already	  outdated,	  while	  specialization	  and	  coordination	  were	  a	  good	  way	  to	  organize	  modern	  industrial	  production.3	  	  	  Another	  economic	  writer,	  Wang	  Zhike,	  made	  an	  almost	  identical	  argument	  on	  the	  critique	  of	  complete	  factories:	  “Small	  and	  complete”,	  “Big	  and	  complete”,	  the	  pursuit	  of	  self-­‐sufficiency	  in	  all	  areas,	  self-­‐serving	  or	  self-­‐circulation	  all	  run	  counter	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  socialized	  mass	  production.	  They	  are	  the	  model	  and	  mindset	  of	  a	  primitive	  barter	  economy.4	  	  The	  concept	  of	  modern	  mass	  production	  was	  emphasized	  by	  both	  Qiao	  and	  Wang.	  In	  their	  discussions,	  they	  referred	  to	  the	  term	  as	  high-­‐volume	  mass	  production	  that	  could	  not	  be	  achieved	  by	  xiao	  er	  quan	  or	  xiaotuqun	  (small-­‐scale	  and	  complete)	  factories.	  With	  the	  advancement	  of	  production	  technologies	  and	  industrialization,	  mass	  production	  became	  an	  increasingly	  urgent	  need	  that	  received	  much	  more	  attention.	  In	  early	  1960s,	  Chinese	  economic	  analysts	  had	  already	  viewed	  specialization	  and	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  as	  superior	  strategies	  for	  improved	  product	  quality,	  lower	  production	  costs,	  and	  greater	  product	  variety.	  In	  post-­‐1978	  years,	  writers	  reiterated	  the	  same	  arguments	  but	  saw	  the	  changes	  as	  being	  all	  the	  more	  urgent	  because	  of	  the	  need	  for	  the	  country	  to	  move	  fully	  into	  mass	  production.	  Both	  Qiao	  and	  Wang	  highlighted	  that	  with	  the	  increase	  in	  production	  volume,	  the	  need	  for	  specialization	  and	  coordination	  was	  greater	  than	  ever.	  	  	   Basic	  arguments	  on	  the	  topic	  of	  specialization	  were	  reiterated	  in	  the	  reform	  era.	  Chinese	  economic	  writers	  promoted	  the	  establishment	  of	  independent,	  specialized	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3 Qiao	  Rongzhang,	  “Tigao	  zhuanyehua	  shuiping	  shi	  jiakuai	  gongye	  fazhan	  de	  zhongyao	  tujing,”	  
Jingji	  yanjiu	  7	  (1978):	  21. 4	  Wang	  Zhike,	  “Fazhan	  hengxiang	  jingji	  lianxi	  chuyi,”	  Sousuo	  3	  (1986):	  9.	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enterprises	  in	  opposition	  to	  complete	  factories,	  and	  argued	  that	  the	  level	  of	  specialization	  of	  the	  former	  was	  higher:	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  level	  of	  specialization	  in	  production,	  there	  are	  two	  scenarios	  in	  the	  specialization	  of	  products.	  The	  first	  is	  a	  complete	  factory	  that	  completes	  all	  manufacturing	  and	  production	  of	  components	  on	  its	  own;	  the	  other	  is	  a	  non-­‐complete	  factory	  that	  completes	  major	  manufacturing	  of	  essential	  machine	  parts	  on	  its	  own,	  while	  other	  components	  are	  supplied	  by	  its	  coordinating	  factories.	  The	  level	  of	  specialization	  is	  low	  for	  the	  former,	  while	  high	  for	  the	  latter.	  When	  we	  promote	  the	  specialization	  of	  products,	  we	  should	  prioritize	  specialized	  enterprises	  that	  either	  produce	  major	  components	  or	  are	  in	  charge	  of	  assembling.5	  	  	  The	  authors	  of	  the	  book,	  Han	  Youlan	  and	  Liu	  Furong,	  offered	  a	  similar	  critique	  of	  complete	  factories.	  They	  also	  acknowledged	  that	  complete	  factories	  could	  achieve	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  specialization	  in-­‐house,	  but	  highlighted	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  specialization	  of	  an	  enterprise	  was	  different	  from	  specialization	  within	  a	  complete	  factory.	  They	  elaborated	  on	  this	  distinction:	  Specialization	  of	  enterprises	  is	  different	  from	  specialization	  within	  a	  factory.	  Specialization	  within	  a	  factory	  is	  a	  result	  of	  the	  division	  of	  labor.	  With	  the	  development	  of	  industrial	  technologies,	  factories	  establish	  more	  specialized	  workshops,	  production	  stages	  and	  working	  stations	  based	  on	  the	  division	  of	  product	  (machine	  parts,	  components)	  or	  production	  techniques.	  This	  is	  called	  specialization	  within	  a	  factory.	  Its	  emergence	  indicates	  a	  deepening	  of	  the	  division	  of	  labor	  as	  well	  as	  an	  improvement	  in	  production	  technologies.	  The	  higher	  the	  level	  of	  specialization	  is	  within	  a	  factory,	  the	  more	  efficient	  it	  is	  in	  production.	  However,	  this	  is	  different	  from	  the	  specialization	  of	  enterprises.	  This	  is	  the	  specialization	  within	  an	  enterprise	  does	  not	  increase	  the	  number	  of	  enterprises	  or	  factories;	  the	  products	  from	  specialized	  workshops,	  production	  stages	  or	  groups	  only	  constitute	  semi-­‐finished	  products	  within	  the	  enterprise,	  and	  they	  are	  not	  circulated	  in	  the	  society	  as	  commodities.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  development	  of	  specialized	  industrial	  enterprises	  can	  not	  only	  increase	  the	  number	  of	  factories	  and	  enterprises,	  but	  also	  have	  more	  commodities	  circulated	  in	  the	  society	  and	  improve	  overall	  level	  of	  specialization	  of	  the	  society.6	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5 Han	  Youlan	  and	  Liu	  Furong,	  Gongye	  shengchan	  de	  zhuanyehua	  xiezuo	  yu	  gongye	  gongsi	  (Tianjin:	  Tianjin	  renmin	  chubanshe,	  1980),	  5-­‐6.	  6	  Ibid.,	  3-­‐4.	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Although	  the	  distinction	  between	  specialization	  of	  an	  enterprise	  and	  specialization	  within	  an	  enterprise	  was	  not	  made	  as	  sharply	  in	  the	  1960s,	  the	  arguments	  made	  on	  specialization	  were	  almost	  identical	  in	  the	  Specialization	  and	  Coordination	  Movement	  and	  in	  post-­‐1978	  years.	  In	  the	  1960s,	  what	  Chinese	  economic	  writers	  defined	  as	  specialization	  was	  what	  Han	  and	  Liu	  called	  “specialization	  of	  an	  enterprise”.	  	   After	  1978,	  economic	  analysts	  reiterated	  the	  argument	  that	  outside	  the	  complete	  factory	  model,	  which	  provided	  for	  limited	  specialization	  and	  internal	  coordination,	  the	  kind	  of	  specialization	  they	  advocated	  could	  not	  be	  achieved	  without	  special	  mechanisms	  of	  coordination.	  Specialized	  enterprises	  of	  the	  kind	  they	  favored	  could	  not	  exist	  in	  isolation	  and	  needed	  an	  extensive	  network	  of	  enterprises	  that	  would	  allow	  communication	  and	  coordination	  among	  them.	  This	  perspective,	  highlighted	  in	  the	  1960s,	  was	  reiterated	  in	  the	  same	  terms	  by	  Wu	  Zhaohong	  and	  Lu	  Wangcai	  in	  1980:	  As	  we	  have	  discussed	  before,	  modern	  mass	  production	  is	  a	  highly	  socialized	  form	  of	  production,	  and	  it	  is	  an	  integrated	  entity.	  Each	  section	  and	  enterprise	  belongs	  to	  a	  production	  stage	  or	  is	  part	  of	  it,	  interconnected	  with	  each	  other.	  Without	  integration,	  no	  enterprise	  or	  factory	  can	  exist	  on	  its	  own.	  Therefore,	  in	  promoting	  modern	  mass	  production,	  it	  requires	  not	  only	  specialized	  division	  in	  labor,	  but	  also	  requires	  improved	  connection	  and	  coordination	  between	  enterprises.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  it	  goes	  into	  the	  direction	  of	  specialization,	  and	  on	  the	  other,	  the	  direction	  of	  coordination.	  These	  two	  aspects	  are	  inter-­‐dependent	  and	  improve	  each	  other.	  Coordination	  is	  the	  prerequisite	  of	  specialization:	  without	  the	  connection	  in	  production	  among	  enterprises,	  regions	  and	  departments,	  there	  would	  be	  no	  realization	  of	  specialization;	  specialization	  is	  the	  foundation	  of	  coordination,	  and	  without	  the	  division	  of	  labor,	  there	  would	  be	  no	  possibility	  of	  coordination.	  Coordination	  improves	  specialization,	  and	  the	  better	  organized	  coordination	  is,	  the	  more	  it	  can	  accelerate	  the	  improvement	  in	  specialization;	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  higher	  the	  level	  of	  specialization	  and	  the	  division	  of	  labor	  are,	  the	  more	  production	  units	  are	  dependent	  of	  each	  other,	  and	  the	  more	  they	  require	  coordination.7	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Wu	  and	  Lu,	  Gongye	  zhuanyehua	  xiezuo	  yu	  xiandaihua,	  33-­‐34.	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The	  authors,	  Wu	  and	  Lu,	  again	  highlighted	  the	  concept	  of	  modern	  mass	  production	  and	  argued	  that	  the	  Chinese	  economy	  had	  reached	  a	  new	  level	  of	  development	  where	  the	  old	  complete	  factory	  was	  inadequate,	  and	  new	  forms	  of	  coordination	  were	  needed.	  	  	   Similar	  to	  their	  predecessors	  of	  the	  1960s,	  economists	  and	  policy	  makers	  understood	  that	  coordination	  centered	  on	  relationships	  among	  individual	  enterprises,	  which	  were	  users	  and	  suppliers	  of	  the	  products	  in	  exchange:	  As	  long	  as	  there	  is	  division	  of	  labor	  in	  the	  society,	  there	  must	  be	  coordination.	  The	  higher	  the	  level	  of	  division	  of	  labor,	  the	  more	  intimate	  the	  relationship	  between	  different	  sections	  and	  enterprises,	  and	  the	  more	  coordination	  is	  needed.	  The	  division	  of	  labor	  and	  coordination	  are	  prerequisites	  to	  each	  other,	  and	  they	  are	  conducive	  to	  each	  other	  as	  well.	  We	  know	  that	  industrial	  enterprises	  are	  the	  producers	  of	  materials	  in	  the	  society,	  as	  well	  as	  consumers.	  For	  example,	  a	  textile	  factory	  provides	  a	  variety	  of	  textile	  products	  to	  the	  society	  to	  meet	  the	  demand	  from	  people;	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  needs	  	  many	  factories	  to	  supply	  textile	  machinery	  or	  equipment,	  raw	  materials	  such	  as	  cotton,	  fuel,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  supplemental	  materials.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  textile	  factory	  is	  integrated	  with	  other	  factories	  as	  an	  organic	  whole.8	  	  	  Economic	  commentators	  Wang	  Guangzheng	  and	  Xue	  Zhaoying,	  argued	  that	  every	  enterprise	  in	  the	  economy	  was	  both	  a	  user	  and	  producer	  of	  goods.	  The	  basic	  point	  had	  been	  made	  by	  writers	  in	  the	  1960s,	  who	  had	  advocated	  for	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  through	  the	  use	  of	  contracts	  and	  fairs.	  	  In	  post-­‐1978	  years,	  writers	  made	  use	  of	  the	  same	  classification	  of	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  that	  had	  been	  developed	  in	  1960s.	  Recall	  the	  concepts	  of	  coordination	  broadly	  and	  narrowly	  defined,	  which	  were	  first	  brought	  up	  by	  Ji	  Ming	  in	  1959.9	  Wang	  and	  Xue	  referred	  to	  this	  classification	  in	  their	  writing	  on	  coordination	  in	  1983:	  [T]he	  industrial	  production	  coordination	  we	  are	  discussing	  here	  is	  not	  coordination	  in	  a	  broad	  sense,	  but	  coordination	  in	  a	  narrow	  sense.	  Such	  coordination	  is	  limited	  to	  only	  one	  form	  of	  production	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Wang	  and	  Xue,	  Woguo	  gongye	  shengchan	  zhuanyehua	  yu	  xiezuo,	  4.	  9	  Ji	  Ming,	  Shehui	  zhuyi	  gongye	  shengchan	  de	  zhuanyehua	  yu	  xiezuo	  (Shanghai:	  Shanghai	  renmin	  chubanshe,	  1959).	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relationship,	  which	  is	  the	  relationship	  between	  enterprises	  that	  produce	  the	  same	  type	  of	  product.	  It	  does	  not	  include	  coordination	  within	  an	  enterprise,	  nor	  does	  it	  include	  coordination	  between	  national	  economic	  bureaus	  such	  as	  the	  industrial	  bureau	  and	  the	  agricultural	  bureau.	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  content	  of	  coordination,	  it	  does	  not	  include	  the	  coordination	  of	  raw	  materials,	  technology	  or	  labor;	  nor	  does	  it	  include	  the	  coordination	  of	  the	  supply	  and	  demand	  of	  commodities.	  For	  example,	  raw	  materials,	  fuel,	  standardized	  machine	  parts	  and	  semi-­‐finished	  products	  are	  usually	  produced	  by	  factories	  based	  on	  social	  demand	  and	  their	  own	  capacities,	  and	  then	  allocated	  to	  the	  domain	  of	  consumption	  through	  allocation	  bureau	  or	  business	  venues,	  in	  order	  to	  meet	  the	  demand	  of	  many	  machine-­‐building	  factories	  of	  various	  departments.	  This	  coordination	  belongs	  to	  the	  supply	  and	  demand	  of	  commodities,	  and	  is	  considered	  broad	  coordination.	  However,	  narrow	  coordination	  refers	  to	  a	  specific	  type	  of	  supply,	  which	  is	  the	  supply	  of	  designated	  semi-­‐finished	  products	  or	  machinery	  components.	  The	  salient	  feature	  of	  such	  coordination	  is	  that	  the	  producer	  would	  complete	  the	  production	  tasks	  based	  on	  specific	  technical	  requirements	  and	  blueprints	  from	  the	  user,	  and	  supply	  the	  products	  directly	  to	  the	  user	  on	  a	  regular	  basis.10	  	  	  The	  revisiting	  of	  the	  classification	  that	  Ji	  came	  up	  with	  demonstrates	  continuities	  of	  the	  discussions	  that	  emerged	  during	  the	  reform	  era	  with	  the	  Specialization	  and	  Coordination	  Movement.	  	  Significantly,	  Chinese	  economic	  writers	  in	  post-­‐1978	  reforms	  emphasized	  a	  variant	  of	  “broad”	  coordination,	  and	  argued	  that	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  was	  no	  longer	  confined	  to	  the	  exchange	  of	  components,	  machine	  parts,	  or	  raw	  materials,	  which	  had	  been	  the	  primary	  objects	  of	  coordination	  in	  1960s:	  [S]ocialized	  mass	  production,	  especially	  modern	  socialized	  production,	  with	  the	  advancement	  of	  technologies,	  development	  in	  specialization,	  expansion	  of	  production	  volume,	  improvement	  in	  the	  continuity	  of	  production	  processes…	  it	  requires	  us	  to	  build	  relationships	  between	  enterprises	  and	  production	  units	  that	  are	  closely	  connected	  with	  each	  other	  in	  terms	  of	  technology	  or	  production	  in	  various	  forms.	  In	  this	  way,	  they	  can	  make	  the	  most	  efficient	  use	  of	  all	  the	  production	  elements	  and	  conditions	  that	  are	  indispensable	  to	  modern	  production,	  but	  are	  scattered	  in	  different	  regions,	  such	  as:	  labor,	  equipment,	  space,	  resources,	  technology,	  information…	  transportation,	  communication,	  etc.	  Therefore,	  as	  long	  as	  [we	  are	  in	  the	  realm	  of]	  socialized	  mass	  production,	  specialized	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Wang	  and	  Xue,	  Woguo	  gongye	  shengchan	  zhuanyehua	  yu	  xiezuo,	  5.	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coordination	  and	  economic	  integration	  would	  inevitably	  exist	  and	  develop.11	  	  The	  realm	  of	  coordination	  had	  been	  broadened	  to	  the	  exchange	  of	  technologies,	  labor,	  equipment,	  and	  information	  among	  enterprises.	  This	  was	  a	  new	  development	  in	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  that	  had	  not	  been	  previously	  discussed	  in	  1960s.	  	  	  	   Although	  the	  need	  for	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  became	  ever	  more	  urgent	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  achieving	  modern	  mass	  production,	  a	  growing	  number	  of	  commentators	  voiced	  the	  view	  that	  the	  national	  planning	  apparatus	  remained	  a	  major	  roadblock	  to	  the	  development	  of	  coordination.	  While	  writers	  of	  the	  Specialization	  and	  Coordination	  Movement	  hinted	  at	  the	  drawbacks	  of	  national	  planning,	  their	  criticism	  was	  implicit	  and	  subdued.	  They	  had	  suggested	  that	  national	  panning	  could	  not	  accommodate	  specific	  needs	  of	  individual	  enterprises.	  They	  also	  implied	  that	  contractual	  coordination	  ought	  to	  supersede	  the	  national	  plan	  in	  allocating	  goods	  and	  resources.	  No	  open	  criticism	  of	  the	  planning	  apparatus,	  however,	  emerged	  in	  the	  1960s.	  After	  the	  Cultural	  Revolution,	  Chinese	  economic	  writers	  became	  more	  explicit	  in	  their	  criticism,	  although	  the	  main	  thrust	  of	  the	  arguments	  remained	  very	  similar	  to	  those	  of	  their	  predecessors.	  	   The	  economic	  writer	  Jiang	  Xuemo	  noted	  in	  an	  article	  published	  in	  1979,	  for	  example,	  that	  the	  national	  plan	  was	  inadequate	  in	  meeting	  enterprise-­‐level	  production	  needs:	  Needs	  of	  a	  society	  come	  in	  a	  great	  variety,	  and	  they	  change	  corresponding	  to	  the	  changes	  in	  production	  technologies,	  economic	  conditions	  and	  other	  social	  conditions.	  There	  are	  many	  types	  of	  products	  in	  a	  society,	  while	  the	  production	  of	  one	  single	  product	  involves	  many	  enterprises	  simultaneously.	  It	  is,	  therefore,	  impossible	  to	  encompass	  the	  production,	  supply	  and	  distribution	  of	  millions	  of	  enterprises	  in	  a	  comprehensive	  state	  plan	  and	  do	  a	  good	  job	  in	  coordinating.12	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Wang,	  “Fazhan	  hengxiang	  jingji	  lianxi	  chuyi,”	  9.	  12	  Jiang	  Xuemo,	  “Lun	  jihua	  tiaojie	  yu	  shichang	  tiaojie	  de	  jiehe,”	  Jingji	  yanjiu	  8	  (1979).	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Jiang	  argued	  that	  with	  the	  advancement	  of	  specialization	  and	  the	  increasing	  need	  for	  coordination,	  national	  planning	  became	  increasingly	  insufficient	  in	  coordinating	  the	  needs	  between	  users	  and	  producers.	  Another	  group	  of	  economic	  writers	  presented	  a	  similar	  critique	  on	  national	  plan	  in	  1980:	  In	  order	  to	  manage	  a	  complicated	  national	  economy	  as	  an	  integrated	  entity	  in	  a	  rigorous	  way,	  only	  relying	  on	  the	  plan	  is	  not	  adequate.	  This	  is	  because:	  (1)	  a	  plan	  cannot	  encompass	  thousands	  of	  economic	  activities	  that	  change	  constantly;	  even	  for	  the	  parts	  that	  are	  included	  in	  the	  plan,	  it	  is	  not	  able	  to	  specify	  in	  a	  comprehensive	  and	  detailed	  way	  (2)	  a	  plan	  cannot	  relate	  various	  economic	  activities	  to	  the	  profits	  of	  enterprises	  (3)	  a	  plan	  does	  not	  have	  the	  enforceability	  as	  that	  of	  a	  contract.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  plan	  cannot	  guarantee	  the	  implementation	  of	  coordination.13	  	  	  These	  were	  reasons	  that	  had	  been	  discussed	  by	  writers	  in	  the	  1960s,	  and	  were	  later	  reiterated	  when	  national	  planning	  came	  under	  increasing	  scrutiny	  and	  attack	  in	  post-­‐1978	  years.	  In	  addition	  to	  criticizing	  the	  inadequacy	  of	  national	  planning	  in	  meeting	  the	  needs	  of	  individual	  enterprises,	  critics	  pointed	  out	  that	  another	  major	  drawback	  of	  the	  planning	  apparatus	  was	  that	  it	  deprived	  individual	  factories	  of	  autonomy.	  Economic	  critics	  in	  the	  1960s	  had	  hinted	  at	  the	  possibility	  that	  enterprise-­‐level	  contractual	  coordination	  should	  be	  prioritized	  over	  the	  national	  plan,	  but	  criticism	  of	  the	  overarching	  power	  of	  the	  national	  plan	  became	  much	  sharper	  after	  1978.	  Chinese	  economic	  writers	  noted	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  enterprise	  autonomy	  remained	  a	  serious	  problem	  for	  the	  Chinese	  economy.	  The	  economist	  Jiang	  Xuemo,	  for	  example,	  elaborated	  on	  the	  lack	  of	  autonomy	  among	  enterprises	  in	  1979:	  On	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  state	  and	  enterprises,	  the	  state	  is	  in	  tight	  charge	  of	  too	  many	  things.	  Enterprises	  lack	  the	  autonomy	  they	  should	  have	  in	  terms	  of	  planning,	  production,	  resources,	  labor,	  finance,	  etc.	  Therefore,	  they	  cannot	  adjust	  [their	  production]	  based	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Sun	  Cheng	  and	  Jian	  Guanglun,	  Li	  Yingqing,	  Qiu	  Ping,	  “Luelun	  shehui	  zhuyi	  jingji	  hetong,”	  
Dangdai	  jingji	  kexue,	  February	  1980,	  24.	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the	  needs	  of	  national	  construction,	  people’s	  lives,	  or	  changes	  in	  national	  and	  international	  [needs].14	  	  	  The	  national	  plan	  was	  not	  only	  inadequate	  in	  meeting	  the	  production	  needs	  of	  individual	  enterprises,	  it	  also	  deprived	  factories	  of	  autonomy	  in	  forming	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  among	  themselves.	  It	  constituted	  a	  major	  impediment	  to	  improving	  the	  level	  of	  specialization	  and	  coordination.	  Another	  Chinese	  economic	  writer,	  Yu	  Hanqin,	  offered	  a	  sharper	  criticism	  of	  national	  planning	  and	  argued	  that	  individual	  enterprises	  ought	  to	  be	  the	  principals	  in	  forming	  coordination	  relationships:	  The	  major	  roles	  played	  by	  local	  governments	  are	  not	  to	  organize	  the	  coordination	  of	  various	  projects;	  instead,	  their	  main	  responsibilities	  are	  to	  come	  up	  with	  a	  series	  of	  policies	  and	  create	  a	  conducive	  environment	  for	  economic	  integration	  and	  coordination,	  while	  the	  coordinating	  projects	  are	  implemented	  by	  enterprises	  themselves.	  Enterprises	  are	  directly	  responsible	  for	  economic	  integration	  and	  coordination.	  They	  undertake	  commodity	  production	  independently	  and	  are	  in	  charge	  of	  their	  own	  profits.	  Therefore,	  economic	  integration	  and	  coordination	  must	  be	  based	  on	  the	  principle	  of	  consensus,	  equality	  and	  reciprocality.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  local	  governments	  would	  be	  in	  charge	  of	  large-­‐scale	  infrastructure	  projects	  in	  transportation	  and	  energy	  that	  are	  usually	  not	  undertaken	  by	  individual	  enterprises.15	  	  	  Writers	  in	  the	  1960s	  had	  hinted	  at	  the	  possibility	  that	  enterprise-­‐level	  contractual	  coordination	  ought	  to	  supersede	  the	  national	  plan.	  In	  1986,	  the	  author	  Yu	  Hanqin	  argued	  more	  forthrightly	  that	  the	  role	  played	  by	  local	  governments	  in	  forming	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  must	  remain	  subsidiary	  to	  individual	  enterprises	  who	  were	  the	  ultimately	  responsible	  for	  the	  coordination	  with	  each	  other.	  	  	   In	  response	  to	  the	  perceived	  roadblock	  created	  by	  national	  planning,	  economic	  writers	  in	  the	  1960s	  came	  up	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  contracts	  and	  fairs	  as	  a	  way	  to	  improve	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination.	  In	  post-­‐1978	  years,	  fairs	  were	  revived	  to	  facilitate	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Jiang,	  “Lun	  jihua	  tiaojie	  yu	  shichang	  tiaojie	  de	  jiehe,”	  55.	  15	  Yu	  Hanqin, “Fazhan	  hengxiang	  jingji	  lianxi,	  tansuo	  jingji	  jishu	  xiezuo	  de	  xinluzi,”	  in	  Jingji	  jishu	  
xiezuo	  xinfazhan	  ed.	  Wu	  Jiapei,	  Xu	  Changzhong	  (Beijing:	  Jingji	  kexue	  chubanshe,	  1986),	  525.	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enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  at	  the	  provincial	  level	  and	  the	  use	  of	  contracts	  was	  encouraged	  between	  factories.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  Chinese	  economic	  thinkers	  came	  up	  with	  more	  radical	  ways	  of	  promoting	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination.	  	  	   The	  organization	  of	  fairs	  continued	  in	  1980s.	  For	  example,	  in	  1984,	  a	  large-­‐scale	  coordination	  conference	  was	  held	  among	  five	  provinces	  and	  cites,	  including:	  Sichuan,	  Yunnan,	  Guizhou,	  Guangxi,	  and	  Chongqing.	  From	  April	  1984	  to	  April	  1985,	  more	  than	  1500	  coordination	  contracts	  were	  signed	  among	  the	  participating	  enterprises.16.	  Another	  economic	  writer,	  Li	  Wanjun,	  wrote	  in	  1983	  that	  fairs	  (	  “coordination	  conferences”)	  were	  conducive	  to	  building	  contractual	  relationships	  between	  enterprises,	  and	  advocated	  for	  government	  agencies	  “organize	  regional	  economic	  and	  technological	  coordination	  conferences	  on	  a	  regular	  basis.	  Participants	  would	  be	  responsible	  government	  departments	  as	  well	  as	  regional	  and	  enterprise-­‐level	  leaders.	  They	  would	  analyze	  the	  advantages	  and	  disadvantages	  of	  coordination,	  set	  principles	  [and	  guidelines],	  negotiate	  about	  coordination	  projects,	  sign	  contracts	  of	  coordination,	  so	  as	  to	  improve	  economic	  coordination	  between	  regions.”17	  Li	  highlighted	  the	  significance	  of	  coordination	  conferences	  as	  a	  way	  to	  improve	  inter-­‐regional	  coordination,	  a	  point	  that	  had	  not	  been	  emphasized	  by	  writers	  in	  the	  1960s.	  The	  breakaway	  from	  regional	  compartmentalization	  in	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  was,	  in	  essence,	  a	  direct	  counter-­‐argument	  against	  national	  planning.	  	  Fairs	  created	  venues	  for	  enterprises	  to	  overcome	  the	  territorial	  boundaries	  imposed	  by	  the	  national	  plan	  and	  communicate	  with	  each	  other	  directly.	  	  	   The	  importance	  of	  contracts	  received	  renewed	  emphasis	  in	  the	  post-­‐1978	  era.	  Economic	  analysts	  saw	  direct	  continuity	  between	  the	  improvement	  in	  enterprise-­‐level	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Ibid.	  517-­‐518.	  17	  Li	  Wanjun,	  “Shilun	  shehui	  zhuyi	  gongye	  xiezuo,”	  in	  Liaoning	  shiyuan	  xuebao(shehuikexueban)	  5	  (1983):	  29.	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coordination	  and	  the	  need	  for	  enforcement	  of	  contracts.	  Four	  economic	  writers,	  Sun	  Cheng,	  Jian	  Guanglun,	  Li	  Yinqing	  and	  Qiu	  Ping,	  fleshed	  out	  the	  relationship	  between	  coordination	  and	  the	  use	  of	  contracts	  in	  1980:	  As	  division	  of	  labor	  in	  a	  society…	  developed	  to	  a	  certain	  extent,	  the	  emergence	  of	  economic	  contracts	  followed.	  Before	  the	  appearance	  of	  division	  of	  labor	  in	  a	  society,	  there	  was	  no	  need	  for	  management	  [of	  these	  relationships]	  and	  therefore	  no	  need	  for	  economic	  contracts.	  It	  was	  only	  when	  the	  division	  of	  labor	  emerged	  and	  later	  developed	  into	  specialized	  coordination	  that	  the	  inter-­‐connectedness	  and	  inter-­‐dependence	  between	  sections	  and	  enterprises	  became	  increasingly	  important.	  In	  order	  to	  ensure	  that	  production	  can	  move	  on	  smoothly,	  the	  two	  sides	  that	  enter	  into	  economic	  relationships	  with	  each	  other	  regularly	  should	  specify	  each	  other’s	  responsibilities	  and	  make	  sure	  that	  they	  can	  fulfill	  the	  conditions	  required	  by	  the	  other	  in	  a	  timely	  manner.	  Thus	  appears	  the	  necessity	  of	  signing	  economic	  contracts	  ...18	  	  Sun,	  Jian,	  Li	  and	  Qiu	  highlighted	  the	  binding	  power	  of	  contracts,	  a	  point	  that	  had	  been	  brought	  up	  by	  writers	  in	  the	  1960s.	  They	  also	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  use	  of	  contracts	  became	  ever	  more	  necessary,	  as	  the	  division	  of	  labor	  in	  a	  society	  improved	  and	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  became	  more	  prevalent.	  	  Fairs	  and	  contracts	  in	  themselves	  were	  not	  new	  interventions.	  In	  the	  post-­‐1978	  years,	  Chinese	  economic	  writers,	  however,	  	  brought	  up	  two	  new	  economic	  terms,	  “horizontal	  economic	  coordination”	  and	  “horizontal	  economic	  integration”	  as	  extensions	  of	  the	  concepts	  of	  enterprise-­‐level	  contractual	  coordination	  that	  emerged	  during	  the	  Specialization	  and	  Coordination	  Movement	  in	  the	  1960s.	  Although	  both	  terms	  had	  earlier	  precedents,	  they	  also	  took	  on	  new	  meanings	  and	  significance	  in	  the	  post-­‐1978	  discussions.	  	  In	  defining	  the	  term	  “horizontal	  economic	  relationships”,	  Chinese	  economic	  writers	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  invoked	  arguments	  that	  had	  been	  previously	  discussed	  extensively,	  including	  specialization,	  division	  of	  labor,	  and	  coordination.	  In	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Sun,	  Jian,	  et	  al.,	  “Luelun	  shehui	  zhuyi	  jingji	  hetong,”	  24.	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the	  economic	  journal	  Caijin	  wenti	  yanjiu	  in	  1986,	  the	  economist	  Li	  Hongshan,	  offered	  a	  definition	  of	  horizontal	  economic	  relationships	  that	  was	  in	  essence	  an	  outgrowth	  of	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  that	  had	  been	  formerly	  defined:	  Horizontal	  economic	  relationships	  are	  external	  coordination	  relationships	  that	  are	  built	  on	  division	  of	  labor	  within	  a	  society;	  they	  are	  how	  enterprises	  complement	  each	  other	  in	  terms	  of	  production	  factors.	  Under	  the	  condition	  of	  socialized	  mass	  production,	  the	  division	  of	  labor	  within	  a	  society	  can	  be	  divided	  into	  the	  division	  of	  labor	  within	  an	  enterprise	  and	  outside	  an	  enterprise.	  Internal	  division	  of	  labor	  within	  an	  enterprise	  refers	  to	  the	  division	  among	  different	  production	  types,	  production	  processes	  or	  workshops.	  Internal	  coordination	  relationships	  are	  built	  on	  the	  internal	  division	  of	  labor	  within	  an	  enterprise.	  The	  external	  division	  of	  labor	  is	  the	  division	  of	  	  society	  among	  different	  enterprises.	  They	  are	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  internal	  division	  of	  labor.	  Under	  socialized	  mass	  production,	  enterprises	  are	  dependent	  upon	  each	  other.	  The	  product	  of	  an	  enterprise	  may	  be	  the	  material	  or	  the	  subject	  of	  labor	  for	  the	  other.	  No	  one	  can	  exist	  without	  the	  other.	  In	  real	  life,	  each	  producer	  may	  not	  have	  adequate	  labor,	  materials	  or	  finance,	  and	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  they	  may	  experience	  shortage	  in	  certain	  production	  factors,	  while	  other	  producers	  have	  excess.	  If	  these	  enterprises	  can	  enhance	  horizontal	  relationships	  or	  integration	  with	  each	  other	  and	  complement	  each	  other,	  then	  productivity	  could	  be	  greatly	  improved.19	  	  	  The	  author	  Li	  offered	  a	  definition	  of	  horizontal	  economic	  relationships	  that	  was	  almost	  indistinguishable	  from	  how	  enterprise-­‐level	  contractual	  coordination	  had	  been	  described	  during	  the	  Specialization	  and	  Coordination	  Movement.	  In	  other	  words,	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  could	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  simplest	  form	  of	  coordination	  between	  enterprises;	  horizontal	  economic	  relationships,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  represented	  a	  direct	  outgrowth	  of	  this	  concept,	  but	  incorporated	  new	  meanings	  as	  well.	  Li,	  for	  example,	  highlighted	  the	  fact	  that	  horizontal	  economic	  relationships	  served	  as	  an	  effective	  way	  to	  break	  down	  hierarchical	  and	  bureaucratic	  boundaries	  imposed	  by	  national	  planning:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Li	  Hongshan,	  “Hengxiang	  jingji	  lianhe	  de	  jiben	  gainian	  he	  zhuyao	  xingshi,”	  Caijing	  wenti	  yanjiu	  6	  (1986):	  21.	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Horizontal	  economic	  relationships	  are	  economic	  activities	  or	  transactions	  initiated	  by	  enterprises	  themselves	  that	  go	  beyond	  certain	  hierarchical	  and	  bureaucratic	  relationships.	  First	  of	  all,	  economic	  horizontal	  relationships	  are	  production	  relationships.	  They	  reflect	  commodity	  exchange	  relationships	  between	  producers	  of	  commodities.	  Secondly,	  such	  commodity	  exchange	  relationships	  take	  place	  among	  enterprises	  and	  go	  beyond	  certain	  hierarchical	  and	  bureaucratic	  relationships.20	  	  Writers	  in	  the	  1960s	  had	  implicitly	  argued	  for	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  to	  take	  the	  place	  of	  central	  planning,	  but	  in	  the	  1980s,	  they	  started	  to	  openly	  call	  for	  horizontal	  economic	  relationships	  to	  take	  the	  place	  of	  national	  planning	  in	  the	  allocation	  of	  resources.	  In	  other	  words,	  they	  believed	  that	  horizontal	  economic	  relationships	  would	  eventually	  supersede	  the	  national	  plan	  and	  became	  the	  dominant	  method	  of	  coordination	  among	  enterprises.	  Li	  also	  highlighted	  that	  the	  principals	  responsible	  for	  coordination	  should	  be	  users	  and	  producers	  of	  commodities	  or	  goods,	  instead	  of	  government	  bureaucracies.	  	  	   Another	  writer	  in	  the	  1980s	  reiterated	  the	  point	  that	  economic	  relationships	  between	  enterprises	  ought	  to	  transcend	  geographic	  boundaries.	  Wang	  Zhike,	  who	  wrote	  on	  the	  same	  topic	  in	  1986,	  argued	  that	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  could	  take	  place	  between	  any	  factory	  in	  the	  economy,	  regardless	  of	  geographic	  boundaries,	  as	  long	  as	  profits	  could	  be	  made	  from	  the	  transaction:	  In	  order	  to	  expand	  production	  and	  make	  more	  economic	  profits,	  the	  producers	  and	  users	  of	  commodities	  would	  inevitably	  build	  relationships	  with	  each	  other	  in	  terms	  of	  supply	  and	  demand,	  financing,	  technology,	  equipment,	  raw	  materials,	  labor,	  etc.	  Their	  relationships	  are	  horizontal,	  and	  are	  not	  bound	  by	  counties,	  provinces,	  or	  even	  nations.	  Generally	  speaking,	  wherever	  there	  are	  more	  economic	  profits	  to	  be	  made,	  they	  would	  build	  relationships	  there.	  It	  is	  even	  more	  true	  within	  our	  country.21	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Ibid.	  21.	  21	  Wang,	  “Fazhan	  hengxiang	  jingji	  lianxi	  chuyi,”	  10.	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Wang	  broadened	  the	  realm	  of	  horizontal	  economic	  relationships	  to	  the	  exchange	  of	  goods,	  products,	  technology	  and	  financing.	  He	  also	  highlighted	  that	  coordination	  between	  enterprises	  ought	  not	  to	  be	  constrained	  by	  their	  locations,	  as	  long	  as	  profits	  could	  be	  made.	  Although	  Chinese	  economic	  critics	  went	  to	  great	  lengths	  to	  elaborate	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  horizontal	  economic	  relationships,	  the	  core	  message	  behind	  the	  concept	  was	  straightforward:	  enterprises	  ought	  to	  have	  the	  freedom	  and	  autonomy	  to	  make	  business	  decisions	  and	  coordinate	  with	  each	  other,	  regardless	  of	  geographical	  or	  bureaucratic	  boundaries.	  One	  reason	  why	  writers	  had	  to	  offer	  extensive	  and	  sometimes	  lengthy	  explanations	  of	  the	  term	  was	  because	  they	  were	  trying	  to	  work	  through	  Marxist	  social	  science	  at	  the	  same	  time	  they	  were	  trying	  to	  get	  across	  economic	  concepts	  that	  would	  otherwise	  be	  straightforward	  in	  a	  capitalist	  context.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  a	  market	  economy,	  for	  example,	  horizontal	  economic	  relationships	  could	  simply	  be	  understood	  as	  relationships	  between	  individual	  buyers	  and	  sellers	  that	  constituted	  the	  supply	  and	  demand	  of	  the	  economy.	  In	  a	  socialist	  economy,	  however,	  it	  was	  more	  challenging	  for	  writers	  to	  articulate	  and	  justify	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  under	  national	  planning.	  	  	   In	  addition	  to	  “horizontal	  economic	  relationships”,	  another	  term	  that	  emerged	  in	  the	  1980s	  was	  “horizontal	  economic	  integration”.	  Chinese	  economic	  writers	  sometimes	  used	  these	  two	  terms	  interchangeably,	  although	  there	  were	  nuances	  in	  the	  use	  of	  these	  two	  expressions	  as	  well.	  Economists	  defined	  horizontal	  economic	  integration	  as	  a	  particular	  category	  of	  horizontal	  economic	  relationships,	  in	  which	  enterprises	  entered	  into	  more	  stable,	  longer-­‐term	  contractual	  coordination	  with	  each	  other.	  Authors	  Chen	  Jiagui	  and	  Huang	  Sujian	  offered	  a	  definition	  of	  horizontal	  economic	  integration	  in	  1987:	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Horizontal	  economic	  relationships	  encompass	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  economic	  activities.	  It	  not	  only	  included	  economic	  integration,	  but	  also	  the	  usual	  relationship	  between	  users	  and	  producers.	  It	  included	  all	  types	  of	  horizontal	  coordination	  relationships:	  general	  contracts,	  agreements,	  and	  various	  forms	  of	  horizontal	  relationships	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  economics,	  technology,	  information	  that	  are	  not	  enforced	  by	  contracts	  or	  agreements.	  What	  differentiates	  the	  economic	  relationships	  described	  above	  from	  the	  other	  is	  their	  tightness	  and	  their	  stability.	  Economic	  integration	  is	  a	  type	  of	  economic	  relationships	  that	  has	  a	  high	  level	  of	  tightness	  and	  stability.22	  	  	  Recall	  the	  concept	  of	  “narrow	  coordination”	  that	  was	  first	  defined	  by	  Ji	  Ming	  in	  1959	  and	  later	  revisited	  by	  economic	  writers	  in	  post-­‐1978	  years.	  Narrow	  coordination,	  for	  example,	  would	  be	  an	  instance	  of	  horizontal	  economic	  integration	  because	  the	  coordination	  relationship	  between	  an	  automobile	  factory	  and	  the	  specialized	  factories	  that	  supplied	  it	  with	  customized	  machine	  parts	  or	  components	  should	  not	  be	  easily	  modified.	  The	  coordination	  between	  them	  was	  still	  undertaken	  by	  individual	  enterprises,	  but	  it	  was	  longer-­‐term	  and	  more	  specific	  to	  the	  participating	  factories.	  	  	   Writers	  also	  emphasized	  that	  horizontal	  economic	  integration	  ought	  to	  be	  more	  effective	  in	  breaking	  bureaucratic	  and	  geographic	  boundaries.	  The	  economic	  writer	  Li	  Hongshan,	  for	  example,	  pointed	  out	  in	  1986	  that	  economic	  integration	  went	  beyond	  regional	  administrative	  jurisdictions:	  Horizontal	  economic	  integration	  is	  the	  organized,	  contractual,	  long-­‐term	  and	  stable	  form	  of	  horizontal	  economic	  relationships.	  Economic	  integration	  refers	  to	  economic	  activities	  that	  go	  beyond	  certain	  regional	  administrative	  jurisdictions.	  They	  refer	  to	  such	  activities	  between	  enterprises	  or	  production	  units	  that	  are	  in	  different	  regions,	  departments,	  and	  ownership	  structure—they	  voluntarily	  negotiate	  contracts	  with	  each	  other	  and	  come	  together	  in	  order	  to	  connect	  with	  each	  other	  in	  terms	  of	  production,	  circulation	  and	  various	  production	  processes.23	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Chen	  Jiagui,	  Huang	  Sujian,	  ed.	  Qiye	  hengxiang	  lianhe	  zixun	  shouce,	  (Beijing:	  Jingji	  kexue	  chubanshe,	  1987),	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  23	  Li,	  “Hengxiang	  jingji	  lianhe	  de	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  gainian	  he	  zhuyao	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Another	  economic	  writer,	  Li	  Douhuan,	  argued	  that	  through	  economic	  integration,	  individual	  enterprises	  could	  overcome	  the	  boundaries	  imposed	  by	  national	  planning	  more	  easily:	  Horizontal	  economic	  integration	  is	  economic	  integration	  among	  enterprises	  that	  is	  built	  on	  the	  foundation	  of	  equality,	  voluntariness,	  and	  mutual	  benefits.	  It	  is	  related	  to	  traditional	  economic	  coordination,	  although	  the	  two	  terms	  are	  not	  exactly	  the	  same.	  Economic	  coordination	  originates	  from	  socialized	  mass	  production.	  It	  is	  promoted	  with	  advancement	  of	  production	  technologies,	  deepening	  of	  the	  division	  of	  labor	  within	  a	  society,	  and	  improvement	  of	  the	  level	  of	  specialization…	  Horizontal	  economic	  integration	  is	  a	  type	  of	  economic	  coordination	  under	  certain	  specific	  conditions,	  and	  it	  is	  a	  new	  type	  of	  economic	  coordination	  that	  emerged	  in	  the	  post-­‐1979	  economic	  structural	  reform.	  Under	  socialist	  conditions,	  it	  is	  a	  breakaway	  from	  coordination	  that	  was	  compartmentalized	  within	  regions.	  It	  breaks	  through	  regional	  boundaries	  and	  promotes	  coordination	  among	  enterprises	  under	  the	  governance	  of	  different	  regional	  administrative	  jurisdictions.	  In	  the	  meantime,	  it	  also	  refers	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  economic	  integration	  between	  different	  departments,	  enterprises	  of	  different	  ownership	  structures,	  and	  different	  industries.24	  	  	  The	  main	  point	  to	  take	  away	  from	  the	  Chinese	  economic	  writers’	  discussions	  on	  horizontal	  economic	  relationships	  and	  integration	  were	  that	  they	  were	  outgrowths	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  that	  had	  been	  discussed	  and	  put	  into	  practice	  through	  fairs	  and	  contracts	  in	  the	  1960s.	  In	  the	  post-­‐1978	  discourse,	  critics	  had	  become	  more	  explicit	  in	  their	  argument	  that	  enterprises	  ought	  to	  have	  greater	  autonomy	  in	  entering	  into	  coordination	  relationships	  with	  each	  other.	  In	  other	  words,	  users	  and	  suppliers	  in	  the	  economy	  ought	  to	  have	  the	  freedom	  and	  autonomy	  to	  go	  beyond	  geographical	  or	  bureaucratic	  boundaries	  and	  exchange	  goods,	  technologies,	  labor,	  or	  information	  with	  each	  other.	  	  	   In	  practice,	  horizontal	  economic	  relationships	  and	  integration	  were	  similar	  to	  the	  outsourcing	  of	  production	  to	  independent,	  specialized	  factories	  that	  had	  emerged	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Li	  Douyuan,	  “Shilun	  hengxiang	  jingji	  lianhe	  de	  jingji	  jichu	  he	  zanlue	  mubiao,”	  Caijing	  yanjiu,	  July	  1986,	  3.	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during	  the	  Specialization	  and	  Coordination	  Movement	  in	  the	  1960s.	  In	  1986,	  for	  example,	  a	  bicycle	  assembly	  plant	  outsourced	  the	  production	  of	  various	  components	  to	  other	  smaller,	  specialized	  factories:	  “while	  the	  head	  company	  was	  mainly	  in	  charge	  of	  major	  manufacturing	  processes	  and	  the	  production	  of	  essential	  components,	  the	  production	  of	  more	  than	  60%	  of	  machine	  parts	  was	  outsourced	  to	  over	  100	  factories.”25	  The	  relationship	  between	  the	  main	  assembly	  plant	  and	  other	  individual	  factories	  was	  an	  instance	  of	  horizontal	  economic	  integration.	  	  	   Another	  example	  of	  horizontal	  economic	  integration	  was	  the	  Dongfeng	  Automobile	  Joint	  Operation	  Company	  (Dongfeng	  qiche	  gongye	  lianying	  gongsi).	  It	  was	  an	  integrated	  entity	  of	  the	  No.2	  Automobile	  Manufacturing	  Factory	  and	  various	  specialized	  factories,	  many	  of	  which	  used	  to	  be	  automobile	  factories	  that	  were	  in	  charge	  of	  producing	  entire	  vehicles.	  In	  order	  to	  increase	  efficiency	  and	  expand	  production,	  they	  were	  restructured	  to	  specialize	  in	  the	  production	  of	  machine	  parts.26	  The	  relatively	  long-­‐term,	  stable	  contractual	  coordination	  between	  the	  No.2	  Automobile	  Manufacturing	  Factories	  and	  its	  suppliers	  of	  components	  and	  machine	  parts	  would	  be	  considered	  as	  an	  instance	  of	  horizontal	  economic	  integration.	  	  	   Chinese	  economic	  commentators	  sought	  to	  explain	  the	  concepts	  of	  horizontal	  economic	  relationships	  and	  integration	  at	  great	  length.	  It	  is	  evident,	  however,	  that	  they	  were	  discussing	  patterns	  that	  would	  otherwise	  be	  described	  in	  the	  West	  under	  the	  rubric	  of	  market	  coordination.	  Economic	  writers	  found	  themselves	  at	  pains	  to	  accommodate	  the	  discussion	  on	  market	  coordination	  in	  the	  socialist	  context,	  and	  came	  up	  with	  terms	  such	  as	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination,	  horizontal	  economic	  relationships	  and	  horizontal	  economic	  integration.	  In	  a	  market	  economy,	  these	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Sun	  Shancheng,	  “Chuangjian	  qiye	  qunti,	  fazhan	  hengxiang	  jingji—changzhou	  shi	  fazhan	  qiye	  qunti	  qianxi,”	  Changzhou	  gongxueyuan	  xuebao	  2	  (1986),	  34.	  26	  Guojia	  jingwei	  tizhi	  gaigeju,	  “Dongfeng	  qiche	  gongye	  lianying	  gongsi	  dali	  zuzhi	  jingji	  lianhe,”	  in	  
Fazhan	  zhongde	  hengxiang	  jingji	  lianhe	  (Beijing:	  Qiye	  guanli	  chubanshe,	  1986),	  150-­‐153.	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economic	  terms	  would	  represent	  any	  form	  of	  exchange	  between	  buyers	  and	  sellers.	  In	  the	  Chinese	  economy,	  writers	  not	  only	  needed	  to	  fit	  the	  discussions	  of	  market	  relationships	  under	  the	  context	  of	  Marxist	  social	  sciences,	  but	  also	  needed	  to	  grapple	  with	  the	  challenge	  of	  national	  planning.	  They	  called	  for	  greater	  enterprise	  autonomy,	  argued	  against	  rigid	  central	  planning	  and	  highlighted	  the	  need	  for	  horizontal	  economic	  relationships	  and	  integration.	  These	  arguments	  were,	  in	  essence,	  what	  would	  be	  described	  as	  market	  reforms	  in	  the	  West.	  Indeed,	  with	  the	  lifting	  of	  taboos	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  the	  advancement	  of	  Opening	  and	  Reform	  in	  1978,	  some	  writers	  started	  to	  discuss	  the	  concept	  of	  market	  openly.	  For	  example,	  in	  1980,	  the	  economic	  writer	  Wang	  Dezhong	  related	  market	  coordination	  to	  horizontal	  economic	  relationships:	  As	  we	  all	  know,	  the	  original	  meaning	  of	  market	  is	  a	  place	  for	  the	  exchange	  of	  things.	  Later,	  it	  was	  extended	  to	  the	  exchange	  or	  circulation	  of	  commodities	  in	  the	  economic	  sense…	  in	  the	  capital	  society,	  capitalist	  commodity	  production	  took	  the	  place	  of	  simple	  commodity	  production,	  and	  production	  of	  commodity	  developed	  to	  the	  highest	  level.	  Almost	  everything	  was	  in	  the	  form	  of	  commodities	  and	  the	  market	  was	  everywhere.	  Therefore,	  the	  market	  emerged	  and	  developed	  with	  the	  division	  of	  labor	  in	  the	  society	  and	  the	  exchange	  of	  commodities.	  Just	  as	  Lenin	  has	  pointed	  out:	  ”Wherever	  there	  is	  division	  of	  labor	  and	  exchange	  of	  commodities,	  there	  is	  a	  market.”27	  	  Wang	  argued	  that	  the	  emergence	  of	  markets	  was	  a	  natural	  outgrowth	  of	  improvement	  in	  the	  division	  of	  labor	  in	  the	  society.	  With	  higher	  level	  of	  specialization	  and	  coordination,	  market	  coordination	  seemed	  to	  be	  the	  next	  logical	  step	  to	  take	  in	  coordinating	  the	  supply	  and	  demand	  in	  the	  economy.	  	  	  	   Outside	  observers	  have	  looked	  at	  the	  market	  reform	  in	  1978	  as	  part	  of	  a	  deeper	  ideological,	  political	  and	  economic	  sea	  change	  of	  the	  "post-­‐Mao"	  era	  in	  which	  markets	  became	  the	  new	  line.	  However,	  this	  chapter	  has	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  very	  close	  approach	  to	  market	  coordination	  represented	  by	  the	  horizontal	  economic	  relationship	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Wang	  Dezhong,	  “Lun	  shehui	  zhuyi	  shichang,”	  Jingji	  kexue	  4	  (1980).	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argument	  stemmed	  from	  the	  same	  set	  of	  problems	  that	  Chinese	  enterprises	  had	  encountered	  since	  the	  Great	  Leap	  Forward.	  Chinese	  economic	  thinkers	  and	  actors	  had	  been	  presented	  with	  the	  challenge	  of	  coordinating	  broad-­‐front	  development,	  and	  they	  had	  come	  up	  with	  solutions	  including	  the	  complete	  factory	  model,	  principle	  of	  diversification,	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination	  (contracts	  and	  fairs),	  as	  well	  as	  horizontal	  economic	  relationships	  and	  integration.	  Therefore,	  the	  market	  reform	  in	  1978	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  direct	  outgrowths	  of	  problem-­‐solving	  efforts	  on	  the	  enterprise	  	  level	  that	  could	  be	  traced	  to	  early	  1950s,	  when	  the	  industrialization	  process	  just	  started	  to	  unfold	  in	  Communist	  China.	  	  	  







	  	   The	  subjects	  of	  this	  study	  are	  individual	  enterprises	  and	  how	  economic	  decision-­‐making	  unfolded	  on	  the	  micro	  level.	  Communist	  China	  had	  witnessed	  three	  decades	  of	  turbulence	  from	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  republic	  in	  1949	  to	  1978.	  Dramatic	  changes	  were	  unfolding	  politically,	  ideologically,	  economically,	  and	  in	  every	  aspect	  of	  people’s	  lives.	  Given	  such	  upheaval,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  overlook	  the	  smallest,	  yet	  most	  fundamental,	  business	  decision-­‐making	  units	  in	  the	  Chinese	  economy—individual	  factories.	  This	  thesis	  focuses	  on	  solutions	  and	  business	  models	  that	  individual	  enterprises	  came	  up	  with	  in	  order	  to	  tackle	  a	  series	  of	  problems	  associated	  with	  the	  challenge	  of	  broad	  front	  development,	  confronting	  the	  industrialization	  process	  from	  the	  start.	  	  It	  has	  explored,	  in	  particular,	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  enterprises	  responded	  to	  uneven	  growth	  and	  sectoral	  imbalances	  characteristic	  of	  the	  broad-­‐front	  challenge,	  most	  commonly	  manifested	  at	  the	  micro-­‐level	  as	  incomplete	  supply	  chains.	  It	  has	  traced	  the	  development	  of	  complete	  and	  diversified	  enterprises	  during	  the	  Great	  Leap	  Forward,	  the	  rise	  of	  Specialization	  and	  Coordination	  Movement	  in	  the	  1960s,	  the	  reversal	  from	  enterprise-­‐level	  contractual	  coordination	  back	  to	  complete	  factories	  during	  the	  Cultural	  Revolution,	  and	  lastly,	  the	  revival	  of	  specialization	  and	  coordination	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Gang	  of	  Four	  and	  its	  culmination	  to	  full-­‐blown	  market	  reforms	  in	  post-­‐1978	  years.	  It	  has	  offered	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  emergence	  of	  market	  coordination	  after	  1978	  stemmed	  from	  a	  series	  of	  concrete	  steps	  in	  problem-­‐solving	  on	  the	  enterprise	  level,	  since	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	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Great	  Leap	  Forward.	  These	  observations	  could	  not	  have	  been	  possible	  without	  focusing	  on	  individual	  factories	  as	  the	  main	  subject	  of	  study.	  	  This	  thesis	  has	  zeroed	  in	  on	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  on	  the	  micro	  level.	  For	  this	  reason,	  it	  has	  been	  able	  to	  identify	  important	  continuities	  in	  the	  business	  history	  of	  Communist	  China	  that	  might	  otherwise	  have	  been	  overlooked.	  The	  introduction	  of	  markets	  and	  market	  coordination	  into	  an	  ideologically-­‐framed	  economy,	  to	  outside	  observers,	  would	  seem	  to	  represent	  a	  dramatic	  change.	  The	  market	  reform	  of	  China	  that	  started	  to	  unfold	  in	  1978	  was	  preceded	  by	  the	  Cultural	  Revolution,	  a	  period	  in	  which	  capitalism	  was	  under	  violent	  attack	  under	  the	  rule	  of	  the	  Gang	  of	  Four.	  Therefore,	  the	  year	  1978	  was	  perceived	  as	  a	  watershed	  in	  Chinese	  history	  that	  marked	  the	  miraculous	  economic	  growth	  as	  well	  as	  full-­‐blown,	  nation-­‐wide	  market	  reform.	  If	  national	  planning	  and	  Marxist	  social	  sciences	  were	  ideological	  commitments	  of	  Communist	  China	  prior	  to	  1978,	  market	  coordination	  became	  the	  new	  orthodoxy	  after	  the	  Opening	  and	  Reform.	  	  Observations	  on	  the	  enterprise	  level,	  however,	  would	  not	  support	  the	  line	  of	  argument	  described	  above.	  The	  findings	  of	  this	  study	  contradict	  the	  analysis	  on	  the	  macro	  level.	  Market	  coordination,	  expressed	  in	  terms	  of	  “horizontal	  economic	  relationships”	  or	  “horizontal	  economic	  integration”,	  was	  a	  direct	  outgrowth	  of	  enterprise-­‐level	  contractual	  coordination	  that	  emerged	  during	  the	  Specialization	  and	  Coordination	  Movement	  in	  the	  1960s.	  Efforts	  to	  grapple	  with	  the	  challenges	  of	  specialization	  and	  coordination	  began	  as	  early	  as	  the	  Great	  Leap	  Forward,	  when	  individual	  factories	  turned	  to	  the	  complete	  factory	  model	  or	  the	  diversified	  complete	  factory	  paradigm	  to	  fill	  in	  incomplete	  supply	  chains	  on	  their	  own.	  It	  was	  only	  through	  close-­‐up	  examination	  of	  changes	  on	  the	  enterprise	  level	  from	  journalistic	  discourse	  that	  conclusions	  drawn	  above	  were	  possible.	  In	  addition	  to	  shedding	  light	  on	  the	  market	  reform	  in	  1978,	  this	  study	  offers	  new	  perspectives	  on	  the	  Great	  Leap	  Forward	  in	  the	  1950s	  and	  the	  Cultural	  Revolution	  in	  the	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1960s.	  The	  GLF	  had	  been	  traditionally	  viewed	  as	  a	  series	  of	  irrational	  and	  purely	  ideological	  driven	  campaigns	  to	  industrialize	  the	  country	  at	  an	  unrealistic	  pace.	  This	  thesis,	  however,	  demonstrates	  that	  in	  addition	  to	  massive	  collectivization	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  people’s	  communes	  all	  over	  the	  country,	  important	  business	  decisions	  were	  being	  made	  on	  the	  enterprise	  level.	  Chinese	  economic	  actors	  recognized	  the	  need	  for	  coordination,	  but	  in	  light	  of	  poor	  transportation	  infrastructure	  and	  incomplete	  supply	  chains,	  producing	  all	  the	  required	  materials	  and	  intermediate	  goods	  in-­‐house	  seemed	  to	  be	  the	  logical	  solution.	  In	  other	  words,	  backyard	  furnaces	  might	  seem	  irrational	  in	  today’s	  context,	  but	  during	  the	  GLF,	  they	  could	  be	  understood	  as	  pioneers	  in	  the	  model	  of	  integrated	  iron	  and	  steel	  enterprises	  that	  combined	  the	  process	  of	  iron	  refining,	  steel	  making,	  steel	  rolling	  and	  the	  production	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  steel	  products.	  They	  not	  only	  met	  local	  demand	  for	  steel,	  but	  also	  tackled	  the	  problem	  of	  coordination	  internally	  within	  the	  enterprise.	  Therefore,	  as	  early	  as	  in	  the	  1950s,	  efforts	  to	  tackle	  problems	  of	  business	  development	  were	  made,	  and	  they	  had	  profound	  implications	  for	  the	  Chinese	  economy	  in	  later	  years.	  	  This	  thesis	  also	  highlights	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  Cultural	  Revolution	  represents	  a	  setback	  to	  China’s	  economic	  development.	  Historians	  had	  noted	  the	  economic	  stagnation	  of	  China	  during	  the	  Cultural	  Revolution	  and	  that	  the	  movement	  had	  not	  only	  important	  political	  implications,	  but	  economic	  ramifications	  as	  well.	  This	  study	  confirms	  the	  appraisal	  of	  the	  Cultural	  Revolution	  as	  a	  disruption	  and	  setback	  to	  China's	  overall	  "modernization”	  and	  emphasizes	  that	  the	  positive	  trajectories	  emerging	  after	  the	  Great	  Leap	  Forward	  were	  reversed	  due	  to	  the	  disruption.	  Recall	  that	  the	  Cultural	  Revolution	  disrupted	  and	  dismantled	  the	  Specialization	  and	  Coordination	  Movement,	  during	  which	  enterprise-­‐level	  contractual	  coordination	  was	  promoted	  as	  the	  new	  business	  model	  in	  lieu	  of	  complete	  of	  complete	  factories	  and	  diversification.	  Discussions	  on	  enterprise-­‐level	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coordination	  also	  led	  to	  the	  organization	  of	  fairs	  (“coordination	  conferences”)	  and	  the	  use	  of	  contracts.	  Chinese	  economy	  had	  been	  on	  the	  threshold	  of	  market	  coordination	  in	  the	  1960s.	  Had	  the	  Cultural	  Revolution	  not	  taken	  place,	  market	  reform	  could	  have	  unfolded	  in	  China	  a	  decade	  earlier	  than	  1978.	  	  By	  1980s,	  Chinese	  economic	  writers	  not	  only	  discussed	  extensively	  the	  topic	  of	  market	  coordination,	  they	  also	  started	  to	  explore	  the	  ramifications	  of	  “administrative	  coordination”	  in	  developed	  capitalist	  economies	  of	  the	  kind	  described	  by	  Alfred	  D.	  Chandler.1	  They	  recognized	  that	  market	  coordination	  was	  not	  perfect,	  and	  that	  the	  emergence	  of	  trusts,	  monopolies,	  syndicates,	  and	  konzern-­‐	  or	  zaibatsu-­‐style	  multi-­‐unit	  enterprises	  characteristic	  of	  "managerial	  capitalism"2	  could	  be	  more	  efficient	  ways	  of	  improving	  enterprise-­‐level	  coordination.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  rise	  of	  what	  might	  be	  regarded	  as	  planning	  in	  Western	  capitalist	  economies,	  implicit	  in	  the	  idea	  of	  "administrative	  coordination,"	  was	  of	  particular	  interest	  to	  Chinese	  economists	  as	  well.	  The	  convergence	  of	  capitalist	  and	  socialist	  coordination	  in	  this	  emerging	  line	  of	  thinking	  offers	  possibilities	  for	  further	  research.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Discussions	  on	  administrative	  coordination	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Alfred	  D.	  Chandler,	  The	  Visible	  Hand:	  
The	  Managerial	  Revolution	  in	  American	  Business	  (Cambridge:	  The	  Belknap	  Press	  of	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1977),	  pp.	  7-­‐8,	  11.	  Chandler	  also	  provided	  a	  comparison	  between	  administrative	  coordination	  and	  market	  coordination	  (pp.	  208,	  453,	  383),	  as	  well	  as	  the	  emergence	  of	  administrative	  coordination	  in	  the	  machinery-­‐making	  industries	  (pp.	  309-­‐312).	  	  2	  Chandler	  discussed	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  managerial	  capitalism	  in	  The	  Visible	  Hand	  on	  pp.	  491-­‐493,	  497-­‐498.	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